


NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

By

DON LUIGI STURZO



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and ecclesiastical authorities were not, and are not, aimed at liberty, society, or community as such, but at the exclusivism or the excess implicit in their respective "ism" forms, which theorize them and raise them to the rank of absolute and fundamental principles.

By the very fact that they are characterized as such, they cannot but assume a finalistic nature of their own, in that the realization of a principle so viewed is regarded as a prevalent good that must in all cases be obtained—the more prevalent the good, the more fundamental the principle—so that if a principle like nationality comes to be regarded (as indeed it did in the course of its historical development) as the unique principle, it becomes simultaneously an all-absorbing goal, to which all else is subordinate. Hence, inasmuch as men of theory and of practice, in accepting the implication given the three words by the added "ism," had accepted a graded order of ends more or less prevalent, of principles more or less absolute (unique), there sprang up a profusion of theory and of practice, with the result that there came into existence not only one liberalism but a thousand, not only one socialism but at least a hundred, not only one communism but at least ten. This multiplicity of meanings must be placed in relationship with the complexity of the subject matter and of the problems connected therewith; hence liberalism as a philosophical, political and economic theory has had in the past and continues to have many and varied facets, while socialism and communism have had considerably fewer owing partly to their materialistic and practical character and partly to their philosophic poverty.

At all events there can be no doubt of the fact that between liberty and liberalism, between society and socialism, between community and communism, there exists not merely the difference between an abstract and its alleged concrete (or vice versa, as the case may be), but also the differ-

ence between a natural principle and its excess or deformation—deformation which might in fact be pushed to a point where it becomes a negation of the principle itself, as might not be difficult to prove in the case of community and communism.

The Meaning of Nationalism

This introduction leads to a better understanding of the scope of the word nationalism because the addition of “ism” to “national” gives evidence of some excess or deformation with reference to the original conception. The nation appears with excessive traits which so alter its natural characteristics, that its theoretical basis comes to be a fixed principle believed fundamental and its realization is thought of as a supreme goal. In consequence the nation becomes not only a political *primum* but also a sociological and even an ethical *primum*.

Such, in brief, is the error or fallacy lurking in the term *nationalism* itself. Nationalism, too, must be classed along with the other already mentioned “isms” which during the nineteenth century usurped the place rightfully belonging to the concepts from which they originated. Thanks to nationalism, the nations’ character as the community of a people organized on the basis of its traditions, history, language and culture, has come to be perverted; for nationalism is interpreted as being the principal efficient and final cause of the community.)

Nationalism, too, takes on a broad variety of colors ranging from the most extravagant to the quite moderate and all the way from the philosophic to the sentimental. For this reason it is difficult to classify it and give it boundaries that will be accepted by all; and if we venture to define its essence as we have sought to do, we shall find some who in good faith will accuse us of using too lurid colors in depicting it

and of giving the word a significance beyond its common acceptance. Having made, however, an analysis at once philological and sociological, we have the right to advert to its results. On the other hand, we readily admit that—logic aside—there are strictly political and sentimental nationalisms which are benign in nature.

(To confound patriotism with nationalism is to err not only linguistically but also politically.) Nevertheless, we have to admit that for many the two substantives were and are quite equivalent. Similarly, for many, even today, the affirmation of freedom or the maintenance of a constitutional system where political freedoms are regulated corresponds to liberalism. And how often have Catholic social doctrines been classified as socialism and communism! The fact of the matter is that the general public is seldom able to get at the intrinsic link between words and their significance, but subscribes by way of approximation to those meanings which prevail at any given time.

Why then, it may be asked, did the Popes condemn liberalism, socialism and communism without qualification, aiming their condemnations at the accepted meaning of those words at the moment the condemnation was pronounced, and disregarding the existence of attenuated forms (in some cases even attacking forms which were believed to be attenuated); whereas in the case of nationalism Pius XI (the only one of the past Popes who has expressly and on more than one occasion adverted to the problem) was at pains to make a distinction between “moderate” and “excessive” nationalism, directing his warnings only against the latter? ²

² In his speech of December 3, 1930, to the cardinals and prelates met in consistory, Pius XI spoke against “harsh and egoistic nationalism.” In the encyclical letter *Caritate Christi compulsi* of May 3, 1932, he draws a clear distinction between nationalism as love of fatherland and exaggerated nationalism: “Right order of Christian charity does not disapprove of lawful love of country and a sentiment of justifiable nationalism; on the contrary it controls, sanctifies and enlivens them. If, however, egoism abusing this love of country and exaggerating this sentiment of nationalism, insinuates

For this there may have been several reasons, but the one which appears most convincing is that the Popes, in condemning an error whose index is the word which expresses it, are not themselves creating either the word or the significance given it, but are making clear its meaning with reference to the error it is considered to contain, according to the general understanding in certain places or times. It may well be that the word which epitomizes the condemned error may have had from the very beginning other meanings, or that it may have acquired such in the course of time (who does not know how liable words are to be changed in their meaning?) and hence it is quite conceivable that these other meanings may not come within the range of the condemnation.³

For example, in England Catholics may belong both to the Liberal and the Labour parties (the latter calling itself Socialist). With reference to the Labour Party, after the publication of the *Quadragesimo Anno* where the famous words were written: "No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a true Socialist," there arose a broad discussion to which Cardinal Bourne put an end by saying that "in this country a man or woman is free to join the

itself into the relations between people and people, there is no excess that will not seem justified; and that which between individuals would be judged blameworthy by all is now considered lawful and praiseworthy if it is done in the name of this exaggerated nationalism." In his allocution to the teachers of the Italian Catholic Action on September 6, 1938, he once more, after many similar speeches, denounced exaggerated nationalism "which does not unite peoples but throws them one against the other." (*Osservatore Romano*, No. 208 of 1938.)

³ Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in his address on World Conflict delivered July 23, 1942, used, in reference to *nationalism*, the very same qualification as Pius XI, as witness the following passage: "One of the greatest of all obstacles which in the past have impeded human progress and afforded breeding grounds for dictators has been extreme nationalism. All will agree that nationalism and its spirit are essential to the healthy and normal political and economic life of a people, but when policies of nationalism—political, economic, social and moral—are carried to such extremes as to exclude and prevent necessary policies of international co-operation, they become dangerous and deadly."

political party which makes the greatest appeal to his sympathy and understanding." Naturally enough he added that it was necessary to be on one's guard "against erroneous principles," and especially never to commit oneself or one's conscience "into the keeping of any political party."⁴ Obviously the liberalism or the socialism of those British Catholics (assuming them to remain true Catholics) cannot be identical with the liberalism and socialism condemned by the Popes. And who does not recall that for a long time the phrase *Catholic Socialism* was used, and is still used in Austria (even after the condemnation of Pius IX and Leo XIII), to indicate the *Social* school of Catholics? In Italy between the eighties and the turn of the century, two notable books appeared: *Catholic Socialism* by Francesco Nitti (who later became prime minister) and *Christian Socialism* by Count Eduardo Soderini (a prominent Catholic).

With these reservations, it may be said that it is the common understanding among Catholics that, in speaking of liberalism, socialism and communism, as theories, one means the *systems* condemned by the Popes. The same is not true in the case of nationalism, for while with regard to the three aforementioned concepts the Popes found that they rested upon erroneous theories which were matters of common public opinion, with regard to nationalism they recognized that the same public opinion was divided, often giving to the word nationalism the meaning of a marked love of country, in contrast to the internationalism of Socialists and Communists (Second and Third Internationals), who, because of an ideal either broadly humanitarian or narrowly class-conscious, discounted or denied (at least as a polemical method) love of country. We say "as a polemical method" because both the German Socialists of the Second International in 1914 and the Russian Communists of the Third

⁴ See Luigi Sturzo, *Politics and Morality*, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1938, Chap. V: The Ethics of Political Collaboration.

International in 1941 demonstrated by their deeds that they knew how to fight even for their geographic and political fatherlands.

Be that as it may: when Pius XI disapproved of nationalism, he was confronted by two concepts current in common opinion, the first of which did not have as its basis anti-Christian theories, or at least failed to show them, while hiding behind the cloak of a love of fatherland (a bit more highly colored than other loves). Hence, the Pope limited his condemnation to anti-Christian nationalism, which he himself called "excessive."

In so doing Pius XI was prompted by two practical considerations of some importance. The first was that of inducing nationalist associations and movements, often created for sentimental motives or for the defense of the bourgeoisie and of the middle classes against the excesses of workers' parties, to reconsider their nationalism and so bring it within the limits of an equitable valuation of the interests of one's own country. The second was that of avoiding the consequence that any just defense of one's own nation or nationality or of a national minority should be classified as anti-Catholic and anti-Christian and as condemned by the Pope. This would have resulted: (a) in convalidating the accusation that Catholics as such are antinational; (b) in lending weight to the unpatriotic pretensions of internationalists during the most acute phases of political struggle, such as was then going on in France.⁵

Although the same might be said of the many varieties of liberalism or socialism born in a century of fermentation of ideas and political attitudes in all countries, yet one datum is easily ascertainable: that the abstract ideas of liberty, society, and community, have in themselves an ethical content whose negation or attenuation implies an error, while

⁵ See Maurice Vaussard, *Enquête sur le nationalisme*, Paris; Editions Spes, 1924.

NATION AND NATIONALISM

the word nation is not a logical abstraction, has not a meaning transcending the mere historical fact of a people possessed of such and such characteristics, and finally does not imply an error when one modifies its physiognomy. Those who know how accustomed the Latin mentality is to such formal schemes and how strictly scholasticism has fixed their type will understand the jealous care that Rome brings to the fixation of the relationship between the word and its essential and permanent significance. The Anglo-Saxon is, in general, more pragmatically minded; he does not link, but isolates; he is not set on synthesizing, but is satisfied with approximations. On that account, he can easily surmount the ideological and systematic implication of a word (or of a fact) by taking it for what it is worth at the moment—*hic et nunc*.

The result has been a series of misunderstandings between the Catholic and non-Catholic worlds that makes difficult any real appreciation of certain pontifical interventions and the problems connected therewith, whenever according to common opinion it becomes hard to understand the historical facts that have given origin to said pontifical interventions. The last of these, namely, Pius XI's strictures on excessive nationalism (which, as we shall see, has taken on the colorings of totalitarian and racial nationalism) deserves to be analyzed further than is the wont in current journalistic polemics, with a view to determining its sociological and spiritual implications.

II.

Modern Theories of Nation

Nothing important and characteristic affects society without an intrinsic reason and a historical occasion. Whatever novelty comes to be grafted upon human processes will be but the development, natural or violent, of motives which

had not been hitherto noticed, but which in the linking-up of free initiatives with social conditioning were made efficient and vital.

Since in the dialectic of sociology (not that of Hegel or Marx, but real and human dialectic), today's affirmation originates from yesterday's negation while producing in its turn tomorrow's negation—and from different viewpoints the negation and the affirmation are convertible—it becomes necessary whenever something new is affirmed at a given historical moment to seek out its characteristics, in order to define the negation it contains.

To carry out such an analysis in the case of nationalism as it appeared in the last century, it is necessary first of all to ascertain what were, at the moment of its appearance, the theoretical and practical positings of the idea of "nation."

There were, in fact, three great historical affirmations between 1789, the beginning of the French Revolution, and 1848, the historical date of national and social revolutions.

1. The first was the French affirmation: *nation* was then taken to mean the country, the State, and the people as a moral and political unit, facing the monarch, considered as the head of the State, but only insofar as he was the first citizen and the first public servant. The three meanings given to *nation* were equivalent, inasmuch as the people (the Latin *populus*) were the whole country and the latter was organized as the State according to popular will. Hence the opposition of *nation* to *roi* (king), in order to deny the previous system of absolute monarchy and to affirm the collective will of the people.

Thus the word *nation* became the assertion of a moral and political personality acquired by the people. The paternalist and patrimonial State was a thing of the past. In the old regime the people had been considered as not of age; the territory as patrimony of the crown; wars as of interest only

to the king; State and crown finances as one. Only with Richelieu was a beginning made toward effectuating a political distinction between the ruling house and France, not enough, however, to preclude Louis XIV from saying: "*L'État c'est moi!*" The *nation* that rose up against such a monarchical system owing to the law of historical dialectics wore revolutionary and democratic colors and built up on the basis of popular sovereignty the new personality of the country: thus was born the France of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*.

2. The second affirmation peculiar to the idea of nation came from Germany, and Fichte, with his famous *Letters to the German Nation*, was its prophet. The nation was taken to mean an idea which realizes itself, a spirit which becomes fact; the individuals belonging to it are only phenomena of a reality which we think of as collective insofar as we live in it and for it. The nation as people and culture was conceived as potential reality which creates and develops itself through interior forces.

This immanent conception of the nation found its literary and philosophic fulfillment in the romantic period, and its political expression in the federalism of a number of small entities striving toward unity. This lasted as long as Hegel's conception of the "Nation-State" as supreme and immanent realization of the "Idea" prevailed. It was then that the Prussian State (which Hegel had in mind when he was setting down its *divine* characteristics) absorbed traditional Germany, which was feudal and federalist. The Reich became the only expression of the Germanic nation in its interior reality conceived as "Power and Force."

The further evolution of the concept of immanent nation has come through the idea of race and through a merging of the philosophic ideologies of Fichte and Hegel, of Bismarck's Power and Force and of the materialistic myths of

Blood and Soil. Its realization is to be found in the National-Socialist Third Reich.⁶

3. The third affirmation of nation to come to the surface in the nineteenth century was that of the political unity and independence of every nation, such as had been formed through tradition, history, language, culture and religion. It appealed to those countries subject to a foreign State or partitioned among several, often nonautonomous, States. Giuseppe Mazzini symbolized this idea. This ferment, which permeated Italy, divided into many kingdoms and partially subjected to Austria, was such as to excite the wars and revolts of Greece and other Balkan countries subject to the Crescent, prompt the nationality and independence movement within the Hapsburg Empire, and cause the fanning anew of Irish and Polish revolts. What tended above all in the nineteenth century to bring about the formation of a new national consciousness was the romantic movement which affected the literature, legends, and sagas of every country; the revaluation of particular languages as against languages of general culture, used only by the higher classes and at court. From this sprang a popular movement orientated toward the idea of freedom, first disseminated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and later by the social movements which reached down to the working classes, at that time kept in oppressive and miserable conditions.

In this historical phase, accordingly, we find the idea of nation taking on a threefold aspect: first, nation as popular will organized in the State (France); second, nation as soul of a people which realizes itself through innate virtue (Germany); third, nation as an autonomous and free political personality (Italy, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Belgium, Bohemia, Hungary and, later on, the Balkan countries).

⁶ See *Nationalism, A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Oxford: The University Press, 1939.

Nation in History

In order to grasp the inner significance of the three aspects which the idea of nation took in Europe between the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, it is necessary to examine in some detail what *nation* has been in its reality.

Nation means individuality of a people; and this cannot come about without a stable geographical contiguity, a historical and cultural tradition, an economic interest. When to these preliminary conditions is added an awakened consciousness on the part of the people of one of those sociological syntheses which only great ideas, such as religion, liberty and independence, can bring about, then there develops the collective *personality* which we call nation. For us the *individuality* of a people means only the *de facto* differentiation between one ethnical group and another. On the other hand, the *personality* of a people indicates the active consciousness which springs out of the differentiated group, giving the latter its own cultural and political stamp.

Hence the starting point in the formative process of a nation is one of *distinction* between contiguous and even related ethnical groups, which later tends to become one of opposition against those who in any way undermine its formation or block its developments and conquests. Indeed, historical experience and sociological reason make us aware that, ordinarily, the personality of ethnical groups in general and that of nation, in its political expression, are most frequently born in opposition and struggle, in defense of their own religion and language, traditional customs and family rights.

A special and interesting instance, which has not been brought to light by historians or sociologists, is to be found in the concept of nation such as it developed in the four-

teenth and fifteenth centuries during the ecclesiastical struggles which stirred the entire Catholic world. At that time national consciousness was beginning to assert its hold over several European countries in consequence of the transition of vernaculars from spoken to written languages, leading to the consolidation of kingdoms, such as those of France, Castile, Aragon, England, Scotland, Portugal, Bavaria, Austria, Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary, while the Italian Renaissance, the flowering of universities and of many other lay and ecclesiastical cultural centers gave an exceptional role to the intellectual classes.

Nations were not then conceived as political States (a wholly modern development); then not the "State" but the "kingdom" (leaving the communes out of account) was the politico-feudal unit. Nations did not lay claim to independence from a ruling house foreign to their population and language. What St. Joan of Arc stood for in France was something unique, achieved not without struggle, and for its originality and extraordinary character, neither followed up nor imitated. "Nations" then upheld their rights against the Roman Church; that is, against the international or supranational power that had powerfully organized its external structure "from Avignon especially" throughout Christendom. There were two motives of opposition: the economic one of tithes, taxes and other levies which were to be paid to the Roman Curia and to its legates, and the ecclesiastical one of the appointments of beneficiaries and of bishops which the Popes had reserved to themselves or retained control of either from the canonical or from the economic point of view.

But beneath the juridical and economic motives there were stirring deeper questions. The chief one was that of the council-superior to the Pope,⁷ which appeared like a

⁷ See Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State*, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

democratization of the Church and represented a stand of the periphery against the center, of the intellectual bodies (universities) against the disciplinary organisms, of the lay against the ecclesiastical power, of the nations against the supranation. Throughout the debates of the councils and in utterances made outside the councils there emerged the consciousness of the nation which, failing as yet to be a political fact and evading any ecclesiastical definition, relied for its strength on the various kingdoms that made up its structural whole.

Hence, in the councils of Pisa, Constance and Basel (during the first decades of the fifteenth century), we find that the commissions of the councils are set up according to nationality and that even the concordats of Constance in 1418 were formulated for each nation or group of nations and with their representatives; not for each state between the Popes and the monarchs.

The sociological aspect of the then rising nation can be said to be more or less similar to that of the nation whose rebirth took place at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Different only were the terms of reference through which national individuality became conscious of its personality. While the nations of the fifteenth century developed at the expense of the medieval papacy (and with the Reformation at the expense of European Catholicity), nineteenth-century nationalities developed at the expense of absolute monarchies and of paternalistic regimes. But whatever the historical contours, national personality in its nature remains always the same and develops with its own inner rhythm.

The Personality of a Nation

In order to get a clear notion of this constant historical fact of the formation and development of national person-

ality, one must go back to the primary concept of community. For the nation in its essence is not the simple political organization of society (State) nor the religious organization (Church) nor a voluntary society to be freely formed and dissolved at the option of its members. It is rather the moral binding sense of a people which, becoming aware of itself, seeks to distinguish itself from any other and to arrange its existence in the best possible manner according to historical circumstances. Thus the nation may tend to become a unitary democracy (France) or a federal democracy (United States of America) or a national church (England in the sixteenth century) or a national federation (Switzerland) or a national unitary State (Italy in the *Risorgimento*) or a bilingual liberal State (Belgium).

But once a country or a people has succeeded in developing a consciousness of its own national personality and in affirming it in the struggles with which history has confronted it, there is no stopping. Like all living moral personalities, the nation will have its increment and development, its involution and decrease, all necessary stages of life until the moment arrives when the national personality itself will either fade away because its physical subject has altogether or nearly perished (as in the case of the Armenians and the Assyrians), or will be transferred to a larger and different personality, reviving in a broader circle of ethnical, cultural and political unity, as Montenegro in Yugoslavia; Sicily in Italy; Provence in France; Bavaria in Germany; and Vermont, Texas or California in the United States.

Let us fix two historical phases: that of the formation of the personality of a nation and that of its affirmation and increment, and we shall see, and the whole world will bear witness, that every nation tends to preserve its existence, personality and future with all its energies and at whatever cost. There is something here that transcends the fact of an ephemeral existence and a transitory feeling, which goes

down to the very roots of human society and of its formation in natural communities.

Since the prevalent sociological conceptions, from the positivist and the Hegelian to the neoracist, might give rise to some misunderstandings with regard to our statements, it is well to warn the reader that in speaking of personality of the nation we do not ascribe to any social body whatsoever a "spirit" of its own or a "soul" or an entity or reality beyond the single individuals who compose it. For us a collective personality, whatever its nature, be it family or nation, State or class, religious or philanthropic community, or even humanity's social whole, is only the simultaneous reflection of the consciousness of the single members who understand the aim for whose attainment they have gotten together to co-operate, or who understand that aim in a different way and dissent therefrom, so that in the end there comes about that maximum and that minimum of consent and of reciprocal influence which create action.

This is not the place to analyze the process whereby the collective consciousness of a people or of a nation is formed nor the factors into which it resolves itself.⁸ Let it suffice here to note that for such consciousness to emerge the social group must have pre-existent within itself those values that form the nexus of a natural community, such as tradition, customs, language, territory, social rights and economic interests. Men living together converge upon these essential values of life, even though the community never had an independent political configuration of its own. The totality of these values, idealized as a reality either to be attained or to be defended, forms the collective consciousness of the nation.

Moral and cultural personality, therefore (in the broad

⁸ See Luigi Sturzo, *Inner Laws of Society*, P. J. Kenedy & Sons, New York, 1944.

meaning of the word, as a "particular stage of advancement in civilization"), is never an entity by itself, above individuals, or a reality that incarnates itself (as the French say, often abusively), as witness the talk about a permanent soul of France, or of Germany, which realizes itself from generation to generation.

Such pseudophilosophic and pseudosociological conceptions of society have entered into common language through idealistic philosophy from Fichte and Hegel on and through positivist sociology, especially Durkheim's, and have recently been applied to the historical case of nation, raising the latter to the status of a primary social constituent and the ultimate goal of social man.

Our controversy on the philosophic plane is with Hegel's idealism and on the sociological plane with Durkheim's "sociologism," though it is our considerate opinion that the theorizers of "nation," who claim to be followers of Hegel and of Durkheim, are guilty of an extralogical omission in transferring to the nation the philosophic *primum* and the sociological *primum* of their respective authors. At this point old and new errors meet, though the alleged connections between the two planes are entirely groundless.

Moral Limits of the Rights of Nation

If the nation, as a people's personality and consciousness of such personality, is a historical and natural fact, it must have its exigencies and its limits and, morally speaking, its rights and its duties, for the same reason that we attribute similar qualifications to every human community, be it the family or the State.

Manifold are the problems that issue from the fact of nation, according to the manner in which the consciousness of a nation originates and takes shape in the people and according to the historical form of its outward projection.

We are confronted with problems relating to a given historical fact; relating to, yet distinguished from, the problems of human society as such; they assume, therefore, a particular and concrete aspect, never a general and abstract one. Leaving out of consideration the historical facts of nations as conceived or concretized in ancient times or in the Middle Ages or in the Renaissance and limiting ourselves to the last phase, from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day, we see first of all the nation arising out of a conflict between historical rights of the higher classes and political ideals of liberty and democracy of the middle classes. This conflict is resolved either through revolts or through wars.


North America was the first instance in point; no one then spoke of an American nation, but the various English colonies in America felt themselves ripe for their erection into independent states governed by the people. The awareness of such maturity and the related assertions of independence and of self-government which led to a confederation were born of their struggle against England and therefore originated in revolt and war. Confederation and subsequent federal government were the political forms used to assert the independence of what was later to become the "American nation."

If we ask ourselves the nature of the principle upon which the American nation claimed its political personality, the answers will vary according to the criteria used. We think that in the process of civilization the colony, if it is ripe for independence, has the right to obtain it by demanding it or even by fighting for it. Such maturity is indicated not only by cultural and economic conditions, but also by the existence of the consciousness of having reached it. The independence of national nuclei is a right which comes before the historical facts (owing to which it was either lost or never reached) and in given historical circumstances such a right

may justly assert itself. (At the same time it is true that the political independence of a community, which we of today call a nation, is also conditioned by the totality of historical international factors and that therefore it is unquestionably a relative and not an absolute right, provided of course that the community in question be in full enjoyment of all the natural rights belonging to individuals, families and the moral personality itself of a people.

The case of France, to which we have already referred in enucleating the meaning of the word *nation*, followed in close sequence that of the American colonies. And, in fact, it is proper to note that the democratization of France, or better, the loosening of the juridical and class ties of her *ancien régime*, was the historical occasion of the germination of the idea of *nation*, and that the word *république* was not taken to mean a popular government without king, but in the sense of a mixed government of people and king. And when, owing to a series of revolutionary events, the monarchy was abolished, it was only then that the expression *sovereign nation* was coined.

We will not hazard any ethical judgment upon the various phases of the French Revolution (nor, for that matter, upon the American and Italian revolutions), but content ourselves with certifying the fact, sociologically ascertainable, that the idea of nation is bound up with the larger participation in the common life of that class or social group which has consciousness of it and which makes of it a motive for its collective activity. The nation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the nation of the university men, the Humanists, the ecclesiastics and nobles, and the courts acting against the papacy; the nation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the nation of the Encyclopedists, the Romanticists, the bourgeois and the mercantilists, both in Europe and in America, acting against the absolute and paternalistic monarchies.



The cases of Ireland and of Poland, from a certain point of view those also of Belgium and Italy, and even more so those of Greece and of the countries subject to the Crescent, had, as their justification, the existence not of a paternalistic government as in France, but of a foreign tyranny. Even in the eighteenth century the British were for Ireland strangers and tyrants. Against them, the right to revolt had to be invoked. We well know that, in the cases of both the Polish and the Irish revolts, the authority of Rome sometimes manifested its disapproval, and in the case of the revolts and wars of Italy against Austria we find even today Catholic writers, like Cathrein, who frowned upon them,⁹ just as Taparelli refused to admit the legitimacy of the insurrectionary war of the Greeks against the Turks. The Encyclical letter of Pius XI, *Nos es muy*, of March 28, 1937, made the resolution of such cases less difficult, because it fixed the criteria for the justification of revolts, although as is stated in the same Encyclical, "the practical solution depends on concrete circumstances." It is from the point of view of these "concrete circumstances" that we must judge the civil struggles and wars of Switzerland in the nineteenth century, aimed as they were at eliminating the religious intolerance dividing that country and at forming a true "Swiss nation."

What we would like to stress at this point is that we must not identify—as is often done—natural rights, belonging to human personality, with rights that are born historically with the formation of a nation. A nationality can undoubtedly claim a right to religious freedom, as the Oriental and Balkan peoples did under the Turks, or the Greek-Ruthen-

⁹ Pius IX, of course, condemned the wars of the Italian *Risorgimento*, which ended with the occupation of Rome. The celebrated Abbé Antonio Rosmini, founder of the Rosminian Congregation, and Father Gioacchino Ventura, General of the Theatines (Regular Clerics), approved of the war against Austria for Italian independence, and Ventura himself strongly defended the right of the Sicilians to revolt and wage war against the Bourbon King of Naples in 1848.

ians of Poland under the czars, and yet fail to claim at the same time the right to its own political personality. On the other hand, it could give strength to its political revindication by uniting the latter with that of despised or suppressed religious rights. Thus, in the Irish case, the fight for religious freedom, which was climaxed by the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1827, came under the natural law and did not depend on any national development, whereas the fight for political autonomy, which ended in the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, was carried out on the basis of national and historical rights.

The difference is very great: we call the former absolute and natural rights, the latter relative and historical rights, in order to accentuate the fact that the latter come to fruition only as the historical process unfolds itself and are subordinated to the exigencies, the rights and the possibilities of common life among the several peoples.

We cannot determine here exactly where the rights of a nation become prevalent over those of its component families and over those of the State or of the States within the framework of which a people has its political organization. In any case, a gradation of hypotheses and of casuistic dosing would be of almost no value, since it would not, in the end, have any bearing upon concrete facts.

The nation must not be conceived as outside the framework of society or community or family groups, which have rights insofar as they represent the means of common life for individual men; because society is for the individual man and not the individual man for society; rights and duties belong to human persons through society and not to society as a real entity outside the individual men composing it. If this holds true for the family and for the State, which are natural societies with specific aims and well-defined juridical contours, the same must be true of a society with a historical character and with indefinite contours like the

nation, because even when it coincides with the State (as in France or in Italy), it is always regarded as a morally and psychologically different entity.

To the exigencies and to the rights of the nation we can therefore set a theoretical limit: the nation is subordinated to human personality as a means to an end, and hence cannot be asserted against the natural rights of men (whether or not they belong to the same nation). On the other hand, in order to meet the individualistic danger, it is necessary to go back to the other principle that every community represents an interindividual bond, brought about to prevent social dissolution caused by the egoism of individuals. The fundamental social principle (like the cosmic one) is the solidarity of the component elements. It is true that the social resultant can never invalidate the rights of personality, but it is also true that individuals in safeguarding their own personality must reconcile this, through observance of the duties of justice and love, with the solidary coexistence of their fellow men.

Among the communities based upon such solidarity, the nation holds a place midway between the family and the State, sharing with the family the feeling of natural affinity and tending along with the State to the goals of civil increment of order and of defense. And between the recognition of human personality on the part of social powers and the observance of human solidarity on the part of individuals, there is also to be found a scale of relative rights and duties pertaining to the nation and its historical exigencies.

We will not be more definite at this stage, because it is always dangerous to attempt a too early solution of a concrete problem which, when all its terms have been set forth, will appear to us with unforeseen peculiarities demanding solutions that lie beyond the range of our previous experience. But in order to fix the limits of the inquiry we may say that the rights and duties that spring from the matura-

tion of a nation, considered in themselves and not confused with those natural rights and duties resulting from human personality, are only historical and relative rights—just as historical and relative as is the nature itself of nation.

III.

Present Types of Nationalism

At this point many will ask themselves in what sense nation differs from *national consciousness* or from *national sentiment* or, finally, from *national ideal*. Here are three commonly used expressions which stand in need of clear definitions.

“National consciousness” is the feeling that comes to the surface with the reawakening of the characteristics of a people in its historical phase and which gives effectiveness to the community. So long as a people remains unconscious of its personality, there is no nation in the sociological meaning of the word. Thus we may have periods during which national consciousness weakens and then reasserts itself. Finland provides us with a characteristic historical example. Her great nineteenth-century poet, Elias Lonnrot, woke her up from her long sleep. Austria in the period between Seipel and Schuschnigg began to feel herself different to the old Hapsburgian Austria, and sharply differentiated, too, from the *Grossdeutschland* of 1848 as well as from Hitler’s Third Reich.

“National sentiment” is akin to patriotic exaltation and is likely to manifest itself at happy or unhappy moments in the life of the fatherland. It may also be interpreted as an expression of solidarity among the members of the national community.

“National ideal” is a longing to obtain what is lacking in order to bring about the realization or the completion of the nation. Thus Italy’s national ideal at the end of the nine-

teenth century was to push her geographical boundaries up to Trento and Trieste; today Eire's ideal is to bring about its union with the six northern countries, while the undoubted national ideal of Holland, Belgium, Norway and of all the countries overrun by the Nazis was to regain their independence and freedom.

All this can be called nationalism by virtue of a journalistic or popular extension of the meaning of the word; but it is not nationalism in an etymological, historical, political or sociological sense. We must be careful not to mistake the former for the latter; for though it be true that *usus te plura docebit*, it is nevertheless necessary to react against such usages as lead to confusion. Today when we recognize more clearly the true traits of nationalism, even while accepting the factual and subjective attenuations of those who call or have called themselves nationalists, we cannot accept principles that involve errors and perverted doctrines.

Nationalism is a theoretical conception and a practical activity which tends to overvalue the nation and to make of it a dominant, nay, an absolute ethical-political principle. In order to give validity to the definition, we must find its verification in the characteristics of nationalisms as they have developed in their historical objectivity and as they have been theorized by their chief propounders.

The first nationalism we meet on our way is German nationalism before and after the formation of the Bismarckian Empire. The anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf* of that time had its nationalistic motive. It is of no moment that the words "nationalism" and "nationalize" were then used in a sense other than today's meaning, for there existed the germs of what is known as nationalism;¹⁰ when Bismarck

¹⁰ *Nationalize* and *nationalization* are still used to mean national or State control or ownership of a territory, of an industry or a public utility, while *nationalism* stands for the political theory of the nation as a prevalent principle of collective life, and *nationalist* for a person belonging to the Nationalist Party.

wanted to Germanize Pomerania and Silesia through eviction of the Polish population of those provinces, he was influenced by a strictly nationalistic concept: that of the homogeneity of the Reich's population. Be it called Germanism or German Nationalism, it is the same thing. The Polish representatives in the Reichstag and the Catholic Centre Party reacted against Bismarck's policies. The substance of Bismarckian policy was that German homogeneity could never be achieved except through the Lutheranization of the Catholic provinces. Hence the persecution known as the *Kulturkampf* was expressly aimed at the Poles and the Catholics. Bismarck failed in the undertaking and had to yield; even in certain Protestant circles his methods had excited some alarm; but the idea of national *Kulturkampf* persisted and spread, Heinrich von Treitschke being its chief theorizer. Treitschke's thesis was that the Poles, Jews, Socialists and Catholics had to be eliminated from the Reich by every available means and device, including deportation, expropriation, imprisonment and death, in order to arrive at a homogeneous nation. The idea of homogeneity was not an end in itself but was conceived as a means of strengthening the State's powers and of uniting the nation in order to achieve dominion beyond its own boundaries and bring about the political and economic expansion of the population.

The Aryan theories of Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain lent themselves admirably to Treitschke's nationalism, and although the former was French and the latter English, their theories were well received by German minds, which always need a theoretical peg whereon to hang any and every practical initiative. The theory of a superior Nordic Aryan race was exactly cut out for them. Already in the sixteenth century Luther had maintained that the Germans were superior to the Latins, and this had become a sort of dogma with Lutherans. But the scientific apparatus of the nineteenth century was needed to give it substance.

This was the era of the triumph of science over philosophy and theology—the time when positivist sociology was raised to the dignity of a science. Nationalist and “scientific” racism was born and grew up in this climate.

In France, after the establishment of the Third Republic, there appeared a nationalism which was the outcome of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but which soon showed its natural characteristics, becoming antidemocratic, antisocialist, and anti-Semitic. But whereas in Germany nationalism was anti-Catholic, in France it was born pro-Catholic; the French clergy were against the Republic, either because they were for the most part favorable to the monarchy, or because they feared the anticlericalism of the bourgeoisie and of the working masses. Leo XIII, by his letter of 1892, in which he advised French Catholics to adhere to the Republic and co-operate in the framing of wholesome laws for the good of the country, did away with the inner conflict caused by the tradition of loyalty to the monarchy (a conflict which for some Catholics was real) and eliminated the pretext for anti-Republican action in alliance with those who were planning a *coup d'état*. But unfortunately a large part of the clergy and the laity refused to follow the advice of a far-seeing Pope. The Dreyfus Case which came up for trial soon afterward brought about a deep cleavage in France, with the Catholic laity and clergy (except for a small but significant minority) on the side of the accusers and in league with the most rabid nationalists and anti-Semites. Regrettably enough, although Dreyfus's innocence was proved, the strife lasted up to the First World War and in certain quarters continued for a very long time. Even to this day there are some who think they do a service to the nation by branding Dreyfus as a traitor.¹¹

¹¹ On this point and concerning later nationalism, see Yves Simon, *The Road to Vichy, 1918-1938*, translated by James A. Corbett and George J. McMorrow, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942.

At that time, however, there was in France no real theorist of nationalism like Treitschke or Gobineau—none whose fame could compare with the celebrity later attained by Charles Maurras. Drumont was only a demagogue. The truth of the matter is that several negative movements of diverse character such as antirepublicanism, antidemocraticism, anti-Semitism were then flowing in a common channel, a fact that makes any theorizing difficult. What brought together industrial bourgeoisie, landed aristocracy, militarism and a large section of the clergy in France was their antisocial sentiment of fear and even hostility toward the working and peasant masses as well as the petite bourgeoisie, all of whom were gaining in importance, strength and power, both in the economic and the political fields.

In fine, there was a class problem: because of the Socialist declaration of the First International and later of the Second International in favor of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the abolition of property and universal disarmament, the wealthier and more powerful classes were afraid not only of Socialist leagues but also of universal suffrage. The word *nationalism*, in its "bourgeois" and "antisocialist" meaning, was used in antithesis to the word *International*, the mere mention of which sufficed to frighten the upper classes—a phenomenon that repeated itself after the First World War with regard to words like *bolshevism* or *Comintern*.

It was at first believed that antisocialist laws would remedy the situation. Bismarck tried this method in Germany, but met with resistance on the part of the Center Catholics, whereas in France the Catholics, being politically unorganized and usually in favor of the Right, fell an easy prey to nationalism of the first and second types.

At that time Italian nationalism had yet to be born. One could hardly call *nationalism* what in Italy went by the name of *irredentismo*, that is, the tendency to look forward to the reunion with the mother country of Trento and

Trieste, then under Austrian domination. Such literary irredentism did not prevent Italy from being a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and the Dual Empire for nearly thirty years. "Nationalist" politics in the sense of colonial expansion can be ascribed to Francesco Crispi, who drew the ire of France and promoted the first war against Abyssinia. True nationalism was of a later date and came of aping Maurras; its poet was D'Annunzio.

British and American Nationalisms

Can we speak of an English nationalism? Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling are representatives of British "nationalistic imperialism."¹² The first asserted the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race as "infallibly destined to be the predominant race in the history of civilization and of the world"; and in the name of such a race those British nationalists justified their dominion over the Celts, especially the Irish.¹³

Leaving aside the eccentricities of the Joseph Chamberlain group and also the traditional British attitude of sufficiency, according to which, before the two great wars, there were only colonials to be found beyond the Channel (with the exclusion of Paris), we find that theoretical and practical nationalism of the nineteenth-century variety never developed in England and this for two reasons: first, because the British are pragmatists and do not care for theories (witness the lack of Marxist influence on English laborism), and second, because the British already had an empire that was expanding almost automatically and without struggle in Africa and the Pacific, up to the outbreak of the Boer War which was due to the megalomania of Cecil Rhodes and to a failure to comprehend facts on the part of the government

¹² See Carlton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1928.

¹³ Cf. J. M. Robertson, *Saxon and Celt*, London: Macmillan, 1897.

in London. The British people itself was divided on the issue of this war and showed its reprobation of the excesses perpetrated in the campaign. But in reality the Boer War was more a colonial than a nationalistic war, and ultimately brought about the formation of a dominion with equal rights for all the peoples within the Union.

Even the London Jubilee ceremonies of 1887 and of 1897 were tinged less with nationalism than with imperialism—nay more with “emotional imperialism,” to use the words of Ramsay Muir. It was then, at a time when all “civilized” countries were bent on dividing among themselves the unoccupied portions of the world, that England, almost without wars, succeeded in carving out for herself the lion’s share and so built up the modern British Empire, which later came to be viewed as made up of three parts: the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Indian Empire and the colonies. Very soon literary nationalism disappeared from the British stage; at the same time local nationalisms came to life: the Irish, the Welsh, and the Scotch, the first political, the second folkloristic, the third literary, headed by the novelist Compton Mackenzie.

Turning to this continent: in what sense is it possible to speak of American nationalism? Here the word nationalism did not take the same meaning that it had in Europe. Indeed, the word was only posthumously applied to movements which, historically speaking, had been identified with different terminology. And, inasmuch as one of the most serious and dominant problems in the internal politics of the United States was the equilibrium between a strong central government and the administrative (and, from certain points of view, the political) freedom of the several states, we find that the idea of American nationalism was linked with federalist policies, the increase in the number of federated states and their cultural and linguistic assimilation. The freeing of the slaves was then the most serious problem to be solved,

being in the foreground of the reasons that led to the Civil War. The man who saved the nation and American civilization was Lincoln. Nevertheless, the problem of the colored man cannot be said to have been socially and morally solved except in part; from the national point of view the problem is a complex one and imparts to American nationalism a certain racial tinge.

Another important problem connected with nationalism gained significance after 1848, retaining it until the First World War. We refer to the great tide of European immigration. Here, too, we remark a racial discrimination between the immigrants of northern and western Europe, on the one hand, and those of southern and eastern Europe (the Mediterranean zone), on the other. The immigration problem was rendered more acute not only from the social point of view but also from the national point of view owing to assimilation difficulties: the persistence of traditional customs among the first and even the second generation of immigrants, the formation of compact ethnical groups within cities and states and the inferior recognition accorded newcomers in the labor market. But gradually the alternation of prosperity and crisis gave occasion to certain social readjustments, and the political events of the last fifty years gave birth to a more deeply felt national sentiment even among the immigrants. The latter little by little gave up the thought of coming to America in order to make money and then going back to their country of origin.

What, however, from our point of view, must be brought into relief—and it is something of fundamental importance—is that in Europe national assimilation was “fostered” through violent processes, as in Bismarckian Germany by the agency of anti-Polish, anti-Socialist and anti-Catholic laws and by dint of repression as in Alsace-Lorraine, or as in Ireland through the suppression of revolts and the denial of home rule, or as in the Balkans where the Turks as late as

the nineteenth century had recourse to mass murders and populations were left no choice save that of revolt and war. In America, on the other hand, the system of liberty and culture was applied and national formation was given a chance to develop of its own accord. Consequently, with all due allowance for the rather frequent asperity of feelings and resentments arising between the old American stock and the immigrant groups, we have never witnessed their leading to persecutions (comparable to the anti-Semitic ones in Russia, Poland and eastern Europe, and even in France during the Dreyfus Case), or to organized attempts to prevent single individuals from following their careers and attaining to high positions in industry, politics and culture.

Thus American domestic nationalism, with all its natural deficiencies, never overstepped the boundaries of pragmatism and sentiment in order to become a sociological or political theory.

At the same time there was a development of American nationalism in the international field. This could be called isolationist or defensive nationalism. Its prototype and foundation are to be found in the Monroe Doctrine, whose juridical nature and political value are debatable, but which must be considered in the light of its origin at a time when the great European powers might still dream of regaining their lost dominion over former western colonies, thus making the American continent a fresh battleground for their rivalries.

Since weapons for defense are readily convertible into offensive armaments, the nation (be it federal or unitary) that has reached a certain degree of peaceful expansion will naturally be tempted to embark on warlike adventures. Unquestionably the union of forty-eight states, the opening of the Panama Canal and expansion in the Pacific gave to the United States an "imperial character" which the founders of the Union never anticipated. The doctrine of the free-

dom of the seas and the creation of a powerful fleet, the policies with regard to Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua and the Philippines and the so-called "dollar-diplomacy" were its natural corollaries.

All this may be called nationalism in the sense of national policy, or even "imperialism," if you will, and as such is subject to praise or criticism as indeed are all policies of all states in all ages. But it cannot be called nationalism in the sense of nationalistic theory, such as was developing at that very time in Europe.

French Theorist of Nationalism

On the eve of the First World War, Charles Maurras, the theorist of nationalism who was to give this its greatest expansion, was already active. Until that moment the prevalent theories had been German, their propounders being philosophic, romantic, militarist and political writers, or racial theorists like Gobineau. Those theories, however, had been confined within the Teutonic ideological framework; they had failed to impress world opinion. The word nationalism itself, used here and there in an equivocal sense, had not yet become the index either of a theory or of a party with well-defined contours.

The doctrinal roots of Maurras's views are to be found in the positivist school; like Auguste Comte he admired Catholicism as a social hierarchic organization, headed by a monarchical sovereign, with an aristocracy of its own selected by the head, with a firm juridical discipline and a dogmatic associative structure. All these were elements that, even in the eyes of a convinced positivist and atheist, as Maurras often declared himself to be, had great value for the worldly social edifice because of the cohesion they gave to the political formation of a nation. To win the Church to nationalism—that would be a master stroke, not only by reason of the

sympathies a party might enlist and the political service it could render to the Church of its country, but also by reason of the adaptation of the reciprocally influenced theories and practical results to the construction of a nationalist State.

In the meantime, during the struggle with the anticlerical French government, which had denounced the Concordat, closed the churches, sequestered ecclesiastical goods, thrown monks, friars and nuns out of convents and priests out of presbyteries, the *Action Française* was the most powerful organization to come to the help of the Catholics; though the *Camelots du Roi*, in resisting the government officials, went beyond anything desired by the clergy themselves.

Furthermore, some bishops and priests, seeing this audacious party assert itself in the street, began to entertain the belief that the monarchy might really be restored. Hence their republicanism of convenience (even if we admit such after the Encyclical of Leo XIII) speedily waned amid the excesses of the anticlericals and the audacities of the nationalists. Thus a good many Catholics joined the faction of Maurras, regarded for the moment as the defender of French Catholicism—a worthy successor to Joan of Arc who just at that time was being reinstated as the protectress of the new Catholic France. Maurras favored the Thomistic revival in France against philosophers like Laberthonnière and Le Roy, who were later to be placed on the Index; against Blondel, who for a long time was held suspect. He advocated a corporative structure of class organization against the socialism of Jaurés and the syndicalism of Sorel. All these efforts were looked upon favorably by the French clergy, with the result that nationalism, which the Church until then had either opposed or slighted because of the immoral and anti-Catholic tendencies it displayed in the course of its formation in several European countries, succeeded for the nonce in winning the sympathies of a part of the French clergy—even in those circles which, thanks to an

equivocal use of the word, go by the name of "Vatican circles." The hidden poison could not, however, remain long concealed, the more so that the movement's best-known leaders in an outside France were obscene novelists like Maurras and Daudet, or, like Barrès and others, pagan in their ideals and conception of life.

French literature was at the time nearly wholly in the hands of this nationalist tendency and it was literature apt to carry this French positivist and philo-Catholic nationalism to other countries. An Italian nationalism was born, represented by the poet D'Annunzio (amongst the most pagan and obscene writers of his day). Even in Belgium and Switzerland the movement spread and the Rightist Catholics and their newspapers upheld the Libyan War which, together with the two Balkan wars, was the starting point of the great upheavals in the European balance of power.

While nationalist sentiments were being thus excited in the West and France was resuming her "literary" campaign for Alsace-Lorraine, the countries of the Hapsburg Empire were striving to obtain a better settlement of the nationality problem, especially the Bohemians and Poles; at Trento and Trieste, Italian feelings too were burning with more ardent fire—the upshot being that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria embittered both Slavs and Italians.

Thus nationalist and national movements, merging together, furnished motives and pretexts that led to war. Every nationalism creates its opposite, and the conflict of interests makes inevitably for war; war in such a climate is all but a foregone conclusion.

IV.

Nationalism and War

Wars are always accompanied by an unleashing of violent passions, until victory or defeat, viewed in their sad reality,

give the lie in fact to those satisfactions of human egoism that, at the price of so much blood, men have striven to achieve. And even when certain satisfactions and gains are won by one side, it may be said with truth that victory itself not seldom turns out to have been really defeat.

Thus all the nationalisms which had their field by day as a result of the last World War became one of the most potent causes of strife and unrest, leading ultimately to a new and more tragic conflict.

It is not for us to inquire here into the exact measure of nationalism's accountability for the last war. Our task is to analyze its immoral and anti-Christian character and to follow to its logical and historical conclusions the movement whose growth we have been considering.

Of all nationalisms since 1918, French nationalism must bear the chief responsibility for the present European cataclysm. (It was French nationalism that obstinately opposed any reconciliation with Germany—any *rapprochement* between the two peoples; it fought every attempt to make the League of Nations superior to the individual States and powerful in molding European public opinion; it exploited the French fear of insecurity to the point of sabotaging all efforts to achieve a reduction of armaments; it would not hear of making any concessions to Germany. When the policy of Briand approving the admission of Germany into the League of Nations and contemplating an end to the Rhineland occupation prevailed in the Locarno Treaty, French nationalism denounced this policy as treason.)

But above all it was French nationalism that poisoned the Catholic world after the war, in France as well as in other countries, even in England, decrying every generous idea, every Christian sentiment, every peaceful initiative, inciting to hatred and resentment, spreading inhumane and anti-Catholic doctrines. At that time a cry of alarm was raised in Belgium after a poll among Catholic students revealed the

fact that a majority of them were in favor of the *Action Française*. An inquiry conducted by the Catholic writer Maurice Vaussard was later published in the book entitled *Enquête sur le nationalisme*.¹⁴ This book makes interesting reading even today, for it shows how the word nationalism, which had received any number of different and even opposed meanings, caused many outstanding persons in France to evaluate wrongly the problem as events had determined it. At the same time, one senses on nearly every page of the book a preoccupation with something that weighed like a heavy burden upon French and Belgian Catholicism, urgently demanding clarification. There were some who held that "nationalism will be the next heresy to be condemned."¹⁵ Other writers of the *Enquête*, interpreting nationalism as national consciousness or as the perfecting of such consciousness, broke lances in its defense. They maintained that the more alive nationalism is, the more effective will internationalism be.

But we find certain clear-headed prophets like Chaptal, the Auxiliary Bishop of Paris, who wrote:

. . . But if politics seizes this notion of nationality and makes of it an absolute principle, without limits or controls, then it becomes, like all other absolute political principles which have no counterweight or measure, a vehicle of oppression, of tyranny and of gangsterism. Under the pretext of giving to a nation the place in the world which will allow it to develop all its worth and its power and to go to the very end of the vital expansion which it claims for itself, the morality of nationalism justifies all atrocities and legitimizes the worst tyrannies. It is to be hoped that all nations will rise up against those nations that profess such principles. These are malignant nationalities. Nationalism is a heresy and a monstrosity.¹⁶

One of the clearest answers was that by the late Monsignor

¹⁴ Editions Spes, 17 Rue Soufflot, Paris, 1924.

¹⁵ *La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits*, Brussels, October, 1938.

¹⁶ *Enquête*, p. 25.

John A. Ryan of the Catholic University of America, who said: "Nationalism is obviously opposed to the teachings and the spirit of Christianity. . . . Nationalism manifests itself in various ways. At its worst, it considers as licit all acts and all means calculated to increase the power, the prestige, or the wealth of the nation. It is hardly necessary to insist on the absolute immorality of this theory."¹⁷

One could expatiate at great length on some pages of the *Enquête*, showing, among other things, how blind illustrious men and sincere Catholics were in 1923 and 1924 with regard to the condition of France and her future. As Émile Baumann wrote: "No country is more divided than France by internationalism. She feels within herself manifold symptoms of death. She has terrible neighbors. She believes, on the other hand, that her mission is not yet finished."¹⁸

The motives which prompted many Catholics to adhere to the *Action Française* and to sustain its nationalistic program were expressed by Gaetan Bernouille, the director of the "*Lettres*" (which published the answers to the inquiry). In his conclusion he said: "We have no quarrel with nationalism itself but with the deviations in its present development. Here again we recognize the eminent role of Catholicism in the regeneration of France. It is not a question of anathematizing nationalism but of rescuing it from the worship of force and from the nefarious influence of nationalist positivism, in short of christianizing it."¹⁹ To this rather superficial view Maurice Blondel was squarely opposed; for he saw in nationalist theories "the formal antithesis of Catholicism"; and Vaussard, in his interesting conclusion, spoke of nationalism's "pitiless inhumanism."²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 234, 235.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 378. In his speech of July 18, 1938, Pope Pius XI said: "The contrast between exaggerated nationalism and Catholicism is evident. The spirit of nationalism is contrary to the spirit of the Creed and of Faith."

Soon after the publication of the sixty answers to the *Enquête*, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Cardinal Andrieu, wrote a letter of indictment against the *Action Française* which, though receiving the approval of Pius XI, roused the anger of a notable section of French public opinion. But the definitive intervention of the Holy See was not long delayed. By the end of 1926 it published the decree which the Holy Office had prepared back in 1914 but whose issuance had been postponed by both Pius X and Benedict XV, who did not think the troubled times between 1914 and 1922 propitious for such action. The decree put the writings of Charles Maurras and the newspaper "*Action Française*" on the Index. Pius XI further enjoined upon the faithful not to associate themselves with the *Action Française*, and extremely severe canonical penalties were enacted against transgressors, including the denial of the sacraments.²¹

Nationalism and Totalitarianism

From French nationalism to Italian nationalism was a short step. The foundations had been laid and the teachings spread. They only awaited a man who could translate them into political practice. Mussolini's teachers had been Napoleon, Machiavelli and Caesar: great names, but belonging to the past. Undoubtedly the historical figures in ques-

²¹ In June, 1939, the leaders of the *Action Française*, after twelve years of open revolt, made a formal act of submission to Rome, stating that "in disavowing all their possibly erroneous writings, they completely repudiated all principles and all theories contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church." Pius XII in the following month approved *ad mentem* the decree of the Holy Office which lifted the ban against the newspaper "*Action Française*," the ban, however, against all its *listings* from 1926 to July 10, 1939, and against Maurras's books still remaining in force. The Pope's *mens* was that, "*firmit manentibus quae saepe a Sancta Sede proposita sunt, tum circa distinctionem religiosarum rerum a negotiis mere politicis, tum circa rei politicae subiectionem legi morali, tum circa principia et officia ad Actionem Catholicam promovendam tuendamque tradita,*" they were specially recommended to the French bishops.

tion excited his imagination after he seized power. But before that, as a Socialist and a newspaperman, Mussolini's teachers had been Georges Sorel and Lenin with whom he had been in contact and from whom he had taken his ideas of revolution and dictatorship, and Charles Maurras (not D'Annunzio, whose "jealous friend" he was), from whom he borrowed his conception of nationalism. Fascism (for a short while called National-Fascism), having crushed in the four years between 1922 and 1926 all resistance and opposition, proclaimed the totalitarian State (the word "totalitarian" was coined by Mussolini and did not exist before in the Italian dictionary) in the famous words "Nothing outside or above the State, nothing against the State, everything within the State, everything for the State."²²

Mussolini's notion of the complete subordination of man to the State, which was at the bottom of Fascist theory, had for Italy the twofold sense of the transcendence of the nation (conceived, in Italy, as contained within the limits of the State and hence as being its equivalent) and of the resolution of every social activity into political power, so that not only was the primacy of politics proclaimed on the basis of the State, but the latter absorbed into itself every reason of social living in that every right came from the State to the individuals and not from the individuals to the State.

To realize the totalitarian State, a complete administrative centralization is first of all required, with the transfer of the sum total of all powers to the government, the government itself becoming the blind executor of the will of a *leader* endowed (it does not matter how) on a *dictatorial* scale with all moral, juridical and political powers.²³

²² Mussolini, when writing the article on Fascism for the *Italian Encyclopedia* in 1932, stressed even more clearly this notion of the totalitarian State, saying: "For Fascism, everything is in the State and nothing human or spiritual exists, far less has value, outside the State."

²³ *Dictatorship*, in its original Roman sense, indicated a power conferred during emergencies and for a limited period of time, of the use of which

For the dictatorial machine to gain momentum, it is necessary to suppress all political and civil freedom, all the fundamental rights of human personality and of the family, of communities and of cities, of universities and of churches. The chief instrument of such power is force. But the public force of the police is not enough; reliance must be placed on a secret police (which has assumed the well-known names of OGPU in Russia, OVRA in Italy and Gestapo in Germany). Recourse had also to be had to private armed bands: the armed gangs of the Blackshirts in Italy and of the Brownshirts in Germany.

Force alone is not enough; education is also necessary. Therefore, the totalitarian State has monopolized the schools, the sport activities of the youth, the cinema, the radio, the press; special schools have even been created in order to shape the "perfect citizens." Still another step: the effort is made to weaken or even to eliminate the influence of the family; hence, the special Fascist, Nazi and Communist institutions for youth. At the age of six, one became in Italy a member of the Sons of the She-Wolf, at the age of eight of the Balillas, then of the Young Italians, and so on for every age to the grave. In Germany children were conscripted into the Children's Group of the Hitler Youth at the age of six, facilities being accessible to children down to four years of age; from ten to fourteen years boys and girls belong to the Young Folk (*Jungvolk*) and Young Maidens, respectively; from fourteen to eighteen to the Hitler Youth (*Hitler-Jugend*) proper and the Bund of German Girls, respectively. Before being admitted to the Party itself or one of its organizations of adults, the adolescents had to go through the rigorous training of the Labor Service (both sexes) and of the army. The Russians have the "volun-

account had to be rendered to the Senate and to the people. Today dictatorship means the power of an irresponsible and absolute leader with unlimited power over everybody and everything.

tary" organization of the Young Pioneers, embracing the ages from eight to sixteen; younger children may be banded together in the Octobrist groups. From the age of seventeen, a Russian boy or girl is eligible for the Communist Youth (*Comsomol*).

A State organized along such lines must have a goal: Fascist Italy dreamt of the Roman Empire, Nazi Germany idealized the *Herrenvolk*, Bolshevik Russia aimed at world-wide Communist revolution. In order to assert itself, the State must rely upon an ever larger and increasingly modern military organization. Mussolini once said: "What maternity is to woman, war is to man," thus uniting two goals—natural and unnatural—one of which destroys the other. The upshot was the complete militarization of the country.

There remained the Church. As long as the Church could be useful toward bringing about or maintaining dictatorships, its help was sought, and concordats were negotiated. But when the Church became an obstacle to the spirit of the totalitarian States, it was persecuted and even abolished. The Bolsheviks tried to form a church of their own, then they suppressed it, proscribing its priests and closing its buildings, declaring freedom of worship, but imposing so many restrictions that this freedom became illusory. Hitler promised that the State would respect both Catholics and Protestants, attempted to make out of the Protestant church a Hitlerian church, stipulated a concordat with Rome. But he soon failed in his promises to both Catholics and Protestants by beginning a subtle persecution which aimed at the complete de-Christianization of Germany.

Mussolini settled the Roman question with the Vatican and accepted a concordat on Pius XI's terms. Generally speaking, he attempted to avoid open conflict with the Church, by favoring it up to the point where it did not threaten the development of Fascism. Here the chief conflict arose out of the question of education of the youth

and of their Catholic societies. In this connection, Pius XI published the Encyclical, *Non abbiamo bisogno*,²⁴ wherein he brought into relief the danger of a State monopoly in the education of youth and the broader danger contained in viewing the State as the end of man. Pius XI had already condemned in his allocution of December, 1926, the Fascist "notion that the State is the last end, for which alone the citizen exists." In the aforesaid Encyclical there is a declaration which gives the crux of the issue existing between the Vatican and all totalitarian States: "We are, as we stated above, happy and proud to wage the good fight for the liberty of consciences."²⁵ And the same Pius XI adds: "Besides, there is involved another right of the Church, equally inviolable, to fulfill the imperative divine commission entrusted to her by her Divine Founder, to bring to souls—to bring to every soul—all the treasures of truth and good, doctrinal and practical, which He Himself brought to the world."²⁶

Many are the documents and the speeches of Pius XI against the State called totalitarian. Being anxious that an exact understanding of current errors concerning race, nationalism and totalitarianism should be imparted in Catholic seminaries and universities, the same Pope Pius caused to be drafted the famous list of eight erroneous propositions, the last of which runs as follows: "*Singuli homines non sunt nisi per 'Statum' et propter 'Statum'; quidquid iuris ad eos pertinet, ex Status concessione unice derivatur.*"²⁷

This totalitarian Leviathan, even if it grants concessions

²⁴ Commonly known as "On Catholic Action," June 29, 1931.

²⁵ The Pope said "of consciences" and not "of conscience," for "liberty of conscience" is an equivocal expression too often distorted to mean the absolute independence of conscience, which is "absurd in a soul created and redeemed by God." (*Ibid.*)

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ "Each man exists only by the State and for the State. Any right he possesses is derived exclusively from a concession by the State." Letter of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, April 13, 1938.

to the Church and accepts concordats, can never admit that the spiritual formation of the people should escape its influence; that any autonomous force should resist it and that the Church should inculcate ideas, principles and theories that contradict the nature, and diminish the power, of the State. It is impossible for the Church to be free under a totalitarian State, which, as such, is intolerant of any liberty.

The fundamental reason is that the basis upon which State totalitarianism is built is an absolute one.²⁸ Be this basis the nation, the empire, the race, or the class, we are in every case faced with a deification that brooks no limits set by another God—no moral limits and hence no juridical nor religious limits. The State so organized becomes the source of every right and of all social reality.

We are faced with a slow but logical realization of theories formulated in the course of nearly two centuries. From a limitless popular will without moral checks (Rousseau), through the idea of the State as supreme manifestation of the spirit (Hegel), one arrived at positivism which made of human society an absolute (Comte), an entity outside of the individuals (Durkheim), with everything reduced to mere struggle for material survival (Marx). But more vivid images and deeper sentiments were needed in order to impress the masses and arouse their fanaticism; nationality, race, empire, class were shibboleths suited to fill that need. The war of 1914-18 with its destruction of the existing particular order of things led to an extraordinary flowering of one of the most terrible social evils with which humanity has ever had to contend.

Pius XI set forth the problem in these clear terms: "He who takes the race or the people, or the State, or the form

²⁸ In his first Encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus* (October 20, 1939), Pius XII speaks against that civil authority which "puts itself in the place of the Almighty and elevates the State or group into the last end of life, the supreme criterion of the moral and juridical order, and, therefore, forbids every appeal to the principles of natural reason and of Christian conscience."

of government, the bearers of the power of the State or other fundamental elements of human society—which in the temporal order of things have an essential and honorable place—out of the system of their earthly valuation, and makes them with an idolatrous worship, perverts and falsifies the order of things created and commanded by God; such a one is far from the true belief in God and a conception of life corresponding to the true belief.”²⁹

The world fell into the sin of idolatry when it raised the State, the nation, the race, the class, the dictator to the plane of principles of morality, of law, and of the existence of the human community. Thereupon, unruly and unbridled passions broke through the barriers restraining them, because the heavens are closed to idolaters; to them man is no longer a brother or a fellow creature, but a thing crystallized in the name of a false deity; all those incapable of being assimilated to that deity (the nation, race, or class), become brute matter to be subjugated, eliminated, or destroyed.

Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Barbarity

Up until the second half of the nineteenth century anti-Semitism was resorted to by the Russians or the Turks in the name of “reason of State.” From time to time anti-Semitic pogroms were engineered by the police in order to appease the populace, which was given certain designated days for looting and revenge. But with the advent of nineteenth-century nationalism there arose a theoretical anti-Semitism (as we have already intimated), justification for which was sought by invoking the ideas of national homogeneity or, later, of racial purity; or of struggle against the internationalisms of the capitalists and of the proletarians, which allegedly were of Jewish inspiration.

²⁹ Encyclical letter, *Mit brennender Sorge* (The Church in Germany), March 14, 1937.

After Hitler came into power, anti-Semitism assumed the twofold aspect of an outlawing of the Jews and their systematic extermination. The anti-Semitic regulations of the Reich were extended to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Italy before the war, and since the war they have been applied in all Nazi-occupied territories; but it should be added that anti-Semitic sentiments and prejudices are also rather widespread in the democratic countries of both Europe and America.

The Papacy has put up a strong fight against anti-Semitism, which exists even in Catholic circles. Pope Pius XI made an unforgettable stand in this connection. As early as 1928, by his express will, there was added to a Decree of the Holy Office dissolving a certain Roman association called "The Friends of Israel" (which for disciplinary and liturgical reasons clashed with Catholic tradition), this open declaration against anti-Semitism: "*Qua caritate promota Apostolica Sedes eundem populum contra iniustas vexationes protegit, et quemadmodum omnes invidias ac simulationes inter populos reprobabat, ita vel maxime damnat odium adversus populum olim a Deo electum, odium nempe illud, quod vulgo 'antisemitismi' nomine significari solet.*" ³⁰

The several speeches of Pius XI, upon the occasion of the introduction of anti-Semitic laws in Italy, are of great importance and some of them are declared truly worthy of a lasting place in historical records. For instance, in September, 1938, during the reception of a group of Belgian pilgrims, the Pope, having asked for the missal, read with tears in his eyes that passage in the Canon where, after the Con-

³⁰ "Moved by the spirit of charity, the Apostolic See has protected the people [of Israel] against unjust persecutions, and since it condemns all jealousy and strife among peoples, it accordingly condemns with all its might the hatred directed against a people which was once chosen by God, that particular hatred indeed which today commonly goes by the name of anti-Semitism." Decree of the Holy Office of March 25, 1928.

secration, God is asked to accept the offering of the Mass as he accepted "the sacrifice of our Patriarch, Abraham." And the Pope added: "Abraham is called our patriarch and ancestor. Anti-Semitism is not compatible with the sublime reality of this text. It is a movement in which we Catholics cannot participate. Nor is it possible for Christians to take part in anti-Semitism. We are Semites spiritually."³¹

Together with acute anti-Semitism, there developed in Germany a totally immoral State-eugenics. Its aim was to regulate births—as if human beings were mere livestock—from an exclusively animal point of view, in total disregard of the regular formation of families. It also aimed at the elimination of diseased subjects through sterilization. Both measures had for their alleged end the achieving of racial purity and of national homogeneity and strength. There was no need of any formal condemnation by the Church to apprise Catholics of the immorality of such practices. But since among the latter in Germany a dispute had arisen as to

³¹ Quotations taken from the article "The Church and Anti-Semitism" in the *Catholic Record* of London, Ontario, Canada, January 7, 1939. The news was also published by the Catholic papers of Belgium and by *La Vie Intellectuelle*, Paris, February 10, 1939. In the *Osservatore Romano* of July 30, 1938, in an official account of the pontifical reception of July 28, 1938, Pope Pius XI, deprecating the racial anti-Semitic movement in Italy, is quoted as saying: "We may ask ourselves how, unhappily, Italy has felt the need of imitating Germany." At this point the Holy Father opened smilingly a parenthesis saying that "somebody—and this had already happened in other circumstances—might have accused him of prejudice because as is well known, the Pope is a son of Milanese, the men of the '*Cinque Giornate*' who threw the Germans out of their town. No, this is not the reason; it is because the Latins never used *race* or similar words. Our ancestors had other, more beautiful, more agreeable words: *gens Italica*, *Italica stirps*, *Japeti gens*. To Pius XI these words looked more civilized and less barbaric." How humane were these words of the Holy Father, and how timely his recollection of the five days of struggle with the Germans at Milan in 1848! For the allusion was particularly significant in view of the fact that the Germans were once more in Italy, although, to be sure, the "Germans" of 1848 were in reality "Austrians."

Here we take occasion to refer the reader to a recent commendable and well-documented work, *National Patriotism in Papal Teaching*, by John J. Wright, The Stratford Co., Boston, 1942.

whether in certain cases the State had the right to order sterilization of its "subjects," the Church did not hesitate to speak out. Her constant answer is and has always been that it is not licit for anyone either to order sterilization where it is not necessary and against the will of the patient, nor to take part in such an operation even as medical assistant in public or private hospitals, or to lend one's services, in any manner whatsoever, to promote and spread the practice of sterilization.³²

Bad as this practice is, what shall we say of the killings, ordered by public authority, of those who "because of psychological or physical defects are no longer useful to the nation,

³² The decree of the Holy Office of February 21, 1940, states that "direct sterilization of a man or a woman, either perpetual or temporary, is forbidden by the law of nature," and that eugenic sterilization had already been condemned by the same Holy Office on March 18, 1931, in connection with the Encyclical, *Casti connubii*, of December 31, 1930. *The New York Times* of December 24, 1939, published an Associated Press dispatch, according to which Heinrich Himmler, chief of all German police organizations and leader of the Elite Guard, was quoted as stressing the need for more and more children. Herr Himmler had this to say with regard to the plans of the Nazi regime: "Special sponsors will be appointed by me for all children of good blood born in or out of wedlock, whose fathers fall in the war. . . . Beyond the limits of bourgeois laws and customs which ordinarily are probably necessary, it can become an exalted task even outside of wedlock for German women and girls of good blood to become—not frivolously but imbued with deepest moral concern—mothers of children begotten by soldiers moving to the front without knowing whether they will return or die for the fatherland. Sponsors will look after the mothers and children during the war, and, if the fathers fall, after the war."

Moreover, Herr Hess, then Deputy Leader of the National Socialist Party, was quoted in the same dispatch as having announced the following regulations to be applied in all future cases of "war brides'" illegitimate offspring:

"1. At the birth registration of children of unmarried war brides the name of the father will be replaced by the designation 'war father' and where the name of the father is registered this designation will be applied to the name.

"2. An unmarried war bride mother will keep her maiden name but with the title 'frau'!

"3. Where necessary the State will provide financial help, but the grandparents of war children will be expected to take care of them."

These developments were perfectly in keeping with the anti-Christian and immoral principles of nationalism, denounced by Pius XI.

but rather a burden to it?" When this news first appeared in the papers, the temptation was strong to classify it as war-time propaganda meant to slander the German Reich. But a little after we read in the *Osservatore Romano* of December, 1940, the answer of the Holy Office to the question propounded by a bishop of an unnamed country. The question was: "*Num licitum sit ex mandato auctoritatis publicae, directe occidere eos qui, quamvis nullum crimen morte dignum commiserint, tamen ob defectus psychicos vel physicos nationi prodesse iam non valent, eamque potius gravare eiusque vigori ac robori obstare censentur?*"³³ Naturally the Holy Office answered that such practice was "contrary both to natural law and to positive Divine Law."

Confronted with such facts, it seems in the nature of an anticlimax to protest against the suppression of minority schools, the forcing upon minorities of the language of the ruling national group, even in courts and in churches, the banning of private teaching, the obliteration of street names and epitaphs written in the language of the minority. These are all old methods of persecution, which nationalism has but enforced with greater asperity.

What has brought us back to the darkest ages of barbarism, with a speed and crescendo horrible to behold, is the mass deportation of minority groups in order to foster national homogeneity. In 1920, after the Greco-Turkish War, about one million Greeks were deported from Asia Minor. For more than a thousand years they had been living from generation to generation on the land, even under Turkish tyranny. And who does not recall the massacre of Greeks in Smyrna during that unhappy war? It is difficult to understand the complacency of the Western powers toward this

³³ "Whether it be legitimate, by order of public authority, to kill directly those who, though not guilty of a crime punishable by death, are because of psychic or physical defects no longer useful to the nation but rather a burden to it, and are thought to represent a handicap to the nation's vigor and strength?"

first large-scale deportation. It is true that the old Turkish regime had accustomed the world to the worst; but Ataturk had appeared upon the scene with the halo of the modern reformer. Only a few noticed the enormity of such a development, because nationalism veiled the crimes committed in its name.

Before the war a deep impression was produced by the agreement between Mussolini and Hitler, whereby the South Tyroleans were offered the choice of returning to Germany or remaining in Italy. The deportations during the war were on an increasingly vast scale. The Poles, by the hundreds of thousands, had to turn over their lands to the Germans. The German populations of the Baltic countries, numbering more than eighty thousand were resettled, after the accord between Hitler and Stalin, in Pomerania and Poland. The ancient German population of the Volga region were to be transported to Siberia or to other places. What has happened during the war—massacre by the thousands to millions of unarmed people because presumed enemy race, deportation by the thousands to million people from their lands and homes, because belonging to enemy country—and this is happening after the war with the consentment of the Allies—is of such repulsive barbarity that we could not believe that it was conceived and actuated by human beings. For us, Christians and civilized people, it is unconceivable that such crimes have been perpetrated collectively, with cold blood, even with scientific plan and systematic execution. Moreover, similar policies have been followed “because they were useful to the nation,” as the compulsory sterilization and the killing off of the country’s own nationals “because they were not useful to the nation” summarize all the inhumanity and immorality of a nationalism that has made of the nation a terrible deity and of the totalitarian State that deity’s all-powerful minister.³⁴

³⁴ The world was horrified to learn during the war of the Nazi decision “to speed and intensify the extermination by massacre and starvation of the

Last Words of Pius XI on Nationalism

We do not wish our readers to believe that nationalism alone, aggravated by totalitarianism, is the sole cause of this modern apostasy from Christianity. Naturalism (taken in the sense of negation of every supernatural principle), sociological positivism, rationalistic philosophy have all permeated our society for more than a century. But while these errors, together with their derivatives, have been combated in the name of a sane philosophy and of the Christian religion, nationalism has been overlooked or, worse still, has been positively favored, even in the Church's so-called foreign missions, as Pope Pius XI strongly lamented.³⁵

If it was opposed, it was opposed only on the political plane, which has led to greater confusion rather than to clarity among many Catholics. It would not be too much to say that the repeated warnings of Pius XI were the prophecy of one who was on the threshold of death. Pius XII accepted the inheritance when in his Encyclical he spoke of the error of totalitarianism as a divorce of "civil authority from every kind of dependence upon the Supreme Being—first Source and absolute Master of man and of society—and from restraint of a Higher Law derived from God as from its first source." ³⁶

Jews remaining in occupied Europe." (*British Section of World Jewish Congress*—see general press, Feb. 14, 1943.) But now the reality of the past and present crimes is more awful than it was then suspected.

³⁵ In his speech to the alumni of the Pontifical Urban College de Propaganda Fide made on August 21, 1938, Pius XI told them among other things: "There is room for a just, moderate and temperate nationalism, associated with all virtues. But beware of exaggerated nationalism as of a malediction. It seems to us that unhappily everything bears us out when we call it a *true malediction*, because it is a malediction of divisions, of contrasts, leading to the danger of wars. For the missions, moreover, it is a real curse of sterility, because it is not along those lines that the fertility of grace can take root in souls and can cause the apostolate to flourish." (*Osservatore Romano*, 1938, No. 194.)

³⁶ See *America's Peace Aims*, *supra*, p. 21.

Catholics should beyond the shadow of a doubt affirm and reaffirm that human and Christian universality which leads all to brotherhood in God, as against nationalisms which, raising themselves to the rank of deities, separate and hatefully divide mankind, each aspiring to dominate in the name of a self-attributed mission, and each substituting itself for God.

Pius XI, in the speech he addressed on July 28, 1938, to the alumni of the Pontifical Urban College de Propaganda Fide, reminded his hearers that "Catholic means universal, not racial, not nationalistic in the separatistic meaning of these two attributes." And he added: "Catholic Action must conform itself to these principles because Catholic Action means Catholic life. . . . It identifies itself with Catholic life, for what would life be without action? . . . Catholic life means activity based on charity virtue, on the law of God which fills this life with which therefore becomes God's life. There is no other way of Catholic thinking, and the latter is not racial, nationalistic, separatistic thinking in the sense which is clearly enough expressed by the last of these words. No separatism: we do not want to separate anything in the human family; for we understand—as is obvious—racism and exaggerated nationalism, *as they are commonly understood*,⁸⁷ to be barriers raised between men and men, natives and natives, peoples and peoples."⁸⁸ Pius XI had so well understood, as if by intuition, the evil impending for humanity, that in the last two years of his life, from the famous three Encyclicals of March, 1937, to the eve of his death (when he wrote the document directed to the bishops of Italy, whose text has remained a secret), his constant thought was the one of guiding Catholics toward the repudiation of what he called racism and nationalism *as they are commonly understood*—the repudiation, namely, of the basis on which

⁸⁷ Italics is ours—AUTHOR.

⁸⁸ *Osservatore Romano*, 1938, No. 175.

State totalitarianism was built. The Pope reiterated upon every possible occasion that "the contrast between exaggerated nationalism and Catholicism is evident," that "the spirit of this nationalism is contrary to the spirit of the *Credo*, is contrary to the Faith." The Pope declared, in the audience granted to the nuns of the *Cenacolo* on July 15, 1938, Cardinal Pacelli (now Pope Pius XII) being present, that "he had never thought of these problems with such precision, with such, one might say, absoluteness, with such intransigence of formulas; and since God has given him the grace of this clarity, he wants to share it with his sons, because everybody needs it in times like the present when these ideas are attracting so much attention and inflicting so much damage. That very same day they had brought him very serious information and there could be no longer any doubt that it was a case of real apostasy." ³⁹

These words begin with the open confession that "*he had never thought of these problems with such precision*" and continue as if the Pontiff were leaving a bequest: "*Since God has given him the grace of this clarity, he wants to share it with his sons.*" These are moving words, uttered by a great man who, upon realizing the imminence of the catastrophe, opened his soul before the world. These words were caught only by a few; they were printed by the press of the world just like the texts of the many papal speeches to nuns and priests and pilgrims thronging the Vatican. Much later a majority of Catholics and of non-Catholics, too, awoke from the stupor of nationalistic poisoning. But this happened only with the outbreak of the last war, nay only after the war had assumed the proportions of a world-wide struggle. Among the many causes of this, we must include the misconception of nationalism as fervent and active love of one's own nation, whereas in truth it was already possessed by

³⁹ *Osservatore Romano*, 1938, No. 164.

an egoistic spirit, inoculated with an inhuman theory that has divided peoples and emboldened tyrants.

Words have their own life and evolution. When the word nationalism was coined, it meant the economic theory of "nationalization of certain industries of collective interest." Later the word was used to express the love of nation and the defense of its rights against the "Workers' International" and "class internationalism." Still later it was applied to the defense of "nationality" and of oppressed "minorities" (something which should have been called, as suggested by René Johannet, "nationalitarism").⁴⁰ Finally it came to mean a given sociological-political theory and the nation was thought of in terms of a supreme entity, a law unto itself, without limits of human or divine bounds, while the national State was declared the totalitarian State. For us, today, in the light of recent experiences, *nationalism* should not hold any other meaning. It is not possible that there should be a common denominator of what is good (love of nation) and what is intrinsically bad (the deification of nation). Before the war, in order to distinguish between nationalism and nationalism, the bad one was classified as *radical nationalism* (Vermersch, S.J.) or as *exaggerated*, in contrast to *moderate nationalism* (Pius XI). But as Pius XI himself emphasized in the last year of his life, by nationalism "*as it is commonly understood*" today is meant the exaggerated kind, the kind in fact that separates peoples from peoples and is opposed to the Catholicity or universality of the religion of Christ, in view of which notwithstanding all the differences of race, of nation, of social condition and of culture, all men are brothers. Over divisions must prevail solidarity, over differences fraternity, over hatreds love.

⁴⁰ Maurice Vaussard, *Enquête sur le nationalisme*, Paris, Editions Spes, 1924, p. 377.

2

The Roman Question before and after Fascism

I.

From Pius X to Pius XI

BY 1910 I had been for five years Mayor of Caltagirone, Provincial Councilor of Catania, and National Councilor of the Association of Communes of Italy, as well as one of the leaders of the "Municipalist" movement against State centralization, so that I was never missing from the Congresses of Communes.

It was at one of these congresses, at Catania, that, between sessions, I was requested by various journalists to explain how I could reconcile my position as mayor and priest with the Catholic thesis that Rome should be returned to the Pope. I replied simply that that was not my thesis, that I did not doubt that Rome was the capital city of the nation; I hoped, however, for a pacific solution of the Roman Question.

Journalists are made for journals: forthwith there appeared in one of the Messina newspapers (I cannot recall its title) an enormous headline: INTERVIEW WITH DON STURZO—ROME NO LONGER THE POPE'S or words to the same effect. The clerical journal of Florence *L'Unità Cattolica* used the news as the basis of a thoroughgoing attack on "Don Sturzo." The Cardinal Secretary of State, at that time Merry del Val, wrote a letter to the Bishop of Caltagirone asking him to make an

inquiry at once into the facts of the case. Invited by the bishop to write a report, I declared that I had not understood at all that I was giving an interview; that it was merely a matter of an exchange of ideas while people were taking sherbets and refreshments in the halls of the congress; that at any rate, I had expressed my own idea and I could not change it, since it was a matter of conviction.

The incident ended there. But my surprise and admiration were great when, a few months afterwards, I had a private audience with Pius X; the Pope, as I entered, and knelt, opened out his arms and welcomed me with these words, "Come, Mr. Mayor, come," and after I had drawn nearer he added, "Has no one excommunicated you yet?" . . . "No one," I replied, "and who could do it except Your Holiness?" "I shall not excommunicate you, dear Sturzo," said the Pope; then, smiling, he added in a low tone, "Watch out for the others who suspect you."

I have spoken of this intimate episode many times with friends, but this is the first time that I have written about it, and I do it for two reasons: first, in order to show what was the mind of Pius X on the Roman Question and what was the opinion of those who surrounded him. It was, perhaps, this environment that prevented him from realizing his dream of a reconciliation.

But I wish to note how certain questions cannot be treated openly before they come to maturity, without throwing suspicion on those who discuss them. And yet it is necessary that there be the pioneers, in order that the terrain may be cleared and the solutions may be made less difficult.

Today it is easy for a Catholic to say that Rome could no longer be given to the Pope after the fall of the temporal power. That statement before 1929 (date of the Lateran Treaty) was already tolerated by many, although there were those who protested. But to make it in 1910, or in 1900, or in 1880 would have indeed been a cause for "excommunica-

tion." Abbot Tosti of Montecassino had to endure the disavowal of his friend Leo XIII, and Bishop Bonomelli of Cremona had his publication on the Conciliation placed on the Index of prohibited books.¹

Another personal reminiscence will serve to show how difficult it was in the past to declare oneself against the temporal power of the Pope in ecclesiastical circles. One of my professors in the Gregorian University between the years 1894-97 was Father Billot, later cardinal until he resigned under Pius XI, according to report, because of the *Action Française* affair. He maintained the thesis (nor was he alone in this) that the temporal power was so closely connected with the principle of the Pope's independence in his universal ministry that it could be qualified as a *dogmatic fact* and, as such, it could be defended even with earthly means.

Difficult and in many cases presumptuous as it is for a student to disagree with his teacher, still the thesis of the *dogmatic fact* sounded harsh to us youths of the generation following the fall of the temporal power. Especially was this true for those who, like myself, took delight in history and could well affirm that in many instances the Pope, with all his temporal power and sometimes because of his temporal power, had been neither free nor independent, either because of external pressure or because of internal agitations. I do not say that all the observations made by us youths were valid, nor that the discussion was exempt, here and there, from prejudices; I simply wish to point out that it was becoming difficult even to discuss the problem from a theoretical point of view because of the suspicions that were aroused against those who might not have been 100 per cent "temporalists."²

¹ D. A. Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, pp. 51-54.

² During his life Contardo Ferrini, who is about to be beatified, was suspected as a "cold Catholic" or even a "Liberal" because he was not *temporalist*.

Pius XI's act in solving the Roman Question by renouncing every temporal pretense over Rome and the other provinces of the former Papal State (although it was a post-factum renunciation, juridical and not political) freed the minds of millions of Catholics, in Italy and out of Italy, from the uncertainty created by the fact that they could not defend the former temporal rights of the Pope, although, at the same time, they wished that the Pope might be free and independent.

From this arose the great wave of general feeling of gratitude toward Pius XI, who was praised as one of the greatest modern Popes. The adulation of Mussolini was still greater because he represented the Italian Government, which not only had taken Rome by force of arms but for a long time had rejected the idea of a conciliation for fear of anticlericals and Masons, although that was debated in papers and books. "The Man sent by Providence" had finally arrived; the man who accepted, in addition to the Treaty, the Concordat, too—the two pacts by means of which, according to the words of Pius XI: "God was restored to Italy and Italy to God."

Fortunately, the favorable opinion about the "Man sent by Providence" did not last long in the Pope's mind; some time before his death he realized fully the evil brought by Fascism into the religious, moral and international field. Many were his declarations, open and veiled, against the theories and practices of Fascism. His opposition to the racial laws and his continual appeals against exaggerated nationalism carried the imprint of an anguish which never left his spirit. We know that Pius XI had prepared on the tenth anniversary of the Lateran Treaty one of the most courageous acts of his pontificate, a discourse to the bishops of Italy assembled at Rome, which (according to report) was on the subject of the then actual state of the Church. But he died on February 10, 1939, and the new Pope (his former Secretary of State), wishing to follow a line of pacification

toward the Fascist Government, just on the eve of the war, locked that document in the Treasury of State Secrets.

The Last Decades of the Temporal Power

Daniel Binchy³ is one of the very few foreign Catholics who has tried to understand the Italian *Risorgimento*, getting away from the prejudices and inexactitudes which for a century have been current in almost all books, encyclopedias and periodicals written by Catholics outside of Italy. In one place Binchy says, "It is even more important to remember that the quarrel between the Church and the *Risorgimento* was conditioned by history, not by theoretical incompatibility. There was nothing inherently anti-Catholic in Italian nationalism; on the contrary, the movement originally drew most of its strength from Catholic sources . . ." (p. 17.)

Binchy does not hesitate to call a spade a spade. For instance, concerning Pius IX's policy toward Italy he observes that Pius IX "was a child in political matters, impulsive and changeable, and his genuine affection for Italy might well have caused him to reverse his *non possumus* and come to a generous, perhaps even imprudent, arrangement with the House of Savoy" (pp. 21-22). This affirmation by Binchy may be historically contestable; he himself explains it shortly afterward by making it clear that the attack on the temporal power gave the impression of being a fundamental attack on the Papacy, the Church, and the dogmas. Pius IX no longer made any distinction between the national question

³ Binchy's book, *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (which ends at the very date of Pius XI's death), can be regarded as the most serious and conscientious work ever written on this theme not only by Catholics (since Binchy is a Catholic) but even by non-Catholics of any country. In it we find breadth of view, precision of fact, abundance of detail, information concerning the attendant circumstances, liberty of appraisal, and independence of judgment.

and the religious question. And because the historical process always evades absolute definitions and surmounts the clash between ideas and facts, a paradox resulted in Italy, a paradox that Binchy notes humorously (and one that was expressed more discreetly by Senator Scialoja in 1929) by stating that "the Roman Question was created by a Government of Catholics and settled by a Government largely composed of agnostics." (p. 24.)

The temporal power of the Popes in the nineteenth century could not be regarded in the same way as in the preceding centuries. The Papal State had been a State with an absolute regime, like all the other States of Europe, in the hands of ecclesiastics who governed paternally and who defended it against the appetites of the external powers, sometimes by means of neutrality, sometimes through leagues, sometimes through Papal authority, when this gave no suspicion to Paris, Madrid, or Vienna. The type of State that came into being after the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna was different; it was subordinated to a European policy of reaction against the ideas of the American and French revolutions, against the aspirations of oppressed nationalities toward independent and free regimes, against the very constitutional forms already adopted with limitations in France and Bavaria in 1815, in Spain and Sicily in 1812. The Popes of that time, from Pius VII to Gregory XVI, not only accepted the Austrian policy but opposed even constitutional forms wherever they were initiated, even in Latin America, thus placing Catholics and bishops in difficult positions with respect to their countries.

It was inevitable that the Pontifical State should become the home of revolutions against the authoritarianism of the Papal Government, and, hence, the experimental field for the political and police repression of the period. As long as Italy remained entirely under absolute governments devoted to Vienna and within the sphere of Austrian policy, the

Papal State was very little different from them, except for the additional disturbance caused by the fact that ecclesiastics ran the government at a difficult and tempestuous time, and exercised enormous power. But when the first revolutionary insurrections occurred, and when the first concessions by the ruling princes in granting constitutions were made, that whole political system collapsed into pieces.

Then there came 1848 and, afterward, the wars of the *Risorgimento*; Europe changed its political and military aspect several times; all the States successively obtained their constitutions. In the Europe of that period there remained only three absolute powers; the Pope in Rome, the Czar in St. Petersburg, the Sultan in Constantinople; precisely in those States where political power was bound to ecclesiastical power. Napoleon III could not be counted in with them, in spite of the dictatorial power that he exercised, because he had been nominated by universal suffrage (real or not) of a character historically and politically transitory. Napoleon I had not been able to establish a new dynasty in the name of the French Revolution; neither could Napoleon III establish it in the name of a *coup d'état*.

The Pope's position was far more difficult than the czar's or the sultan's because his State was small and his power was religious and not military. Surrounded as he was by the free and liberal Italian State, the Pope must needs rely on the army of a great power, France, and the support of a strict police. When these two supports, too human and too hated, failed him (the French troops were withdrawn for the War of 1870, and the police force was unable to prevent revolutionary infiltrations that easily crossed the boundaries of the small State), the Pope was already a prisoner before the breach of Porta Pia, of September 20, 1870. If that breach was an offense against the double right of the Pope, religious and political, it was also the mark of a historical maturity which it would have been impossible to arrest. The temporal

power, as a Papal State, had had for more than a thousand years a historical task of extraordinary range; now, like every form of a passing reality, it, too, was being transformed into another reality more adopted to its times.

That Papal Rome, as a self-sufficient entity, as an administrative ecclesiastical system, and as a political State could no longer survive was perceived by Catholics and priests of high worth like Cardinal Consalvi, and later, by the Abbé Rosmini and the Theatine Gioacchino Ventura. All three stood for the widest reforms, since they still believed that the Pope should preserve the appanage of a State, but that the State should no longer be an absolute one. Ventura, the friend of Pius IX, had warned repeatedly that "if the Church will not march with the people, the people on that account will not stop their march, but will continue marching without the Church, out of the Church, against the Church: that is all. And who could then calculate the evils for the people and for the Church?"⁴

It was not a question, as they thought, of simple administrative and social reforms, nor of a constitution which at bottom left every power to the Pope; it was a matter of political transformation through which the people should decide its own fate. Pius IX experienced the popular enthusiasm of the whole world because of his utterance, "God, bless Italy," for the amnesty he granted to political criminals, and because of the constitution he granted to the Romans. But all these things vanished when he perceived that they were heading toward the separation of the State from the Church, toward the secularization of the political power, and toward liberty of conscience and religion.

On the other hand, the enemies of the Papacy did not cease to provoke not only political disorders but essentially religious quarrels as well. Freemasonry, with a vigor that

⁴ Cf. *Discorso Funebre per i morti di Vienna—Introduzione e Protesta dell'Autore*, Milano Turati, 1860, Vol. I.

hitherto it had not possessed, accentuated its struggle against "Temporalism." Binchy justly notes that "the extent of their (the Masons') influence has been greatly exaggerated by clericals." (p. 40.) What happened in Italy at that time was this fact: the clericals, keeping themselves politically separated from the majority of the population, thought that they saw in everything the hand of Freemasonry, though, in reality, this was often insignificant. (Indeed, in small towns it was only the air of secrecy that made certain gentlemen important.) On the other hand, the Liberals of the time, far from a direct contact with Catholics and the clergy, always thought that they saw the shadow of the "Jesuit," who for them was the "Mason" of the Church. This suspicion made several years of the reign of Pius IX and also of Leo XIII very difficult ones.

Looking, from a distance of more than half a century, at what then happened, that is to say, at the change of tone from the implacable condemnation of Pius IX to the calm reasoning of Leo XIII, one can observe what great relief the latter brought into the Catholic world with his discussion of modern problems; his presentation of them in the least offensive manner, even when he disapproved and refused to accept current solutions for these problems; his invitation to study and action for their solution. In practice Leo XIII accepted all the political experiences of the time; he encouraged the French clergy and Catholics to accept the Republic; he sought to interpret in a suitable manner the political liberties that the whole civilized world had already acquired through so many struggles. Two mottoes took on great significance when he uttered them: "*God made nations curable,*" and "*If Democracy becomes Christian, it will bring great good to the world.*"

With regard to Italy Leo XIII's policy was not so broad: He was the only one who could have won over the resistance of the Roman Curia to a renunciation of Rome; he had this

idea for a moment, but he did not carry it out. The times were not mature. Those who had preached to the four winds that Pius IX would be the last Pope had not given up the fight against the Papacy and were working so that Leo might really be the last one. That was the time when the intellectual world was bloated with Positivism; *Science and Progress* were the magic words with which one hit the obscurantism of the Church. Italy was not alone in experiencing the spell of the revolt against the Christian tradition. But in Italy this revolt (whose singer was Carducci, a great poet in many ways) was doubled by a breath of Ghibellinism which had become a national ideal: Italy finally liberated from the Papacy and mistress of herself.

The passage of time was necessary to attenuate on both sides the feelings of an irreducible conflict. There was needed, too, a policy without shadows on the part of the Papacy toward Italy, so that there would be no further occasion for suspecting possible intrigues with the powers adverse to Italy. Under Leo there were no intrigues, but there seem to have been some imprudent hints, so that with the coming of Pius X, the Pope who stated simply: "*If they gave me Rome, I shouldn't know what to do with it,*" even the spirits hostile to the Papacy had to disarm.

Today, after the Conciliation has been concluded, when we look at almost a century of history of the Roman Church, we can say that Pius IX was the Boniface VIII of the modern epoch. Historical similitudes often are carried too far; but there are in the depths of history recurrent lines which reveal the perennially human and providential background in their reciprocal interactions. Boniface closed the epoch of the medieval Papacy and his Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, had the phraseology and historical motivation of what was to die with him and the dogmatic conclusion of what was to remain perennial. After him there was Avignon, the struggles of the

rising nationalities, the reform that begins to peep through with Wycliff and Huss: it was a new world.

In the same way Pius IX closed the period of the Church allied with the monarchies, that of the Counter-Reformation (from the Treaty of Westphalia to the French Revolution) as well as the period of the Holy Alliance and the Restoration. His protests against errors and new systems did not give life back to what was dead. All that political past was buried with the Breach of Porta Pia.

From the religious and perennial point of view, however, Pius IX gave a living soul to the modern world by himself proclaiming the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and by defining through a new Council the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The Council, which is not yet closed, is an act of Church unity. The four Popes who followed have remade the Catholic world spiritually, but, they, too, have had much troubles in politics. There was the problem of the Roman Question which was for everyone a stumbling block. More agile than the others, Benedict XV acted in such a way that for him that question was not an impediment. However, he had to deal with Article 5 of the London Pact, the Gerlach affair, and the occupation of Palazzo Venezia. Finally, he took the initiative in receiving the heads of the Catholic States who came to Rome, and of abolishing the *non expedit* which had deprived the Italian State of the co-operation of organized Catholic forces. Thus we come to Pius XI to whose lot it finally fell to remove from the Church every residue of temporal power, or, rather, to reduce it to a juridical and religious symbol, "*The State of Vatican City*." He accepted the solution offered him by the Fascist Government. The solution under such circumstances created a delicate situation, which in various ways, was undesirable and dangerous. Today when Fascism has fallen, one can see better what a rough period Pius XI and Pius XII have traversed.

II.

Pius XI and Mussolini

In order to evaluate today's situation, it is necessary to understand the various elements of the solution of the Roman Question given by the Lateran Treaty, by the Concordat, and the other acts attached to them.⁵

The first question that arises in one's mind is the one that has been asked many times: How did Pius XI ever induce himself to negotiate with Mussolini, knowing so well as he did who Mussolini was, how he had come to power, and how he maintained it, through violence, crimes, falsehood, and tyranny? He himself had publicly protested against the destruction of the Catholic clubs of Monza (1924) and the disbanding of all the sport societies, including the Catholic ones (1927). Moreover, it was well known that the philo-Catholicism shown by certain Fascists was for the purpose of deluding the clergy and gaining their support. The elimination of the Catholic labor unions which had formed a confederation of more than a million and two hundred thousand workers and peasants had been opposed by Pius XI since he, as Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, had learned to appreciate their social and moral activity.

The answer to this question, however, was given by Pius XI himself, either in the phrase that the Concordat had given "Italy back to God"—which he firmly believed to be true—or that other phrase he uttered during the lively controversy that followed the signing of the treaty, when he said that he was "ready to negotiate with the devil if thereby

⁵ For this purpose, Binchy's book is truly invaluable. Students of "diplomacy" (in the old sense of the word) will not find in it either the text of the original act, or the various names of the signatories and the witnesses, or the maps and other useful documents; but historians and students of social and religious facts will be aided by it in comprehending the true range and the various implications of the unique problem that was solved on February 11, 1929.

he could save a single soul." On the other hand, Pius XI, coming from a family and an environment of conservatives (Lombardian conservatives could well be called reactionaries), greatly feared Communism which he had experienced directly in Poland when he was there as Papal Nuncio, and accredited Fascism as a movement of order and security, in spite of its really blameworthy methods. Binchy discusses this point, and it is worthwhile to cite him at length:

True, those writers who have accused him of exaggerating the menace of Communism and of the spread of Bolshevism to other countries have been made to look singularly foolish in the light of recent events. It was not that the Pope exaggerated the dangers of Communism; it was rather that he mistook the defenders of traditional Christian civilization against the new barbarism. He believed that democracy was too feeble and incoherent to serve as a dam against the Communist tide, and a strange irony made him turn to the new form of authoritarian government as offering the only hope of successful resistance. He was not, of course, blind to the religious dangers inherent in Fascism and its equivalents elsewhere, but he failed at first to recognize that these dangers nearly all sprang from the essential similarity between these systems and Communism, that all forms of authoritarianism—Fascist, Muscovite, or Hitlerite—have far more in common with each other than any of them has with traditional Christian polity. Nor had he at the time of his election any real appreciation of the forces that give democracy in the hour of crisis a strength and toughness far greater than the most rigid authoritarian system can command; like so many continental ecclesiastics, he identified democracy with that particular brand of secularist Liberalism which it had assumed in his own country. Further, his ideal of Catholic Action, in which the faithful of each country should be organized "outside and above party politics" made him view with disfavor the existing Catholic parliamentary parties, nearly all of which had strong democratic leanings; witness the indifference, not to say satisfaction, with which he viewed the dissolution of the Popolari in Italy. Perhaps too he was not free from the delusion which is even still

common, and to some extent excusable, in ecclesiastical minds: that the authoritarian form of government which is indispensable to the Church should also be most beneficial for the State. If so, he was to learn by bitter experience that the totalitarian State, with its claim to control the whole spiritual life of its subjects, is far more dangerous to religion than the most "indifferent" or secularist democracy. (pp. 85-86.)

Binchy does not ask why the Catholic clergy (the Latin, especially, but the rest as well) should maintain that the authoritarian regime is more advantageous to the Church and religion than the constitutional, democratic regime. Nor does he ask why it was that Fascism was believed to be authoritarian when it had defined itself as *revolutionary* and *totalitarian*. But we can easily answer the first question by pointing out the fact that historical events had bound the Church to the old monarchies, to systems of reciprocal support; this was "natural," we assert, during the period of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, when Reformation kings played the role of Popes in their countries, while the Catholic kings were more or less regarded as ecclesiastical rulers⁶ who sometimes even resisted Rome. The separation began with the American Revolution, and America then was nine-tenths Protestant. The experience of the French Revolution ended with a secularized government that sometimes tried to control the clergy. Little Belgium was separate but the Catholic Party fought its own religious battle, just as the Center in Germany and the Irish in London fought theirs. But at Rome then they preferred to deal with the various governments through diplomacy and concordats, rather than to leave Catholics completely free to fight their own political battles.

For the same reason, up to the last war, Rome counted

⁶ For example, the King of Spain acted as Apostolic Delegate in the Tribunal of Inquisition and the "Ecclesiastical Monarchy" of Sicily, suppressed by Pius IX, had power as Apostolic Delegate for some centuries

upon the ruins of the old monarchies, Vienna and Madrid, in spite of all the political, religious, social and moral disillusionments of the past. For the same reason, too, the French clergy was monarchical even after the appeal of Leo XIII; and the *Action Française* was protected and helped by some members of the French clergy up to the condemnation (1926).

That Fascism should have been believed to be an *authoritarian* system, in the traditional meaning of the word, and not *revolutionary* is to be attributed to Mussolini's propaganda and to his method of double dealing. Many imagined a Mussolini or a Fascism of their own conviction: if the facts turned to be otherwise, either it was Mussolini who deceived Fascism or it was Fascism that deceived Mussolini. Those people hoped that, as time went on, Mussolini and Fascism would become that reality which they wishfully imagined. Certain Catholics created the myth of a "Catholic Fascism"; and, in rebound, the Fascists the other myth of a "Fascist Catholicism." Each one went along his own jolly path.

The error was a psychological one, partly emotional and voluntary, partly resulting from historical and political ignorance and from the intoxication of success which caught everyone in its train. A sociological fact of primary importance was completely forgotten: that Fascism, in order to be a return to authoritarianism, would have to create the conditions suitable to authoritarianism: historical princes, juridical tradition, religious conviction, class division with a closed organization. It was impossible that even a genial man, with a band of companions deprived of convictions and moral principles who formed the nucleus of the central political party, could possibly reconstruct a social order and structure in which the Church could give worth to her moral principles and inculcate them in the people.

The incompatibility between the Church and Fascism

were such that no declaration concerning the "Religion of State" could fill the gap. The conflict was innate, fundamental, irremediable: the acceptance of a Catholicized Fascism (as was done by several in Italy) was a deceit for the Church itself and for the people. The day of clarification must needs come: the fall of Fascism hastened it; but already the war itself, wanted and preached by Fascists as the only means for the renewal of the world under the dominion of the Axis, had caused the bandage to fall from the eyes of many Catholics of Italy and of other countries of the world.

Catholics in a Totalitarian State

The central point of the question was (as it still is today, since, although Fascism has fallen, its derivations have not disappeared) whether and to what extent Catholics could collaborate with a totalitarian State in which, by definition, no individual liberty exists and there is complete subordination of everyone and everything to a blind, sovereign will. This question was discussed by this writer in his book, *Politics and Morality*⁷ and in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* of Louvain.⁸ The thesis sustained here is that in a free regime all collaboration is *morally* possible because all dissension is politically permitted; whereas in a totalitarian regime, on the contrary, since political disagreement is not permitted, collaboration becomes *morally* impossible.

But then why is it, the adversaries of the Church ask, that for over a century down to our day Catholics have been more for reaction than for liberty? From the historical point of view it can be answered that there has been among Catholics a stronger democratic minority holding free ideas and policy (I do not say *liberal* in order to avoid misunderstand-

⁷ *Politics and Morality*, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1938. Cf. Chap. V. "The Ethics of Political Collaboration."

⁸ October, 1938.

ing), which for a century has struggled and is still struggling on the side of democracy and liberty: history records in this group the names of O'Connell, Lacordaire, Montalembert, Father Ventura, Rosmini, Windthorst, Toniolo, and a thousand others. The parties called Catholic, Christian Democratic, or Popular have a history that must come to the surface. But on the other side there has been historically fear: fear of *Liberalism* first, of *Socialism* next, of *Bolshevism* finally. Many Catholics belong to the bourgeois class; the clergy itself (of whatever descent it may be) is more or less disposed to support the conservative classes: all that has absolutely nothing to do with the Church itself *as such*, but it influences *human* attitudes of all religious centers, Catholic or Protestant. And if, on the other hand, one takes into account the fact that all extreme parties like to call themselves *revolutionary* and often take as their point of departure the denial of Christianity (Rousseau, Marx, or Lenin), it can be seen how this fact, too, has its importance, even today, in the historical attitudes of the Papacy.

I know that some think that there is a "dogmatic" (?) impossibility for Catholics to be democrats: they often cite the celebrated distinction made by the *Civiltà Cattolica* at the time when the *Syllabus* was issued (1864) between *thesis* and *hypothesis*, maintaining that the Catholic *thesis* is reaction and authoritarianism (expressed by the *Syllabus* and other Papal documents) and the *hypothesis* is liberty and democracy, to be accepted only as a tolerable reality, as is done by American Catholics. Thus, they arrive at the conclusion (opposite to the one reached by the author of this book) that Fascism was protected by the Church as more suitable to her than democracy.

I should like to take this opportunity to try to destroy the myth that has been created around this matter of the distinction between *thesis* and *hypothesis*. The *thesis* constitutes the ethical and religious principles of society which Chris-

tion asserts and proclaims. The *hypothesis* constitutes the various historical realizations of society, wherever, in one way or another, they are effectuated and put into concrete form in institutions, customs and laws of diverse worth. Thus, the living reality is always an *hypothesis*, i.e., a given realization (unfortunately incomplete and limited, as men are in our individual lives) of those principles that are eternal, since they are based on the natural law and on revelation.

Political society may be authoritarian, patriarchal, feudal, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. Any one of these realizations is not the *thesis*; it is the *hypothesis*. In each realization there will always be deficiencies from the ethical and religious point of view, wherefore, reforms will *always* be necessary, and there will always be a struggle to eliminate these deficiencies. The Church has proclaimed a thousand times that she is indifferent to any political form whatsoever, provided morality and religion are respected. But she accentuates first one point then another of the ethical and religious principles, according as they are lacking in society. Thus the *Syllabus* defended the religious (not political) supereminence of the Church when, in the name of Liberalism, it was deprived of many traditional rights. If the clergy, in defending the Church, often defended those regimes to which it was bound, it did so for two reasons: because the historical system is changed with difficulty and not without struggles involving ecclesiastical organization, though not the Church; and, secondly, because of the lack of experience of a regime of liberty in which the Church might have such advantages (human, of course) as would compensate for the too costly ones derived from the support given to the monarchies or the aristocracies on which was constructed the society of the eighteenth century and the hastily reconstructed society of the Restoration in the nineteenth century.

If, today, Catholics accentuate (as do Maritain and the

French Personalist movement) the rights of the human person in a society that they call "pluralistic" and find a broad basis for their stand in pontifical documents, it is precisely because present-day society is individualistic and hence the accent is put more upon the person. During the centuries following the Reformation, society was rather *Communitarian* (in closed unities); the accent at that time was put on the rights of the single communities represented by the head: *Cuius regio illius et religio*. Neither in the first case, nor in the second were all the ethical and religious theses of the social system actualized; we simply have to be content with the immortal values represented by the theses, and the limitations of human conditioning, individual and social, represented in fact by the hypotheses.

Today we say that democracy is the regime that is closest to social perfection. Yesterday many Catholics, supporting themselves by St. Thomas (according to me without understanding his mind) saw social perfection in monarchy. While we cannot admit a deterministic human progress, we must grant the fact that humanity makes progress in its experiences, and that between a monarchy (absolute, of course) and a democracy there is no comparison. But, everything in its time; human hypothesis (or realizations) are infinite. A monarchy *à la Charlemagne* (which is not according to my taste) is preferable to a democracy like that between 1792-95 in France.

Church and State after Fascism

From the viewpoint of history the mistake made by politicians, literary and ecclesiastical men in Italy and elsewhere was in believing that after the liberal-democratic experience of the *Risorgimento*, Italy could return to an authoritarian system, already outdated, by means of the imposition of an armed party, Fascism; and that, once the power was obtained,

the social classes and organizations would adjust themselves under the double monarchical-dictatorial system. Pius XI thought of the Concordat as a means for influencing morally the political structure of Fascism. He did the same thing with Hitler: but he well perceived that with neither dictator could he "concord" or "collaborate." With the fall of Fascism, for a little while there ceased in Italy those threatening attitudes (even when not expressed), those requests for compromising aids, that co-operation given without conviction, with continual interior resentments, often revealed in generic or cryptic terms in discourses and addresses composed to tell the truth and avoid conflicts at the same time. What insupportable years were those from 1929 to 1943.

In his conclusion, *Future Outlook*, Binchy puts as a heading to Chapter XXV a quotation from Pius XI's discourse to the Lenten preachers on the very day of the Conciliation (February 11, 1929): "another doubt: what will tomorrow bring? This question leaves us still more tranquil, because we can answer simply: We do not know. The future is in the hands of God, and, therefore, in good hands." In uttering those words Pius XI showed his tranquil conscience in having authorized the signatures of the Lateran Treaty as an act of duty, and, hence, his faith in Divine Providence.

From the spiritual point of view there ought not to be and there is no man more tranquil and calm than the good Christian who, with a pure conscience, awaits events, even when it may happen that involuntarily he has prepared the way for results contrary to those he would zealously desire and had intended.

In the present case, human prevision leads us to see a better future for the Church in Italy than in the past, the whole past from the *Risorgimento* to our day. First of all, there are no longer any motives for combat against the Church in the economic field, as was the case a century ago when ecclesiastical mortmain occupied almost a third of

national property; nor are there insurmountable motives for struggle in the political field, as during the time the temporal power, which was an obstacle both to the unification of the nation of Italy and to the formation of a constitutional regime as a basis for political liberties.

The fall of the monarchy, as the result of the popular Referendum of June 2, 1946, has removed a motive of suspicion that the Holy See, after the Conciliation, supported the House of Savoy against the republican trend of the people. Such a suspicion was quite unjustified, but the monarchist parties increased it with their propaganda, spreading it as the truth. The strange and irreverent resentment, and in some cases even outrages, of the monarchist mob against churches, nuns and priests, following the results of the Referendum, has been a new proof that the Holy See had not interfered in such a political question, leaving the clergy and laity free to make their own choice.

The experience of Fascism caused even the most retrograde man to comprehend that in the twentieth century one can no longer return to an authoritarian system except through the superimposition by force of a single class or a single armed party upon the rest of the population. And if this party demands the help of the Church, it involves the Church in the abuses of the political power. The episode of the Ethiopian War will always remain a dark blot of shame on the civil and religious history of Italy, manifesting on excessively nationalistic feelings even among Italian clergy.

The Church has always been characterized by the internationalism of its own activity. In the Ancient Era, the Middle Ages, and the Modern Period, the Roman clergy and Roman thought had never been particularist, but universal. The trend of Rome and its tradition had always been on the universal plane. This, not only because the Bishop of Rome is Peter's successor and shepherd of all the

faithful, but, also, from the human point of view, because the juridical, political and social education led to the surmounting of every local particularism. From this point of view, the temporal power served to preserve the clergy from provincialism and to strengthen in it a truly universal spirit.

After the capture of Rome in 1870, during fifty-nine years of discord, the clergy of the Curia (and many of the others in Italy) remained aloof from the participation in political interests and life. They remained bound to the Pope in his perennial protest as the defender of those rights which the State would not recognize. But after the Lateran Treaty a fury of nationalism burst forth in Italy, a nationalism identified with Fascism, and both seemed united to the Catholic idea. Never did Italy experience a nationalistic fever like that of the past twenty years, a fever that gripped much of the people and the clergy. An exception to this fever were those of democratic ideas and those in direct contact with the wretched condition of the poor, such as the country parish-priests.

Pertinax, the well-known French writer, raising the problem of the relation between the Church and Italian nationalism as soon as the Conciliation had been concluded, proposed as a remedy the changing of the number of Italian and non-Italian cardinals to strengthen the International spirit of the Roman center. Such a solution has been reached by Pius XII in his first nomination of thirty-two cardinals (February 1946). But it is also necessary that the structure of the ecclesiastical center be adequate to its importance, that its tradition be vivifying and perennial, that the political debates of the various States enter the Bronze Gate already internationalized, that the environment be saturated with its own character. That has been and is the special virtue of the Roman clergy and that of the lay world that has specialized in the services of the Vatican.

Let it not be believed that the environment of a capital

city, of a center, of a tradition bound to a material reality such as a city, is unimportant. Paris is what it is because it has a tradition of politics, culture, and art that neither New York, nor London, nor Berlin has. Rome has been Papal from the time Constantine abandoned it until 1929. In the period of the liberal governments, too, an attempt was made to make a political Rome, or a worldly Rome, or a Rome of modern edifices. A complete fiasco: the monument to Victor Emmanuel that was to mark the beginning of a historical national greatness, seemed, and it still does today, an absurd intrusion within the walls of Rome. Mussolini cut, mended, destroyed, remade: forums and statues, civil and military buildings. Fascism was to be the historical synthesis of two empires in the world: the Roman and the Catholic. A failure! Rome became Papal once again when the Allied bombs fell on San Lorenzo and when, on the night of July 25, the people acclaimed the Pope for the fall of Mussolini, the Pope who had not had and could not have had any part in it.

The new popular governments will have to renounce, for their part, any attempt to transform Rome into a lay and political city (after two attempts have failed), any attempt to stamp it with buildings of a new grandeur to vie with the ancient Rome. Let Rome be the Capital of Italy, well and good; but Rome is more than ever the Seat of Catholicism. The Italian Republic is now a reality; and though the monarchist party will continue to stir up the mob here and there, it is an achievement that cannot be overthrown. The Church in Italy is now freer than before; the Lateran Treaty will be respected and the Concordat with some changes will continue to regulate the relations between Church and State. It is possible that new questions will arise that oblige the hierarchy to take a stand, like those of private schools or the divorce; but these or other questions are of the same character as the question of birth control or

the equal opportunities for schools in England and in the United States. But, as Italy is the country to which belongs the honor and the burden of having in its territory Rome as the See of Peter, she cannot, therefore, avoid the historical effects of such providential destiny. Everything can happen: but Divine Providence guides the Papacy—through the hardest experiences—to an ever greater importance and elevation, so that the terrestrial supports on which it counted in the past become ever less necessary and less useful, while the moral and spiritual authority of the Pope emerges ever more luminous over the whole world.

3

Has Fascism Ended with Mussolini?

I.

Mussolini and Fascism

MUSSOLINI'S FASCISM—that of the Blackshirts, of banners bearing the skull-and-bones emblem, of the so-called Roman salute, of parades, punitive expeditions with muskets, clubs and castor oil, of the East African Empire and the Albanian Kingdom—may be called dead, even buried. But the Fascism that antedates Mussolini, the Fascism of all times and all countries—that brand of Fascism never dies. It adapts itself, instead, to all climates and all temperatures; it dresses according to the fashion, disguises itself and hides. That brand of Fascism has not died because it is deathless.

The destiny of names, like that of men, is strange. Fascism was an insignificant name: it was taken from the Lictorian fasces of ancient Rome to indicate power or strength in union. Mussolini and a group of First World War veterans chose it to differentiate themselves from (or even to oppose, out of jealousy) the *Arditismo*, the name taken by the followers of D'Annunzio who had excited popular fancy with the expedition of Fiume (1920). *Arditismo* was derived from *arditi* (the bold; the daring; the audacious), a name given in the Italian army to those squadrons and groups appointed for daring attacks and difficult undertakings. (In other countries similar groups were called death or suicide squadrons,

and by other colorful or degrading names.) Mussolini invented the name of *Fascio* (bundle); from that were later derived *Fascista* and, finally *Fascismo*. It is so easy to invent a new name; the difficulty lay in giving the name a meaning. This difficulty was greater because the author really meant so little himself.

Mussolini came from the Left Wing of Socialism; he had, as an ideal, the social revolution, or rather the Revolution (with a capital R) as means and as an end. It was no wonder that Mussolini, even when he was a dictator, could not help affirming the revolution that had been made and the revolution that was to come. In all his youth he had heard nothing but talk of revolution and its exaltation as a world palinogenesis.

It worried him that Italian Socialism was dominated by the reforming wing with Turati and Bissolati at the head, that within it there prevailed the founders and administrators of co-operatives, popular banks and labor unions, that these leaders thought of everything except revolution. During the Libyan War he tried to arouse the people against the government; he succeeded only in some sporadic demonstrations, tearing up railroad tracks and massing crowds of women and children in front of trains transporting troops. The attempt failed. Another revolt was tried later in Ancona in 1913; it was called "The Red Week"; it, too, failed. (The Socialist leaders of that time did not want to participate in the government in order not to collaborate with the capitalistic bourgeoisie and did not promote revolution, except in words, because the occasion was not deemed mature.) Mussolini could not thus await its hour, and, seizing the opportunity offered by the World War in which Italian public opinion was favorable to intervention on the Allies' side, he suddenly left the Socialists and their newspaper, *L'Avanti* (of which he was chief editor), and founded a new newspaper at Milan with the subsidy of the French Govern-

ment. During the war, his name became popular because he knew how to write with ease polemics against his former companions for their neutrality, while he boosted, in his turn, that exaggerated and inconsistent nationalism which was then in vogue.

When the war ended, the working masses and a good part of the middle classes and veterans flocked to the Social-Communist Party (Socialists and Communists were at the time fused) and to the Christian Democratic Party (then called the Popular Party). Mussolini found himself with a handful of companions, but without followers. The dreamed-for revolution was escaping from his hands. He thought of an extreme program that should be republican, anti-clerical, anticapitalist and nationalist; this was the 1919 program of the first *Fascio* created at Milan. The workers did not follow him; those to the Left did not believe in his program. In the meantime, for the anti-Socialist struggle, Mussolini got money from the industrialists and landowners of the Valley of the Po, help from the heads of the army, and favor from the bankers and some politicians.

What decided Mussolini to leave the Left and pass to the Right, always, of course, as a revolutionary, was the fact (a revelation for him) that in the general political elections of November, 1919, he was not able to obtain—with the system of proportional representation so favorable for small parties—a single seat in parliament, either for himself or for others of his Party, whereas the Socialists (together with the Communists) obtained 158 seats and the Popularists (Christian Democrats) 99 seats.

The Fascist revolution had no appeal at that time. Mussolini would find an audience whenever he would exaggerate the Bolshevist peril, whenever he would send his armed squads to burn co-operatives and assail Municipal Palaces of the Communes administered by Socialists. And, since the hatred that the industrialists and agrarians bore against trade

unions was also directed against the Christian Democrats, the "punitive" expeditions made by the Fascists were extended to the men and institutions of the Popular Party.

In this undertaking Mussolini found those aids from the capitalist and "liberal" sides that he never could have dreamed of obtaining had he continued to be a revolutionary of the Left. He shifted his republicanism to an understanding with the Monarchy, his anticlericalism to amity with the clergy, his social revolution to the support of the capitalists. His success was assured.

This is not the occasion to retell its history: there are thousands of books, *pro* and *con*, and many others will be written on the subject. I mention it only to arrive at the principal fact that I intend to emphasize: the lack in him of convictions and stable principles. Thus the revolutionary menace served him only as a means for achieving power, it mattered not a jot whether with the help of the working masses or against the same masses. Once power was obtained, the revolutionary menace served to support him against the working masses or against the bourgeois classes; against the Church or against Freemasonry, as needed. And thus did Mussolini work during all his life, in the national field as well as in the international, by creating around himself boundless expectations and limitless distrusts, until, finally, his game could no longer serve him. When he bound himself to the fate of Hitler, he suddenly lost his personal character, his political consistency, even his physical figure; he returned to his real being: the mask that falls, the stage performer that returns behind the scenes, the shadow that disappears.

Totalitarianism

The difference between Mussolini on one side and Franco, Pétain, Dollfuss and Salazar on the other, lies precisely in this, that Mussolini never believed in Fascism as an ideal

and as a principle. He made use of it only as a technique for power, while the others, though they adapted to the particular situation of their countries the Fascist technique, believed or still believe in non-Fascist ideals (I should say ideals of authoritarianism and conservatism) which have been or are the basis of their action. Notwithstanding this, they, too, are to be blamed, in measure with their actions for having introduced, either in the acquisition or in the exercise of power, Fascist methods which exceed by a long stretch the authoritarian and arbitrary methods of princes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Franco and the others represent an intermediate phase between the antiliberal authoritarianism of the Holy Alliance and the Fascism of Mussolini. The element that characterizes them is that political or clerical Catholicism of the beginning of the past century which opposed every constitutional system, every form of political liberty. Liberty was then badly understood by clericals but it could have been relinked to the Christian tradition of popular sovereignty and to the democratic regime. These Catholics were the late heirs of such a clericalism; they saw in Fascism a system of "popular" reaction and a means (however violent) of political recovery which made possible that Corporative State by which, according to them, the authority of the State would be reconciled with the well-being of the working classes. They accepted Fascism as a method capable of overcoming the demagoguery of the Socialists and the subversiveness of the Communists. Moreover, in their antihistorical religious conception they saw again in action the collaboration of the State with the Catholic Church, through concordats, or even without, but with the mutual aid of favors and services.

How far all of this was from true Fascism (from which Nazism took a great deal) as well as from the democratic concept of Western civilization has been seen during the war and will be seen better still after the war by those coun-

tries which will have a chance of not falling into the Moscow "sphere of influence." The others will pass from one totalitarianism to another and God alone knows when they will be able to breathe the air of liberty or, at least, have assured the elementary right of human personality.

Mussolini (who had "genialoid" intuitions) invented the adjective "totalitarian" and applied it to his system with the celebrated affirmation: "Nothing out of the State, above the State, against the State; everything from the State, for the State, and in the State." From that sprang the substantive: *totalitarismo* (the English and Americans say *totalitarianism*) and from that time the two words entered into all languages without the permission of linguists even, or of the compilers of dictionaries.

Totalitarianism is the common qualification that can be applied to Mussolini's Fascism, Hitler's Nazism, Stalin's Communism, Franco's Falangism and so forth. It is understood that between the concentration camps of Dachau or Buchenwald and those of the deportees to Siberia from one side and the "Confino" in the Islands of Ponza, Ustica, Lipari and Pantelleria there was some difference; that between Hitler's or Stalin's purges and Mussolini's State Defense Court there was also some difference; that between the suppression of the Jews in Germany and the laws against the Jews in France and Italy there was some difference. The Latin temperament and the relative traditions enter into the account, but when the human beast is in the clutches of fear or hatred, at bottom it is always the same. This has been seen during the war in those zones of Italy under the Nazi and Fascist yoke.

If real Fascism, the Mussolinian brand, has fallen, totalitarianism survives its unhappy "literary" author, because at bottom it lived before him. Napoleon Bonaparte gave a first sample of it to the modern world; the ancients were called tyrants, but the peoples of that time and the Church knew

how to resist tyrants or avoid their clutches; today, both peoples and Church have been and are still less equipped to resist totalitarianisms. There is still another difference between totalitarianism and ancient tyranny; the latter was personal or of the family or caste, and did not claim to appeal to the people for its consent or to solicit their national sentiments or their social aspirations; it is modern totalitarianism that calls the people into its orbit, regiments them for its own ends and constrains them to servitude through a single party. Today only two such parties survive: the Communist and the Falangist. The latter is about to fall because Franco at last doubts the system, the Spanish Church from having been tepid and tolerant now has become opposed to Falangism as a system.

Instead, Communist totalitarianism is spreading and is becoming a terrible heir of the Fascisms of Pilsudski, Horthy, Schuschnigg, Antoniescu, and of the various Serbian and Bulgarian dictators. We shall not speak of what Germany occupied by the Russians will be; there, a new totalitarianism will be "justified" by military and even (why not?) "educational" reasons for extracting the poison of Nazi totalitarianism from the Germans. Let us hope it will not be so: hope never dies.

II.

The Fascist Residues and "Statal Monism"

On the other hand, let us see what may be the Fascist residues in the western countries which are presumed to be, now or in the future, democracies. We begin, of course, with Italy.

It cannot be denied that there exists in that country signs of Fascist survival. I do not speak of the monarchy, which, although infected with Fascism for so many long years, as an institution cannot be called Fascist. But the men of the

House of Savoy, the entourage of high officials, of court people, of defenders and supporters of the monarchy (outside of the Liberal *élite* around Croce) has a more or less Fascist mentality. This is not said with the purpose of crying: "Wolf, Wolf"; some Fascists there are in all the parties: those who were Fascists to earn their livelihood, others because of a nationalistic spirit, and, also, some who really believed in Fascism. Ninety per cent of them were deceived or attracted by the enviroing atmosphere (as many were in foreign countries outside Italy), but they had no crimes for which they had to answer before their judges. It is their mentality, their spirit, their education that must be changed. It will be changed assuredly. Indeed, it is in the process of changing and events teach more than words.

This post-Fascism may have some influence but in itself it causes no fear. There is another Fascism to be feared. If Italy is further humiliated politically and submitted to territorial mutilations and the loss of colonies, willy-nilly, a nationalism of resentment will develop widely, Fascist ideas and secret Fascist propaganda (which will not be lacking) will kindle a fire that it will be very difficult to extinguish, even though during certain periods it will remain under ashes.

Another post-Fascism is that of street violence against opposing parties, practiced today by certain Communist groups against Christian Democrats, by certain local groups in southern Italy against Socialists and Communists, and by the Separatists in Sicily against their adversaries. Demagogues are not lacking to threaten in the newspapers of the Left even a civil war if what they propose is not allowed.

It can be said that this spirit of violence is a product of the war and that it is not lacking in any European country; but for a country such as Italy which, besides the wars (and what wars!), has had more than twenty years of Fascism in power and, before that, three more years of street Fascism,

the spirit of violence assumes a character that I should call endemic and which gives food for thought.

Misery, hunger, inflation, the black market, the secret terms of the Armistice, workers' unemployment, the fall of money, have influenced and are influencing banefully the creation of a general state of mind which (would that I were mistaken) I should call either pre-Fascist or pretotalitarian, even if, as I believe, it will not go as far as the Communist experiment—unless London and Washington (through their lack of comprehension and their mistakes) push Italy toward that line.

What we say of Italy may be said, with variants adapted to each case, of all the Latin countries, even of the neutral countries of the Iberian peninsula which likewise have an indigenous Fascism and which, notwithstanding their neutrality, do not fail to feel the economical, psychological and political effects of the war.

What is surprising is to find wide traces of Fascism in England as well as in America. Let not the reader marvel. When Winston Churchill, on December 15, 1944, could announce to the House of Commons with a sense of tranquillity that about ten million persons will be *disentangled* from local populations and *transferred*, also expelled, within or outside of Poland, and that this will be done *humanly* with modern means at *our disposal*, one remains incredulous, uncertain whether such an affirmation is being made in a country of liberal tradition, or whether its authors are Mussolini or Kemal Pashà. Mussolini succeeded in transferring only about eighty thousand Tyroleans and Kemal Pashà only about one million Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia.

But the greatest astonishment has been caused not only by the lack of spiritual reaction on the part of the English people against a violation of this kind of the rights of human personality, but by the consent of many political men, states-

men, scientists, journalists, clerics and laity. Even Benes and his government had proposed to purify Czechoslovakia of Sudeten Germans (to be shipped to Germany), the Hungarian Government had proposed the same measure for Germans and other minorities of Hungary, pushing them out beyond the boundaries. This "readjustment of populations" against the individual will of each person, against his personal rights, his interests and family ties, under the pretext of a homogeneous race, national interests, state security, is the summit of injustice and is in line with Fascist criteria of the rights of the State over individuals.

It is true that similar transfers of populations were not lacking in the eras of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; but in those times the populations were given the option of staying and submitting to civil and religious limitations or of emigrating where they would find a benevolent prince or a free zone as in America. But, for us, those wars, those deportations were barbarities against which succeeding centuries reacted. That from the House of Commons was to come a similar proposal which did not find a chorus of disapprovals was something that gave one thoughtful concern. That Fascist totalitarianism should have reached the point of defiling Gladstone's country!

But there was worse still: the proposal to make slaves of German laborers for the reconstruction of the occupied countries. It is one thing to exact an indemnity from the German people, obliging the new German State to distribute the burdens as best it may; it is another thing to oblige definite individuals, who have the fortune or misfortune of being masons, carpenters, smiths, engineers and such to undergo years of servitude in a foreign country. No matter how much it may be organized, such a "service" is always a form of war slavery, discarded (we thought) forever. That this should be demanded by Moscow causes no surprise, considering the dictatorial mentality and their Czarist,

Leninist traditions; but by some people in Paris, in London, in Brussels . . . !

If anyone reads the proposals of certain American scientists, usually of positivistic mentality, and the proposals, sometimes too, of the man in the street, he finds suggestions that cause amazement. There are some who propose the sterilization of all the Japanese; others, convinced of the impossibility of "educating" the Germans, propose their destruction. If I myself had not read with my own eyes these proposals, some mad, others criminal, I should not believe it possible that they should have been made. But the worst is that they found reception in the press and that unconscious journalists and editors, anxious about circulation, did not think of throwing them into the wastepaper basket, instead of giving diffusion to such ideas. These ideas penetrate into the depths of consciousness, they find a hearing in some spheres of public opinion, they accustom the common mentality to find these things natural, or rather, inherent, in the spirit of the time. And there are no voices of protest except those usual few and weak ones that end by not counting.

The fundamental error of Fascism was the contempt for human personality. This contempt is at the basis of every anti-Christian concept of man and it became characteristic of the Fascism that wanted to deify the State and identify itself with it in Mussolini's celebrated epiphonema recorded above, "Nothing outside, above or against the State; everything from the State, for the State, in the State." It is worth recalling that Pius XI raised his voice against such a theory many times, from the Christmas allocution of 1926 up to the very end of his life.

Fascism derived this attitude from the Positivists of the nineteenth century. They, however, counterbalanced their concept of the State with that vague humanitarianism which, at least, caused them to take into account the interests and

rights of man (I say "rights," though no true Positivist can admit that rights exist, since rights have a spiritual content).

But when the humanitarianism of the past century declined as being inconsistent with Positivism, human personality had no other defense except that of the play of forces in conflict: the class struggle of Karl Marx served Socialism and frightened the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie caused liberty, for which it had fought for two centuries, to collapse. There was, moreover, no other solution in the politico-economic field, except "Statal Monism," either in the name of the nation (Fascism), of the race (Nazism) or, on the other side, in the name of the class (Communism). Such iron unification crumbled for Fascism and Nazism only on the field of battle; it has not crumbled for Communism which, because of the effects of the present war, is thriving among the European masses.

But Communism itself, from the economic and political viewpoint is but the other face of capitalism, to which it seems to be antagonistic. Modern society is based on a capitalistic system and cannot do without it. Whether capital is in the hands of a few capitalists or in the hands of the bureaucracy of the Communist State is insignificant incidence if both are responsible for the appalling phenomena of our times: the totalitarian war and the new slavery of industrialized labor. But it would be worse indeed if capitalism and Communism make an alliance in the international field in order to create a joint power for common aims even though over distinct spheres of influence. Their totalitarianism would then cover all human activities.

In such an event our modern society would endure the last consequences of that political and social "Monism," which for the past century has infected philosophy, science, politics, economics and public opinion, weakening one by one all the institutions that our Judeo-Christian civilizations built up in defense of human personality.

The Anglo-American and the Scandinavian democracies themselves, which more than the other European democracies have maintained Christian ideas and feelings through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation periods and the following revivals, are no longer capable of finding those moral convictions which, if truly felt, can draw out of the minds and hearts of peoples the venom of positivism. They also, of course, are going to encounter some experiences of totalitarianism.

It makes no difference if we call it Fascism or Communism: though each be placed at the opposite ends of the arch of a pendulum, they have the same impulses, the same fundamental concepts, namely: the spirit of violence and the use of force as a means to acquire and maintain power, the subordination of the legal rights and moral values of the human personality to the interests of the State, the loss, be it gradual or violent, of Liberty!

4

Christian Democracy

I.

The First Signs (1815-48)

AT THE end of the Napoleonic Wars Europe was in the process of bringing to maturity two great movements that were to cover the whole nineteenth century: one for constitutional regimes, among the bourgeois classes; the other for economic guarantees, among the working classes. The first of these movements gave origin to *Liberalism*; the other to *Socialism*.

When we speak of "liberalism" we must remember that in Europe there was not a single "liberalism" but various theoretical and practical forms, distinct in nationality (French, English, Italian, Spanish, and even German, Austrian, Hungarian liberalism) and in character (philosophical, religious, political, economic liberalism). Nor did socialism ever have a precise definition: its various phases are indicated by the names of their leaders (such as Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen, Engels, Henry George, and the most famous of all, Karl Marx) or by their varying characteristics (Anarchical, Syndicalist, Communist, Christian Democratic) according to the prevalent economic and political pattern.

More than the working classes, it was really the bourgeoisie who, during the first half of the nineteenth century, kept gaining positions in the economic and political fields in the name of liberty by inaugurating individualistic sys-

tems that facilitated their ascent. On the other hand the working masses were agitating and attempting to reorganize themselves in order to make headway against exploitation by a nascent capitalistic industry. It is necessary to keep in mind this dynamic process of the two principal classes of Continental Europe in order to understand the role enacted by the authorities of the Catholic Church and by Catholics themselves from that time to the present day.

When one speaks of the Catholic Church it is necessary to avoid the error of attributing to bishops and Popes every initiative made by the faithful or the local clergy, or of isolating Popes and bishops from the faithful themselves. In the question that we are to examine we shall find individual, unauthorized initiatives (sometimes opposed at the time of origin) that afterward insert themselves into the general activity of Catholics and eventually obtain sanction; or else, other initiatives which in the beginning seem favored by ecclesiastic authorities and then gradually end by being merely tolerated, or opposed and even condemned. The Church, like every living, moral body, assimilates or rejects theories and practices of the earthly society, viewing them only from the point of view of Christian doctrine and morality. The historical developments deriving therefrom may be unwanted by the ecclesiastical authorities and can pervade society in an entirely autonomous manner.

The Popes of the beginning of the nineteenth century, and many bishops too, were opposed to movements called liberal. In the Restoration and Holy Alliance period there prevailed the point of view of return to a prerevolutionary past. There was fear of liberty, and while admitting parliaments (as in France and Bavaria) they tried to restrict their functions and limit their importance. Still remembering the excesses of the French Revolution and the movements of the masses in revolt, some of them believed that by restoring

the privileges of the nobles, clergy and monarchies, it was possible to hold in check the liberal groups and parties.

The effects of such a policy, directed by Vienna for the whole of Europe and agreed to by all the other powers, including England until Canning's arrival, were contrary to the trend of European interest and order. There were thirty years of conspiracies, revolts, repressions, civil wars. In 1830 France changed king and regime, and Belgium obtained her independence. In 1848 Sicily was the first to convene parliament on her own initiative and to proclaim on January 12 the revolt and war against the King of Naples. Pius IX, who had aroused the enthusiasm of the whole world for his nomination to Pope in 1846 and for the political amnesty that followed it, granted his constitution. France ousted her king and proclaimed the Second Republic. There were uprisings in Munich, Prague, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest. Even the bourgeoisie was frightened and hastened to return to absolutism, except in Belgium and Piedmont.

In this period many Catholics had been for constitutional liberties in spite of the fact that often local ecclesiastical authorities were hostile: indeed, it would be impossible to understand the movements in Ireland, Belgium, France, Italy, the Rhineland, and Bohemia without taking into account the favorable attitude and initiative taken by eminent Catholics, the clergy, and laity.

The most noted of the Catholic leaders of the time was Daniel O'Connell in Ireland; to him is due the first political awakening of his island. His activity was not always pleasing to Rome; but he was admired as the champion of Catholicism and liberty.

The revolt of Belgium, its separation from Holland, and the constitutional form adopted were due to the masses and their leaders, who knew how to unite the national and Catholic spirit of the country to a profound feeling of liberty.

Another champion arose in Germany: the Westphalian

priest, von Ketteler. He was a deputy to the Diet of Frankfurt in 1848, and there upheld the principle of liberty. Afterward, he, as the Bishop of Mainz, espoused the Christian concept of property—the first indication of social laws that he later developed at Offenbach.

In France, the new movement for liberty was guided by the Abbé de Lamennais, with whom the youths Lacordaire and Montalembert had become associated. In 1832, Gregory XVI condemned some principles upheld by the newspaper they published, *l'Avenir* (although the Pope did not mention it by name). Lamennais rebelled and ended outside of the Church; Montalembert and Lacordaire submitted and continued their political-social activity so that we find the latter a deputy to the Parliament of Paris in 1848, and the former in the House of Peers sustaining the political and social principles that were afterward to be those of Christian Democracy.

In the meantime there arose in France a first class youth who through his initiative and culture was to become an international figure: Frederic Ozanam. He was the first to give the real meaning of democracy and to affirm it in the difficult period between 1847 and 1853, not only from his professorial chair at the Sorbonne, but also through his newspaper and his organizational activity.

In Italy at that time the greatest proponent of liberty and democracy among Catholics was the Sicilian Theatine, Gioacchino Ventura, who after 1849 was forced to go into exile. His celebrated discourses in Rome on Daniel O'Connell (1847) and on the dead of Vienna (1848), his defense of the Sicilian revolt (1848) and his insistence that Pius IX should maintain the constitution, earned for him the hatred of reactionaries. Another great man, more famous than Ventura, and also a friend of Pius IX, was the philosopher who founded a religious congregation, the Abbé Antonio Rosmini Serbati, favorable to constitutional liberties and to

the liberation of Italy from Austria. He, too, was persecuted by reactionaries.

Catholics, before 1848, headed an important intellectual, historical and literary movement which later became political. It was baptized Neo-Guelph because to the ideas of liberty and national independence they united an understanding with the Papacy in an interstate Italian federation. The Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti was its exponent with his *The Primacy of Italians* and Cesare Balbo with his *The Hopes of Italy*. Both of them were later ministers of the Subalpine Government. With the failure of the revolutionary uprisings of 1848 not only in Italy but also in all of Europe, and after Pius IX had gone into exile at Gaeta and had changed his policy, Neo-Guelphism fell as a political ideal. Liberal Catholics (among whom the greatest was Alessandro Manzoni, a poet and philosopher of international fame) joined the other liberal current without, however, renouncing their religious faith.

While the bourgeoisie in Europe was constructing the Constitutional State—called 'Liberal' from the prevalent current, but in fact a mixture of liberalism, conservatism and radicalism—the workers and peasant classes were held out of politics by lack of the right to vote, which was restricted at that time to income and tax-paying groups. The industrial workers had no guarantees of economic security, while the peasants were in wretched circumstances, oppressed by usury and in certain countries still wearing the chains of their traditional servitude to the soil.

Under such conditions two movements developed in Europe during the period: one for economic reform and the other for the political rights of the working classes. The latter asked for the political vote; the former appealed to revolt.

The year 1848 not only marked the political revolution of the bourgeoisie, it marked also the social-economic revolt

of the masses. The Communist Manifesto bears that date; Marx emerges as the new prophet.

Another voice was contemporary to that of Marx; a voice certainly feebler and heard by few at the moment, but which had far-reaching effects—the voice of the Frenchman, Frederic Ozanam, for Christian Democracy. Ozanam was prepared to speak. In his commercial law course given at Lyons in 1839-40 he had already shown that he possessed a clear vision of the social problems of the time and the necessity for adequate, urgent measures. In his trips through Italy he came into contact with Gioacchino Ventura. Ozanam realized the necessity for Catholics to dedicate themselves to social and political reforms. His celebrated phrase was “On to the Barbarians.” The modern barbarians were the working classes in revolt who were erupting into the political world. Catholics, he maintained, should support their just claims.¹

Ozanam wrote in 1848: “Let us give up our repugnances and resentments and turn toward that democracy, that people that does not know us. Let us woo them not only with our preaching but with our good deeds. Let us help them, not only with those alms which make man obliged to man, but with our efforts to obtain for them institutions that will set them free and improve them.”

And in September of the same year (year of struggles, hopes, delusions) when he was directing in Paris *l'Ère Nouvelle* (*The New Era*), he wrote to his brother: “I have believed and still believe in the possibility of Christian Democracy; I do not even believe in anything else in the political field. . . .”

Ozanam was the prophet of the social activity of Catholics. Through him the term “Christian Democracy” entered into the consciousness of his followers—it matters not whether

¹ Ozanam wrote his favorite book on *Christian Civilization in the Fifth Century* in 1843.

few or many, for it inspired far reaching social and political action.

Though Ozanam is known by many only as a great historical critic, a philosopher and the founder of the Societies of St. Vincent de Paul (diffused over the whole world), those who have had faith in Christian Democracy place him in the top rank as their precursor.

II.

Two Currents Among Catholics (1849-71)

Twenty-three critical years followed in Europe. Monarchical absolutism was resumed and the new Napoleonic dictatorship seemed likely to impede forever the progress of the bourgeoisie toward Liberalism and that of the proletariat toward Socialism. Then, in the midst of the crisis, the two movements affirmed themselves and advanced.

During these years three great changes occurred: the accomplishment of Italian unity with the fall of the temporal power (1870); the formation of the German Empire, after France's defeat and Napoleon III's fall (1871); and the appearance of the Third French Republic. Also, the national movements were accentuated within the Austrian and Ottoman empires.

One of the principal political results of these changes in Europe was the extension and affirmation of the parliamentary system, even to include Vienna and Berlin. St. Petersburg and Constantinople were nearly the only absolute governments left. The middle classes were winning everywhere. Moreover, the Paris Commune, combining sentimental nationalism with social revolution, and the heroism of the people with the barbarism of revolt and regression, taught Europe that the fourth power (the working classes) was mounting toward the conquest of the State. The First International, Bakunin's anarchistic propaganda, and

Marxist propaganda kept Europe agitated. Meanwhile, workers' parties which later took the name of Socialist parties were being organized in the various states.

The attitude of Pius IX toward such movements was largely negative. Several times he condemned Liberalism, Socialism, Communism and Anarchism. The condemnations struck primarily at the doctrinal premises of these movements, but also included their various juridical, political and social implications.

The most noted Papal document of the time is the so-called *Syllabus*, a collection of eighty propositions derived from the discourses, documents, and letters of Pius IX and listed (hence a syllabus) for the use of the clergy and the faithful. This is not the place to examine the ecclesiastical value of the document. It came to be regarded among its adversaries as the very essence of Catholic reaction against liberty and progress. Perhaps the events of almost a century may be a counterproof of what indifference, atheistic rationalism, political and social naturalism and other theories condemned by the *Syllabus* can be. While granting that Pius IX was no longer favorable to political liberties after his experience of 1848, nevertheless the *Syllabus* does not contain a single word against democracy as a political form for the State, nor anything against the democracy attained at that time in the United States and Switzerland.

To understand Pius IX, we must keep in mind that he was resisting those governments and political parties that wanted the abolition of the historical rights of the Church—feeling on his part the duty of defending and guarding them. But he was fighting with even greater vigor against that liberalism which in the name of the natural rights of man denied or disregarded all supernatural concepts of life. Communism, Socialism and Anarchy, furthermore, had to be condemned because they aimed at the suppression of private property (which for Catholicism is one of the safeguards

of the rights of the human person and the Christian family) and because they disseminated class hatred and incited to revolt.

While the official attitude of the Papacy was negative, Catholics (clergy and laity) were following two different paths. Politically there were those like Ozanam in France; Father Ventura, Manzoni, and the Baroni d'Ondes Reggio in Italy; Windthorst and the Reichensperger brothers in Germany; Verhaegen and Helleputte in Belgium and many others who supported the participation of the people in political life. Others like Louis Veuillot in France and Don Margotti in Italy (the most noted journalist of the epoch) combated liberalism by supporting the absolute and paternalistic governments, thinking that they could revive the Christianity linking the *Throne* with the *Altar* (as was then the motto).

The middle or conservative current, represented by those Catholics who had already arrived at government positions, favored a limited monarchy in which, substantially, the government was held by the new capitalistic bourgeoisie and the residue of the former military or propertied classes and of the free professions,

In such surroundings the word democracy caused scandal. When Montalembert at the International Catholic Convention of Malines in 1863 pronounced this word amid the applause of the audience, he was believed to be almost a heretic by the conservatives. "The new society, democracy, to call it by its name, exists, and in half of Europe it is already sovereign; in the other half it will be so tomorrow . . . I look before me and I see nothing but democracy everywhere. . . . In the new order Catholics will have to fight, but will have nothing to fear," Montalembert said. (Today, after the victory of the United Nations, these words could be repeated exactly as they stand.)

At that time the word democracy, pronounced fifteen

years before by Ozanam and Ventura, was already old in America, but not in Europe. There the masters of the moment were Bismarck and Napoleon III; England was in the full midst of the Victorian Era; the historical Right (Liberal Conservative) dominated in Italy; in Austria, the Liberal anticlericals were in the hands of the capitalists of the dominating German and Magyar races.

And yet, Montalembert saw correctly. Cardinal Manning a quarter of a century later was to confirm his evaluation with the words: "The future belongs to democracy. That is what must be saved, what must be Christianized. That is what must be reconciled." Between the two affirmations of Montalembert and Manning little more than a quarter of a century was to pass; but the path had already been forced by the laws of thought and of history, so that still following this line, we come in a few years to Leo XIII's celebrated phrase: "If democracy is Christian, it will do great good to the world."

III.

The Social Question (1871-91)

During the twenty years from 1871 to 1891 constitutional, parliamentary regimes covered all of Europe except Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Industrial expansion, the creation of great empires, and the stable armament of the great powers were fruits of the alliance between the capitalistic bourgeoisie and modern militarism. All of that was at the expense of the lower middle classes and the workers, who, while gaining influence in the political field through the widening of suffrage, increasingly felt their economic instability, the insufficiency of their salaries, and the hardness of their long hours of labor.

In this period, Catholics participated in public life in the various parliaments, some on the Right (as in France and

Belgium), some on the Centre (as in Germany), some on the Left (as the Federalists in Austria). But from the social point of view they were gradually detaching themselves from the bourgeois and liberal groups who represented the Manchester tradition of *laissez faire* and *laissez passer*.

Two schools developed among Catholics. The corporative school was supported by Baron Karl von Vogelsang, who had great influence over the Austrian and French groups with social concern. This school upheld a return to the Middle Ages with the reconstruction of the guilds (also called corporations, different in meaning from the current English word), and with the organization of the State on the basis of local and professional (or trade) autonomies, giving to private property a social-political function. Baron von Vogelsang was, in fact, a fierce opponent of capitalistic economy, even of that interest on money which is allowed by usage and tolerated by Catholic moral theology, and of that political individualism which produces economic individualism (or vice versa). The French corporative school, drawing its inspiration from the Austrian and supporting politically a monarchical restoration, was known as the *Association Catholique*.

Its eminent heads were La Tour du Pin and the Count de Mun who proposed obligatory trade corporations for all the factors of production representing capital, technical direction, and work. On this basis they outlined a representative political system which was to culminate in the "grand council of corporations" (*grand conseil des corporations*), a kind of consultative Senate of Social Monarchy.

The other school, the Catholics of the German Centre, adhered more closely to the real conditions of the epoch and dreamed less of a return to the past. It was headed by the priest and deputy to the Reich, Franz Hitze. He and his companions maintained, against the Manchester School, the necessity of State intervention in social matters, such as the

limitation of hours of labor, Sunday rest, insurance laws against misfortune and old age, and workers' education which would lead to a kind of labor habilitation. The principal task of this school, which branched out over all of Europe, either spontaneously, or through imitation, was that of reconciling the rights of the liberty of work and enterprise with a moderate regulatory intervention by the State, without causing a large part of the nascent modern economy to fall into the hands of the State (and hence, of bureaucracy). Bismarck, who at first had rejected the proposal of the Centre formulated by Franz Hitze, came out with social security for the workers, but in the hands of state bureaucracy. However, the Centre, which had beaten Bismarck in the anti-Catholic struggle called *Kulturkampf*, beat him a second time in social legislation, sustaining the principle of free workers' associations and excluding every monopoly on the part of the State.

In Austria-Hungary, also, the Catholics had to their credit the introduction, albeit timid, of the first social laws in favor of workers. In France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Holland (also in Spain, to a lesser degree) Catholics were promoting associations, studies, and periodicals of a social character and were implementing their principles in attempts at co-operative, mutual and syndicalist organization.

A great influence, even outside of the Catholic world, was exercised in economics by Frédéric le Play. He was primarily a rather detached scientist—not a political organizer. But others—Gaspard de Courtins in Switzerland; Professor Toniolo, Professor Burri, Monsignor Talamo in Italy; Léon Harmel, Camille Léron-Vrau, Claude Jannet in France; Helleputte, Monsignor Doutréloux, Charles Périn in Belgium, and many others—exercised an influence in the orientation of Catholics toward a study of social problems and toward corresponding legislative and organizational action.

In this period three cardinals emerged whose international

fame still endures. The first, Edward Manning of London (a friend of Henry George), famous for his intervention in the dockers' strike, formulated his social ideas in a discourse at Leeds (1874) under the title, *The Dignity and Rights of Labor*. For twenty years he was the moral leader of the Christian Democrats. The second was Cardinal Mermillod, whose conferences at Paris some time before his nomination to the Bishopric of Geneva awakened alarm. He was accused of Socialism, but just as he had resisted the anticlerical Swiss radicals, so too he resisted the French clerical conservatives. The third was an American, Cardinal Gibbons, who defended the Knights of Labor against the attempt to have them condemned by Rome (an attempt initiated by certain conservative Canadian bishops). Other eminent figures were not lacking in the episcopate of the period, but the definitive, unifying word was yet to come.

IV.

Democrats and Conservatives after Rerum Novarum (1891-1914)

On May 15, 1891, Leo XIII published the Encyclical on the condition of the working classes, called from its first words: *Rerum Novarum*. It is the first ample, solemn manifestation of the Papacy concerning the modern labor problem and is fundamental because it fixes the prominent points of Catholic doctrine in such matters.

As we have seen, throughout the nineteenth century there had never been lacking in Catholicism theorists and practical organizers who had dedicated themselves to social problems and had incited Catholic interest in them. But it was desired that the highest authority of the Church should pronounce itself, not only in a generic form in favor of the workers, but giving doctrinal and practical rules concerning the questions that had agitated the public opinion of the world

and had kept Catholics divided among themselves. This word came in *Rerum Novarum*.

The reception given to the Encyclical was exceptional, even from liberal Protestants and from certain segments of reformatory socialism. With the admission of the State's intervention in social matters, Leo gave the *coup de grâce* to the economists and political leaders of the Manchester School. With the lively defense of the right of workers to organize, a right that the State does not create but recognizes, he laid the basis for the organic reform of society. And in affirming the necessity of a family wage he touched the weak point of modern economics and proposed its remedy.²

Two accusations were made against Leo XIII due to incomprehension and perhaps also to prejudice. The first was that with his corporative system he wanted to revive the closed system of the Middle Ages. The truth is that Leo XIII never accepted the thesis of corporativism as a closed economy and a political system. He was a realist and could not create social reform out of what was nonexistent, but out of what existed, proposing for it the necessary reforms, one of which was that of class organization. He proposed mixed corporations of workers and employers, but accepted also the class syndicates, provided that an agreement among all the factors of production be reached. The efforts made along this line from then on have been immense. And if there has been a struggle between capital and labor, in the majority of cases (though deploring excesses) the wrong has not been on the side of labor.

The other accusation, made by Socialists, was that Leo XIII by defending private property took force away from social action in favor of workers. In order to accept this criticism one would have to prove that private property is

² Pius XI, forty years later, in his Encyclical letter on social questions (*Quadragesimo Anno*) made important additions to the teachings of Leo XIII.

an institution opposed to workers' interests. Leo XIII instead, in accord with Christian tradition, maintained that property should be spread over all the social classes, as a means of the preservation of human personality and the consistency of individual families. On the other hand, he threw light upon the social function of property and the obligation of the "haves" to share their possessions with others, not only under the title of generosity, but also as a duty of social solidarity.

These themes and others of the great Encyclical furnished the occasion for a significant social literature.

Leo XIII turned the Catholic world toward the study and remedy of workers' problems. He formed a true "social" mentality, among students and cultured groups as well as the working classes who heard for the first time of "social" Christianity, a "social" Pope and a Catholic "social" school.

The phrase that first made a hit and was quickly adopted during the first years after the Encyclical was that of *Christian Democracy*. It was taken up again in Belgium (where the echo of Ozanam, Montalembert and the Convention of Malines had not vanished); thence it passed quickly on to France and Italy. Its new apostle was Giuseppe Toniolo. A professor of Political Economy at the University of Pisa, he had been militant in the field of Catholic Action, and was esteemed in all of Europe as one of the leaders of the social movement. His course on Christian Democracy, given in Rome and other Italian cities, and later published and translated into various languages, marked an epoch.

Christian Democracy brought a new vitality to Italian mutual workers' societies, workers' and consumers' co-operatives, popular banks and rural credit banks. Following it, there were various tentative attempts at workers' leagues and Catholic youth clubs composed of both workers and students. It also orientated toward social problems the somewhat general, somewhat protective, action in favor of the

laborers by the various Catholic traditional associations. It inspired study and toward the end of the nineteenth century arrived at its own social and political program, which was carried into Italy, France and Belgium, and other countries like a blaze. This program demanded universal suffrage, votes for women, a proportional electoral system, labor laws, progressive taxation, agrarian reforms, freedom of education, the legal recognition of labor unions, an elective senate (where it did not exist), and so forth.

Christian Democracy met enemies immediately. It was opposed by three groups. The first of these was the liberal group of the Manchester School, who saw in the willingness of democratic Catholics to sustain the intervention of the State in economic matters a limitation on their own effectiveness in denunciation of Socialists as revolutionary and for invoking a repressive policy. The affirmation that Christian Democrats were more dangerous than Socialists was not unusual. The Socialists themselves comprised another opponent, maintaining that the unity of the workers was compromised by the formation of Christian Democratic unions. Nor did they fail to accuse these unions of being bound to owners and of being the betrayers of class interests. The third group was composed of Catholic conservatives, especially the landed proprietors and industrialists, who feared that Christian Democracy might go too far in protecting workers' interests and might aspire to laying the basis for a political democracy they hated.

The complaints of Liberals and Catholic conservatives arrived at the Vatican. Leo XIII, who had put so much trust in young people and workers, saw accusations against them arise from all sides. In the meantime, there occurred in Italy the revolts of 1898. The government, in the hands of conservatives and reactionaries, was afraid and proclaimed a state of siege. Military tribunals condemned Socialist and Republican leaders to long years of imprisonment. Among

them was the journalist and priest Don Davide Albertario of Milan who had embraced the Catholic Democratic cause and had defended the strike of Catholic workers in certain Lombard factories. He received a sentence of twenty years of imprisonment (1898). All the associations were disbanded, including those of Catholic Action, which brought a strong protest from Leo XIII.

But in the two following years political liberties were restored, and amnesty was granted to those condemned by the military tribunals. Naturally, as a result of reaction, the country leaned toward the Left, giving the victory to the Socialist-Republican-Radical-Democratic coalition. In July, 1900, King Humbert was assassinated by an anarchist. France was agitated by the Dreyfus Case and the laws against religious congregations, and Austria by the increasing demands of the oppressed nationalities. Terroristic assaults, mass agitations, and workers' strikes (then believed to be revolutionary) were being repeated quite often in industry, and threatened to extend to agriculture.

In January, 1901, there appeared Leo XIII's Encyclical called from its first words, *Graves de Communi*. Leo XIII while consenting that Catholic associations should bear the title of Christian Democracy warned that they should have no political significance. In the social field Catholics should hold to the outlines of the Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, without exceeding it either in substance or in mode of procedure. He insisted on the charitable aspects of social action, and wanted Christian Democracy associations to depend on their respective bishops.

It was said that the Pope's intervention was requested by Catholic and non-Catholic conservatives who feared a social revolution, and desired to prevent the participation of Christian Democrats in it. But Leo XIII's salient points resist every criticism even today, especially what was then at the bottom of the problem, namely, that Catholics, while being

free to support one political form in preference to another, must avoid involving the Church in their preferences, even though they be for a democracy of Christian inspiration. For this reason, if they give the name of Christian Democracy to Catholic associations, they must limit its meaning to that of social aid to the working classes and keep themselves under the dependency of the bishops. This necessity was then prevalent in Italy, since the rule of the *non expedit* (given as a result of the yet unsolved Roman Question between the Vatican and the Italian State) was still in force and Catholics by it were prohibited from intervening in political elections and forming their own party.

The Christian Democrats of Italy (among whom was the author of this book) aspired, in fact, to become a political party. What in the time of Leo XIII was immature, became mature eighteen years later. From then on many misunderstandings were cleared up and practical activity was useful for the acquisition of political experience not possessed before. To be sure, Catholic Action of the nineteenth century had assumed a semipolitical character in the struggle against Liberalism. But when Socialism affirmed itself in political and parliamentary life. Catholics and Liberals of conservative tendency united to oppose the so-called "social revolution." Therefore, Christian Democrats opposed a conservative policy which was unwilling to face the workers' demands. Their inexperience led them to uphold their policy in the name of the Church.

Pius X, who succeeded Leo XIII, saw the Christian Democrats of Italy take the lead in the Bologna Convention of August, 1903, and decided to order the disbanding of Catholic Association Congresses and Christian Democratic Leagues, and to cause an entirely new organization to arise bearing the name of *Popular Union* of the *Volksverein* German type. He placed at its head Professor Giuseppe Toniolo as a

man who conciliated in his person the trust of conservatives and democrats.

A crisis was not avoided. The author of this book dedicated himself completely to municipal and provincial activity, and became in 1905 Mayor of Caltagirone, Provincial Councilor of Catania, Councilor, and later, Vice President of the National Association of Communes and a participant in various government commissions. The leader of the Left Christian Democrats Wing, the priest Romolo Murri, rebelled in 1909. He left the Church and abandoned the movement, the leadership of which was then taken by Giuseppe Donati. (We now have the news that Don Murri has become reconciled to the Church.) Marc Sangnier, leader of the *Sillon* of Paris, was condemned and submitted (1910). The Abbé Naudet received the injunction not to occupy himself any more with social questions (1911). The Abbé Lemire limited himself to his College at Finistere where he was mayor and deputy to parliament. Thus in all countries social ideas and organisms had kept developing in a tacit, spontaneous movement—notwithstanding the grave crisis (which in certain moments had been abusively inserted into the Modernist controversy), and notwithstanding the fact that many had dropped the name of Christian Democracy.

V.

Democratic Rebirth and Totalitarian Crisis (1914-39)

The years of the First World War and those immediately following were years of exceptional developments and crises for democratic movements. Throughout Europe, Christian Democrats and Socialists participated in the war governments of their countries, whereas before the war they had either been kept at a distance or they themselves had refused to participate. MacDonald in England, Albert Thomas in France, Vandervelde in Belgium, and Bissolati in Italy were

the most noted Socialists in power, while the Christian Democrats included such well-known names as those of Professor Poulet in Belgium and Attorney Filippo Meda in Italy. Even the German Centre had its first chancellor in the person of Baron Hertling who, although he belonged to the conservative wing, nevertheless was of the school of Leo XIII in the social field.

The war, won by the Allies, led to a wider conception of political and social democracy. In England, America, Germany, Austria and the various English dominions women won the right to vote. The constitutions of the states created after the war and of Germany herself were quite broad in the democratic sense. In many European countries the introduction of proportional representation was advantageous for political, religious and historical minorities. The economic uneasiness of the postwar period and the financial crises gave an impulse not only to the formation of labor unions, but also to revolutionary propaganda in their midst, aside from the influence of the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia.

In this climate, the first among Catholics to raise the banner of Christian Democracy in the social-political field was the *Italian Popular Party*.³ Other "Popular" or "Christian-Social" or "Christian Democratic" parties sprang up in Europe in the same year, while the Centre Party in Germany, together with the Socialist and Democratic groups of the Left, became one of the principal factors of the Weimar Republic and the Christian Social Party of Austria founded, in agreement with the Socialists, the Austrian Republic.

To understand the rapid, uncontested success of the Italian Popular Party we must recall that the Catholic social movement, whether or not it was called Christian Democracy, had developed uninterruptedly during the crisis years and the war. Thus, at the beginning of 1919, barely two

³ Founded on January 18, 1919.

months after the Armistice there were in Italy in the hands of Social Catholics more than four thousand co-operatives, some one thousand workers' mutual aid societies, about three hundred popular banks, many professional unions (which had been confederated together in September, 1918) reaching within a short time a membership of almost eight hundred thousand (and in 1920 a million, two hundred thousand). Moreover, many of the students of the secondary schools and universities had been educated for a long time in Catholic Youth clubs. They had given during the war a magnificent example of military courage and Christian virtues. They came spontaneously into the Popular Party, becoming its intellectual and moral lever, just as the working masses of the Catholic Unions, leagues and Peasant Co-operatives were its most convinced and most disciplined recruits. Finally, the co-operation of the middle and intellectual classes, doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers, and technicians, revealed themselves to be of an importance and breadth never before seen in a young party of a conspicuously social nature. It is strange that American journalists and writers designate the Popular Party nominally as a Peasants' Party belonging largely to southern Italy. The fact is that the Party's strongest contingent came from northern Italy and the large cities where Catholics were better organized and had more schools, more social programs, and study clubs.

Besides the rapid success of the Italian Popular Party, both among the various social classes and in parliament itself (in ten months it gained a fifth of the Chamber of Deputies), the interesting fact to be noted is its profoundly democratic spirit and program. Among the parties of all countries this one holds the record for truly democratic internal organization. From the local nuclei (the Municipal Sections) to the Provincial Committees, up to the National Congress, the Party was formed on the basis of the members' will, with

the majority elections and minority representations renewed every year. Thus, the interest of each member could be represented in the proceedings of the Party. Even the National Council, elected by the Congress through a majority and with a minority representation, kept the democratic type of organization. Under it, the direction of the Party was in the hands of seven members, among whom was the Political Secretary, its responsible head. Beside it were the representative bodies, that is to say, the Populars elected to the Municipal and Provincial Councils and to the Chamber of Deputies. These were autonomous in the management of the government, but had to account respectively either to the Party Section, the Provincial Committee, or the National Council concerning the observance of the program and Party discipline. With the worker unions and their confederation, the Party maintained the relations of a good neighbor and a common program; but only the workers who were members of the Party could participate in the deliberations of the relative sections. This was an internal democracy which not only served to create among the members the spiritual understanding of real democracy, but also caused individual values to emerge in public life as a sense of personal responsibility within a collective dynamism.

It has been said and written, even in America, by critics who were unacquainted with the true facts of the Popular Party that it was the *longa manus* of the Vatican. This has become one of those uncontrolled reports, which by dint of much repetition become axiomatic truths. What may have caused some superficial observers to fall in error is the fact that the author of this book, before founding the Party at the end of 1918, went to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, to request from the Pope the abolishment of the *non expedit* then in force. In order to induce the Catholic masses to join a political party, that prohibition, dating from

the time when Rome was taken from the Popes, had to be abolished. To have obtained this request ten years before the Lateran Treaty (which ended officially the Roman Question) was an advantage for the nascent Popular Party and a unilateral, sympathetic gesture made by Pope Benedict XV toward Italy ⁴

Some readers may ask why the Christian Democrats of Italy wanted to form a new party for themselves instead of uniting with the existing parties. Europe does not have the two-party system of America. The working class does not place much trust in the bourgeois parties, hence it prefers its own parties, be they called Labourite, as in England, or Socialist, as on the Continent. Because the European Socialists were at bottom Marxists, that is, for the abolition of private property and for the class struggle method, supporting themselves on the principle called "historical materialism," Catholics could not accept such principles, which were antithetical to theirs. Christian Democracy is politically and economically a center party between Liberalism or bourgeois radicalism on the one hand and Socialism and Workers' Communism on the other. The presuppositions of Christian Democracy are the Papal teachings in social matters with reference not to a single class (the workers) but to all classes of society.

The political battles engaged in by the Popular Party in its seven years of life can be remembered with honor. The principal one was Agrarian Reform, both for the amelioration of agrarian pacts among proprietors and tenants of the farms, and for the salaried peasants. The Party sought the colonization of the *latifundia* of central and southern Italy and Sicily where roads are lacking and the condition of

⁴The *non expedit* was withdrawn in November, 1919, ten months after the formation of the Party; but Cardinal Gasparri had promised it orally to the author of this book.

farm workers is very primitive. Hence the periodic agitations of the peasant masses of Italy to the cry of "Land for the Peasants." The southern and Sicilian peasant wants his farm, his "piece of land" as property for himself and his children. That is why many came to America "to make a fortune," accumulating money in order to buy afterwards—at any price—a farm, a cottage on it, plant a vineyard, an orange grove, or a fruit orchard, and cultivate it for his enjoyment and that of his wife and children. A modest ideal, but sane and just. The proposal of the Populists was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in July, 1922, but with the arrival of the Fascists it was withdrawn from the Senate, where it had gone for a definitive approval, by the will of the Duce.

Another political campaign of the Populists was for the legal recognition of labor unions, their direct and proportional representation in the Superior Labor Council, and the introduction of the system of *workers' shares* which meant that a part of the annual income of factories must be converted into shares for the workers, thus giving them a voice in the shareholders' meetings. These proposals were presented to the Chamber of Deputies but were opposed by the Socialists and Liberals; by the former because they saw their monopolistic position in labor representation compromised; by the latter, because they feared that freedom of enterprise might be shackled.

The Socialists and Liberals also opposed the effort of the Popular Party to grant the vote to women; both parties feared reinforcement of the Party they opposed, since they saw it increase daily in number and strength. Likewise, they fought the measures of the Populists for educational freedom (in Italy schools were and are a State monopoly) presented upon the insistence of the Populists and the illustrious educational leaders who followed one after the other in that

period: Croce, the Liberal; Corbino, the Radical; Anile, the Popular.

The history of the years between 1910-22 is full of struggles between Populares, Liberals and Socialists in a period when the Fascist peril was rising to power and no one saw it as imminent. When the danger was understood, the Liberals, instead of forming a solid front with the Populares and Socialists, attempted to come to an understanding with the Fascists, in the municipal elections of 1920 and 1921 as well as in the political election of 1921 and in the successive phases of the struggle.

The author attempted several times to obtain a common front among Social Democrats, Socialists and Populares, and the formation of a government in which the Socialists would participate. But after various discussions, the Socialist leaders preferred to stay out, and at the end they gave support to the general strike of July-August 1922. The Italian bourgeoisie was alarmed by it and decided for Fascism. The March on Rome took place in October, 1922. The king refused to sign the decree of a state of siege and to use arms for the repression of the Fascist insurrection. The *coup de main* succeeded. Mussolini became head of the government and dictator.

In the early postwar period there had already been formed in Europe other parties like the Italian Popular Party. The best organized was the Czech Popular Party whose head was Monsignor Sramek, Minister at Prague for many years previously, in collaboration with Masaryk and Benes.

In Poland, the Christian Democratic group had affinities with the Peasant Group whose leader was President Vitos. During Pilsudski's dictatorship and the government of colonels, the Christian Democrats were in the opposition and for some time reduced to silence; but they came back, and now, in London, they are collaborating with the Polish Govern-

ment in Exile and participating in the underground resistance in Poland.

In Lithuania, too, there was a Christian Democratic group that as a Catholic Social movement survived dictatorship.

In Austria, there were two phases: the first was that of an understanding with the Socialists for the establishment of a Republic; the second, that of struggle against the Socialists, since they had created in the Municipality of Vienna a center antagonistic to the government, headed by Monsignor Seipel as chancellor. This leader did well in the first period and would have led Austria to a quite good economic and political position if an understanding for collaboration could have been possible with the Socialists. The latter, however, were divided by two tendencies: the rigidly Marxist, aspiring to class revolution, and the pragmatist, which would have found a way for adaptations. The first prevailed, helped by the fact that Seipel, during the second period of his public life, turned to the side of reaction and began to trust in repression and methods of force. Dollfuss, his pupil, went farther; he bound himself to Starhemberg who had already organized an armed militia (on the Fascist pattern). When he became chancellor he came to an understanding with Mussolini; he introduced an authoritarian system when the opportunity was offered him by the Socialist attempt at revolt. The repression of February, 1934, was a very sad page in the annals of Austria. Many of the Social Christians were alarmed at the turn their policy had taken; others, such as Dr. Funder, Director of the Reichpost, and Dr. Schmidt, the new Burgomeister of Vienna, approved it. They, conservatives in politics and social in economics (of the school of Leo XIII), paid for their illusion by dying as martyrs in the concentration camp of Dachau.

This sad episode among the Social Christians of Austria influenced the Social Christians of Hungary. The latter never consented to the dictatorial methods introduced into

Hungary; parliament was never suppressed and Cardinal Seredi could several times defend the rights of workers and peasants, as well as those of the Jews struck by the race laws. But the Hungarian Social Christians resented, as did all Hungarians, the diminution of the national territory as a result of the Trianon Treaty (1919); so that their policy was nationalistic instead of internationalist, conservative rather than forward-looking.

Switzerland has always been a well-balanced country, and Catholics, since the period of Leo XIII, have been able to pursue their way without excesses and crises, both in the political and social fields. In the Canton of Ticin (Italian) they have called themselves Christian Democrats; their newspaper has as its title Savonarola's motto: *People and Freedom*; in the Cantons where German is spoken they have taken the title, *Conservative Party*, meaning the *conservation* of liberty and Swiss cantonal independence. Catholics have contributed to the maintenance of Swiss Democracy which is unique in Europe, and which in this last period has experienced the terrible danger of finding totalitarian countries at its northern and southern boundaries.

In Spain, before Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the Minister Ossorio y Gallardo founded with some friends the Popular Social Party. In the syndicalist field there were the programs of the Christian Syndicates of the Asturias and of the far better organized groups of the Basques.

With the advent of the Republic, the Catalan group of Christian Democrats affirmed itself with youthful ardor. The Basques (Catholics in the majority) attempted to create their own State with broad social ideas. In the meantime the Catholic, Gil Robles, founded his own party on the program of the Papal Encyclicals, but unfortunately as Minister of War, he became an instrument of Spanish militarism and consented to a fierce repression of the revolt in the Asturias.

When Franco came to power, Robles went into exile in Portugal.⁵

France, between the two wars, went through a terrible crisis. It has never been observed that the weak point of France's political structure was the disequilibrium between the democratic concept of the Left and the reactionary, anti-constitutional concept of the Right. There was lacking a really strong center to give to the two wings—in parliament and in the country—a stability that the two systems would never have been able to achieve by themselves.

The Popular Democrats founded their own Party in 1924. To it became allied the Social Christian group of Alsace-Lorraine which came from a German Centre tradition, dating from the time before the war when those two provinces had belonged to Germany. But the combined groups did not total forty seats in the Chamber, nor were they always in accord, given the divergent interests of the readmitted provinces. The French Catholic majority was more largely aligned with the Right and many of the French clergy favored the *Action Française*, rather than the Popular Democrats. There was still another wing, more to the Left, that of the *Démocratie Chrétienne* of Marc Sangnier.

There were, also, the Democrats of "Esprit" (an intellectual group), the groups of *l'Aube* (a political organization that made a very vivacious anti-Fascist and anti-*Action Française* campaign): in substance, many fine initiatives, much intellectual culture, and little political cohesion.

Belgium and Luxembourg have had Catholic majorities and governments for very many years; they have been of conservative character, but the workers' wings and the Christian trade unions have functioned as pressure groups as long as they have been able to have their own representatives

⁵ For the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church during the Spanish Civil War see Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

in the Senate and Chamber, among which, in Belgium, the most noted were the Dominican Senator, Peere Rutten; the Deputy and President of Ministers, Professor Poulet; the Minister Heyman, Head of the Labor Syndicates in Belgium; Monsignor Origo in Luxembourg and the Prime Minister Du Ponge.

In Holland, the party called itself Catholic in order to be differentiated from the historical Protestant and the Socialist parties; it also had two wings: a Conservative and a Christian Democratic Wing. For almost half a century it has been impossible to form a government in Holland without the participation of the Catholics. The syndicalist and co-operative movements among Social Catholics have been very much developed. They have avoided the word Christian Democracy, either because of lack of imagination, or in order not to worry the Right Wing and break the political unity of the Party. Their social ideas have been founded on the Papal Encyclicals.

In Holland, at Utrecht, was located the seat of the International Confederation of Christian Laborers which from 1919 to 1940 held an important role in Geneva in the International Labor Office. Its General Secretary, Mr. Serrarens (who from a laborer became a senator) was its principal organizer. It had three million members, but after Mussolini's advent it lost its Italian membership (1,082,694), and after Hitler's advent, its German members (1,142,956). The Confederation was disbanded in 1940 by the Nazis, who sequestered everything found at the Seat. Nothing is known of what happened to its leaders.

Ireland cannot be put among the countries in which Christian Democracy has had a following. After the formation of the Free State, the two parties headed by Cosgrave and De Valera, made up in great majority of Catholics, have given to Eire the stamp of a Catholic national State. The prevalent problems have been national; workers have been

left to the Laborite Group with an exclusively professional character. This group has become affiliated to the Second International of Amsterdam (Socialist) and not with the Social Christians of Utrecht.

In Yugoslavia, there was the Peasants' Popular Party of Slovenia, directed by the Catholic priest, Korosech, who held an interesting political position, not only in the formation of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene State, or in the period of King Alexander's dictatorship (which that Party opposed so that the priest Korosech had to go into exile), but also in the period of the reconciliation when Korosech was raised to Minister of the Interior. From the social point of view that Party was far advanced; politically, however, its leader was uncertain between democracy and dictatorship. Croat and Slovene Catholics participated widely in resistance against the Nazis and against Pavelic's Croatian Government.

I have left Germany for the end, both because it is the most important from the Social Christian point of view, and because of the consequences of the past war.

The judgments given on the Weimar Republic are varied. In my own opinion, because of the personal experience I had with it, I exclude the judgment that the Socialists and the Catholics of the Centre created the Republic in order to make of it a screen for the military leaders who were to prepare the revenge of the German people against the Versailles Treaty. I admit that in the Catholic camp there was the Right Wing which loved neither the name of Republic nor that of Democracy. There was also in many Germans (Protestant and Catholic) resentment of the defeat they had undergone and a strong desire to reform the *diktat* of Versailles, imposed on Germany without her consent and with no spirit of pacification. But Catholic chancellors like Wirth and Max (the first Democratic, the second Conservative), later the Catholic Chancellor Bruening, and the Socialist leaders of the Reich and of the Prussian State, had no idea

and no desire to have Germany venture forth on a Second World War.

The first crisis occurred in 1923 with the unhappy occupation of the Ruhr on the French side and the subsequent devaluation of the mark. The second crisis, the economic and unemployment depression with almost five million unemployed, occurred in 1929-31. These crises created an atmosphere propitious to Nazism. The example set by Mussolini (praised the world over by nationalists, capitalists, conservatives, and the big press) served to incite the same classes of the Right in favor of Hitler and his men.

Some German bishops became aware of this and applied in Germany the canonical measures adopted by Pius XI against the *Action Française*. Other bishops were satisfied with giving to Catholics prudent warnings, while other ecclesiastics without political sense threw themselves into Nazism (just as some did in Italy with Fascism), in order to save the world from Communism. The only ones who resisted the swelling wave of Nazism were the Socialists and the Christian Democratic Wing with the Christian Labor Syndicates, formed by Catholics and Protestants with a membership of more than four million.

Catholic Chancellor Bruening struggled against the economic crisis which hit Germany; with England and France, who promised but gave no aid (not even solving such urgent problems as that of the war debts which later, in 1932, were allowed to lapse); and against the mounting Nazi tide. When Bruening proposed an agrarian reform which struck at the Junkers, who were friends of President Hindenburg, he was forced to resign. Von Papen kept plotting for Hitler's triumph until Hitler was named chancellor; later, on Hindenburg's death, Hitler united the two posts in himself, taking the name of *Fuehrer*, just as Mussolini had called himself *Duce*. Totalitarianism had already been introduced into Ger-

many with the Reichstag fire, arranged by the Nazis and blamed on the Communists.

The Centre Party, against Bruening's judgment and that of other leaders, dissolved itself. It was said that the Vatican suggested this final act, contrary certainly to the glorious tradition of militancy of the Centre and to the memory of its battles and victories against Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor. I do not know whether or not the report was true. Perhaps the Vatican was influenced by Monsignor Kaas, then head of the Centre, who when threatened personally by Hitler had taken refuge in Rome; and by von Papen, who belonged to the Right Wing of the Centre but betrayed it to help Nazism, as shown by events up to the present day.

The resistance of Catholics and that of Socialists at Hitler's advent was weak because the public opinion of the world favored Hitler, believing him to be the man of destiny. The only ones who spoke and wrote against Hitler were the Socialists, the Christian Democrats, and a few European Liberals. But their voices were hidden, their newspapers obtained no following, their books found no favor, their last reserves in London and Paris were treated as harmful people quick to complain and foresee catastrophes, because they were refugees, politicians, disillusioned men, in short defeated men.⁶

As far back as 1925 there had been founded at Paris the *International Secretariat of Democratic Parties of Christian Inspiration* in which almost all the groups and parliamentary parties I have mentioned in these pages took part. This association held various conventions in Paris, Brussels, Boisle-Duc, Luxembourg, Cologne, to which came representa-

⁶ The reader can find in the books of Luigi Sturzo (*Italy and Fascism*, *The International Community*, *Politics and Morality*, *Church and State* and *Les Guerres Modernes*), his point of view on the position of the Roman Catholic Church and Catholics in the political affairs from the First to the Second World War, including the much debated questions of the Abyssinian War and Spanish Civil War.

tives from all countries. They were never lacking in the clearest declarations against the danger that threatened freedom, democracy and peace in Europe.

The example of Fascist Italy was before everyone, but the Secretariat continued to maintain Italian representation, notwithstanding the fact that the Popular Party had been dissolved in November, 1926, by royal decree. The author and another political refugee, F. S. Ferrari (who died in Paris in 1933), represented the Christian Democracy of Italy. All foresaw the same fate as Italy's for our friends of the German Centre, and for those of Austria shortly afterward. Our assemblies resembled Cassandra's cry over all of Europe. Little by little, the Secretariat became thinner. The participation of the Germans was forbidden by Hitler. The Austrians, Czechoslovakians, and Yugoslavs lost all their freedom. Polish representatives sometimes attended, even during the government of the colonels, but their presence was not reported to the press, nor was that of the Lithuanians. The Luxembourg delegates wavered. The nucleus that, until the end, remained faithful to the task of holding high the torch of Liberty and Democracy was the French-Belgian-Dutch group, together with an occasional refugee such as the author. Thus we come to 1939. The meeting of the Assembly, set for July, 1939, by the Secretariat of Paris, was suspended. With the war the Secretariat ceased to function. The torch was taken up once more at London in 1940 when the *International Christian Democratic Union* was founded.

VI.

During and after the War (1939-46)

The *People and Freedom Group* was founded in London in 1936 by some young people in agreement with Mrs. V. Crawford, a pupil of Cardinal Manning, and the author for the purpose of raising in Great Britain the voice of Chris-

tian Democracy and of educating youth to participate in national and international public life with moral and Christian perspectives. The *People and Freedom* groups are not political parties but nuclei of political action.⁷

People and Freedom is Savonarola's motto: *People* means not only the working class but the totality of citizens, because all are to enjoy liberty and participate in government. *People* also means democracy; but democracy without freedom would be tyranny, just as freedom without democracy would become liberty only for some privileged class, never for the whole people.

The mottoes taken by the Group were: *Magna est Veritas et Praevalebit*, against the lying propaganda of the Fascists; and *Fiat Justitia*, against the appeasement method of the democracies. When we remember that the first group was founded in 1936, just when the Spanish Civil War had created an atmosphere of lies and injustice on both sides, the significance of the mottoes is better understood. The Group is formed of Catholics but has a Section of Friends of the Group in which Christian Democrats of all denominations participate.

The Group was against the Spanish War, and for the conciliation of both sides in order to avoid the creation of a Fascist-type dictatorship in Spain. To this end, it promoted a committee formed by representatives of various English political parties "for civil and religious peace in Spain." A con-

⁷ The five point program of the London People and Freedom Group: (1) The primacy of morality in political, economic and social relations. (2) This morality to be that founded on the Christian tradition and on respect for human personality and its rights. (3) The necessity for civil and political liberty, with a just balance between liberty and authority, as well as between the individual and society, in every type of modern State. (4) Permanent union and co-operation between States on a basis of morality with the progressive formation of international law. (5) The conviction that war should no longer be recognized as a legitimate means of settling international disputes, and must be replaced by a system of voluntary or compulsory arbitration or by the decisions of an international court of justice, as the case may be.

vention was held in Paris, presided over by Wickham Steed, Jacques Maritain, and Madariaga. The proposal of conciliation was presented to Lord Halifax and G. Bonnet, the Foreign Ministers of England and France. All would have gone well, but Chamberlain refused to be an intermediary to Mussolini and preferred to sign the Mediterranean Pact with Italy, leaving Mussolini free in Spain.

Well known also is the opposition by *People and Freedom* to the *de jure* recognition of the Abyssinian conquest by Italy. A statement was made to Lord Halifax, with whom there was an exchange of interesting letters that document the unfortunate history of the affair.

The interest of the London *People and Freedom Group* in the Basque children brought to England, and later in the war refugees of various countries, has shown the usefulness of such a movement. This Group held the first assembly in London in favor of Occupied France, on June 27, 1940. It supported De Gaulle from the first, when in London there was still doubt as to what he represented. Interesting and significant is the use that the newspaper *People and Freedom*, published in London, is making of the principal figures of Christian Democracy and its historical development in the various countries.

Finally, in August, 1940, friends of the *People and Freedom Group* decided to form an *International Christian Democratic Union* to take the place of the Secretariat of Paris. The Union was to be more widely representative, including not only the parties but also political groups and social movements. The object of the Union as defined by Article 2 of the Constitution was: "To create permanent bonds of solidarity between the Christian Democratic movements in the various nations, through association on the political plane, so as to combine their activities in the fight against the forces of materialism and totalitarian oppression, and for the triumph of organic and parliamentary democ-

racy in the government of States and as a means of assuring peace and solidarity among all men." It held its first assembly in London in January, 1941, with the support of Christian Democratic groups in England, France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. Many other general reunions were subsequently held.

The Union was in favor of a real League of Nations, with political and juridical functions, with its own means for impeding effectively new recourses to arms. *People and Freedom* of London promoted an inquiry based on the motto, "A League of Nations Now" which had authoritative support. The defense of the Atlantic Charter against every *realpolitik* manipulation has been supported by the press and in timely discussions.

Italy has been the first country in which Christian Democracy was constituted on two bases—*political* and *social-labor*—both in the liberated zones and in those still occupied by the Germans. With the fall of Fascism in July, 1943, five parties of an anti-Fascist character emerged: the Socialists, the Christian-Democratic, the Communist, the Liberal, and the Actionist. In many cities Committees of Liberation were formed, composed of the representatives of the five parties (in some provinces six parties, the additional one of a local character), in order to confront the enemy, to avoid a resurgence of Fascism in any guise, and to prepare the Constituent Assembly which must decide the future regime of Italy.

The Christian Democratic Party was formed on the initiative (taken in May 1942) of the former members of the "Popular Party." There was no return to the former name. The members wanted to take up again the ancient tradition of Christian Democracy in order to mark more distinctly the Party's personality with the public, and to bind themselves

once again to all similar movements in Europe and elsewhere.

Christian Democracy makes more of an appeal to young people than did the name *Popularism* as they were rising out of the Fascist lethargy and reorienting themselves for new political battles. Popularism as a name did not take hold among the masses in spite of the success of the Popular Party, because the people preferred their ancient motto.

In all occupied countries the Christian Democrats participated in the movements of resistance; often they were the chief leaders. In France they were the first to oppose the Vichy policy, to resist making a moral theory of political conformity, and to prevent Catholics from being tied by certain hasty ecclesiastical declarations to the fate of Pétain's government. But that is not merely to the credit of the Christian Democrats, because even a certain number of Catholics of the Right and bishops became aware of the danger for France and the Church in a Vichy Government subject to the will of Berlin and the intrigues of the most discredited men in France, such as Laval, Maurras, Déat, and Doriot.

Stronger and more constant was the resistance of Catholics in Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Bohemia and Poland. Even in Germany and Austria (aside from the attitude taken by the bishops from the religious and moral point of view), the only passive resistance is due to Socialist and Christian Democratic groups.

In Latin America, at various times, tendencies toward Christian Democracy have been noted. In the social field there are not lacking labor unions or leagues and co-operatives promoted by Catholics. One of the most noted of the unions, in Buenos Aires, is promoted and directed by Bishop De Andrea.

On the political terrain, too, there are the Civic Union of Uruguay, the Popular Party of Argentina, Christian Democratic Party of Brazil, and the Christian Popular Party

of Chile, all of which are inspired by the principles of Christian Democracy.

North America has not had any movements of Christian Democracy as in Europe. But the Hierarchy and the Catholic press have favored labor unions, especially since the First World War, and have widely diffused the social theories of the Papal Encyclicals (particularly the *Quadragesimo Anno* of Pius XI) and the Catholic school of thought. The tradition of Cardinal Gibbons has never ceased. One of the best pioneers of social action was Monsignor John A. Ryan. During the war, Monsignor Francis J. Haas (before being named bishop) was chosen by President Roosevelt as Chairman of the Fair Employment Practices Committee. The National Catholic Rural Life Conference is a social institution of great importance, and its Executive Secretary, Monsignor Luigi Ligutti, comes from a family in the Italian region of Friuli most closely tied to the Christian Democratic movement. The Antigonish co-operatives are well known in Canada and America too.

American political life differs widely from that of Europe. This writer has attempted to introduce People and Freedom groups here,⁸ but he has to recognize that the implementation of social ideas in the political field is very difficult, though Christian Democracy interests some intellectual and political quarters.

The first general elections which have taken place in Continental Europe after the war have revealed the ripening of Christian Democracy in every country. In a few months the parties of such an ideology (though called by different names in each country) have achieved political leadership, emerging on top between the Leftist and Rightist parties. Before the war, Catholic parties, with their Christian Democratic wings, often led coalition governments in Holland, Belgium,

⁸ Italo-Americans of New York and New Jersey have founded a Christian Democratic association called *People and Liberty*.

and Luxembourg, but a Christian Democratic (or Social Christian) Party was never autonomous and as strong in those countries as it is now. In Italy, the *Popular Party* was strong enough (before Fascism) to win one-fifth of the seats in the Lower Chamber; but the Christian Democratic party (heir of the Popular Party) has now two-fifths of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, and its leader, Dr. Alcide de Gasperi, is the Premier of the Government. In France the Christian Democrats, before the war, were comprised of three small groups: the "popular democrats" with sixteen deputies in the Chamber of Deputies; the "populars" of Alsace and Lorraine with fourteen deputies; and the "young republic" with four deputies. The Popular Republican Movement has now one hundred and sixty-two deputies in the Constituent Assembly and as the leading party, Mr. Bidault, its leader, is the President of the Government and the State.

Even in the occupied countries, Austria, Hungary, and Germany, the Christian Democratic parties (or People's parties) are the leading parties in most of the elections; a little setback is noted only in Czechoslovakia and that was due to the gain in the Communist Party. In Poland the People's Party is animated with the same ideals and aspirations as that of Western Christian Democracy even though the name of Christian Democracy was introduced there by another group which is probably still fighting for its autonomy.

The new position of political and governmental responsibility of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe during the coming year of reconstruction will test the strength, usefulness and the possibilities of a movement created by the people and for the people, and a movement which is popular in its structure and in its aim, truly democratic and fundamentally Christian.

5

The State, the Unions, and the Labor Parties

I.

The State and the Rights of Unions

IN DEALING with the problem of the relationship between the State and occupational groups, we start from a firm principle concerning the natural right of man to form particular societies. This principle Leo XIII authoritatively applied to workers' unions in his celebrated Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, when he said, "To enter into a society of this kind [particular society] is the natural right of man. . . . The State must protect natural rights, not destroy them." The demonstration which the Pope gave of this tenet sounded novel to contemporary ears, nor is there even today any lack of sociologists and philosophers who contradict it—but in its logical evidence the Pope's conclusion is incontrovertible. "If it [the State] forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both them and it exist in virtue of the same principle; namely, the natural propensity of men to live in society."

Indeed, there is no room for any doubt about it: both the State and professional groups, like all other societies having legitimate and useful ends, have the same natural source, that is, man's own nature, which is sociable and

which needs, in order fully to realize itself, the reciprocal aid of individuals grouped together. It is passing strange, then, that nearly half a century later another Pope, Pius XI, should have found it necessary to repeat this teaching, which, though so evident in itself, is frequently misunderstood and flouted. He wrote in his letter to the Church in the United States on November 1, 1931: "Since man is naturally sociable . . . it is not possible, without injustice, to deny or limit the freedom to form associations in the case of workers any more than in the case of employers."

We now point out that this right flows from human personality, because it is this that realizes itself in society. Human personality, laid down as the source or principle of every human right, leads us to the true root thereof: reason, unfolding itself in understanding, will and work—claiming for itself the complex and organic activity of social life.

Pope Leo XIII's thesis, belonging as it does to the best Christian tradition, was especially directed against two theories prevalent fifty years ago: (a) that the State was the source of all rights, and (b) that the State ought not to allow labor associations, as being opposed to economic freedom and individual initiative.

The two errors were not new; for they had sprung from the false conception identifying the State with human society as constituting a totality of wills and interests. Strange as it may seem, we perceive—going to the bottom of things—that both democratic-liberal individualism and totalitarian pantheism (Bolshevist, Nazi, or Fascist) have, as a common root, the identification of the State with human society.

For nearly two centuries Catholic thought has been free from this error. True, the infection of *étatisme* (stateism) has touched certain groups of scholars and politicians. That was only to be expected, for the prevailing atmosphere was bound to exert its deleterious influence, notwithstanding the

wholesome currents of air and light that emanated occasionally at first and then more frequently from the Vatican.

The theory of natural law has saved some thinkers, even non-Catholic, from falling into the errors of individualism, or of State pantheism. But political experimentation has followed prevalent philosophical currents (which were not those of Christianity) and the historical process has been enormously influenced thereby.

Fortunately the practice of social life does not revolve un-deviatingly within the logical circle of ideas, and the oscillation between the two extremes often leads to a historical resultant very different from the theoretical premises. Thus it came to pass that, although theoretically the State was conceived as identical with society, this identity was in point of fact never realized; for intensively no less than extensively, the forces of opposition to the State let loose during this period transcended the limits of the State itself.

To say nothing of the moral and religious forces that have played a role antagonistic not to the State as civil power, but to the ethical content of the modern State, the forces that have borne the brunt of the conflict with the so-called "bourgeois" State have been the economic and social ones; everywhere the working masses, be it under the banner of Socialism, or of Communism, or of Anarchism destructive of all society, or of anti-State syndicalism, or of Christian Democratic leadership exhorting them to claim their just rights, have engaged in a struggle against the State. All this signifies that within the bosom of modern society a dualism has been born in view of which it has become impossible any longer to regard the State as the social whole, as certain theorists of yesterday pretended and some few still continue to do.

This fact in its concrete reality paves the way to a better understanding of that equivocal acceptance of the term State which has tormented modern society. The State represents the political form of society but is not society itself; it

controls public power but is not the whole of social power; it deals with economic interests but not with the whole of economic life; it formulates laws but does not create them; it is charged with the defense of the country but the duty of fighting for the latter is not incumbent upon it alone. The State is to be regarded as the political juridical organism of society, but must never be confounded with society itself. Were the State a perfect organism, no social factor could elude the consequences of the State's organicity and functionality. But since nothing in this world is perfect, though everything is perfectible, the State is never wholly efficient, but like every other social activity develops historically according to the dynamism of the forces operative within society.

Among these forces—fundamental so far as the individuals and the social groups are concerned—is the accumulation of wealth and of power, the one of these generating, influencing, or limiting the other. It is indisputable, however, that the lust for power and the lust for riches keep society in turmoil, influencing the governmental policies of all countries whatever their governmental structure may be.

Wealth and power are often, not to say always, united in the same class or in kindred classes, which sociologists speak of under such various names as the governing classes, the political classes, the ruling elite and so forth. As a corollary, the middle and working classes are, so far as possible, either excluded from power (in nondemocratic regimes) or nominally included but really shut out (in regimes based on individualist and capitalist democracy). Simultaneously, and at every step, they are hampered either by State action or by economic competition in their effort to attain to a just participation in wealth proportioned to their needs and abilities.

Hence, the State, which ought to be the supreme political expression of all classes, is often controlled by powerful families, by aristocratic classes, by big business, by financial

concerns, by profit-seeking bourgeoisie, becoming at times a veritable monopoly in the hands of these privileged classes. The theories that help to entrench privilege are well received. When Louis XIV originated the saying, *L'État c'est moi*, monarchist writers celebrated the divine right of kings. Napoleon and the members of his family found warrant for their prerogatives now in the rights of man, now in the rights of victory. The French bourgeoisie of the Restoration framed their own principle of liberty with a view to denying to workers the right to organize, though at that very time they themselves were organizing on a capitalistic basis, bringing pressure to bear on governments for the enactment of protective tariffs and the granting of bounties and privileges.¹

¹ In his *Quadragesimo Anno* Pius XI has a very trenchant passage on the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few in a regime of free competition and of uncontrolled power. It is not out of place to quote him here at length:

"It is patent that in our days not wealth alone is accumulated, but immense power and despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands of the few, who for the most part are not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, which they administer at their own good pleasure.

"This domination is most powerfully exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, also govern credit and determine its allotment, for that reason supplying, so to speak, the lifeblood to the entire economic body, and grasping in their hands, as it were, the very soul of production, so that no one can breathe against their will.

"This accumulation of power, the characteristic note of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limitless free competition, which permits the survival only of those who are the strongest, and this often means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.

"This concentration of power has, in its turn, led to a threefold struggle: First, there is the struggle for economic supremacy itself; then the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority may be abused in economic struggles; finally the clash between States themselves. This latter arises from two causes: because the nations apply their power and political influence to promote the economic advantages of their citizens; and because economic forces and economic domination are used to decide political controversies between nations."

On this question, see Chap. I: "Possession and Power," of *Politics and Morality*, by Luigi Sturzo, Burns, Oates and Washbourne, London, 1938.

Therefore, in any regime, so long as the working classes have no voice, direct or indirect, they will have no choice but that between economic oppression and revolutionary agitation.

This dilemma, historically, is only resolved through political organization with economic purposes. This, in fact, has been the most salient development of the past century, having reached an acute phase when Leo XIII intervened with his *Rerum Novarum*.

The economic organization of a country is not something that can be isolated, since it is inextricably intertwined with the political system. The two social factors—economic and political—are interrelated and reciprocally influenced. It is a costly mistake to believe that one can be dealt with and the other disregarded. Some Christian social theoreticians have let themselves be ensnared by this error. Such are the so-called “pure” organizers of professional groups, conceived as entities existing “outside of time and space,” with politics wholly left aside.

In the periods of the Communes of the Middle Ages, guilds of artisans not only had a corporate personality of their own (corporation) but participated through their representatives in the government of a free city or City-State, or of a Municipality subject to a feudal lord.

When the monarchs of the *ancien régime* narrowed the guilds to closed privileged groups, without any political significance, this entailed their inevitable sterilization and atrophy. Indeed, public and private economy developed without them and therefore against them. In the sequel, mercantilism, which was a necessary phase in the economic transformation of modern times, superseded the corporate system. The reason is clear: While political life, following its impulses, was broadening, surmounting class barriers and making room for the Third Estate—the bourgeoisie of capital, trade, and of small property holders—it was impossible

for economic life to be hampered by duties and tolls levied at every city or castle, by the privileges of guilds and their component families which excluded the masses of people anxious for work, by the feudal rights of landed aristocracies, by tremendous royal and ecclesiastical mortmain. Economic life in its turn had to be molded according to a new pattern and the forces resisting the change had to yield. This is the law of the historical process.

The guilds were accused of being what they had never been in their great past: a defunct institution obstructing life. But the accusation was true only of the emasculated form to which they had been reduced. The reformed monarchies of the eighteenth century, instead of rebuilding the guilds according to the needs of economic life and the development of political life, deprived them of governmental help. Thereupon they fell as a dead tree falls. But shortly afterwards the paternalistic and absolute State of the *ancien régime* in Continental Europe collapsed, because the drive toward economic evolution had not been met with the measures required to free property from feudal ties and from the domination of primogeniture and mortmain.

Thus the divorce of economics from politics (and vice versa) created one of the greatest crises in history; a crisis which under different aspects dragged on into the nineteenth century because of persistent failure to recognize the law of solidarity between economy and politics, either within the State or in international relations.

For this second or nineteenth-century crisis economic liberalism is accused of being responsible, though it was rather a consequence than a cause. The actual cause is to be found in the disequilibrium between economic transformation and political conceptions. While international and intercontinental markets were being enlarged, contacts made easier and more frequent, production augmented, supply rendered more abundant and circulation more intensive, the political

structure continued to be monopolized by one class—the bourgeoisie. To the aristocratic feudal landed regime there had only succeeded the bourgeois mercantilistic industrial one. The former, based on privilege, had regulated participation of the various social nuclei in this privileged system according to rank in a hierarchically ordered society. The latter aimed at freedom (for itself) in order to produce trade and gain.

In this way political liberalism was born out of economic liberalism, and the two systems, present in variable measure, formed the social complex of the past century; not to the extent, however, of bringing about the total extinction of the past. In some countries, such as England, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Scandinavia and Switzerland (we are not here discussing Russia), many vestiges of the old regimes survived, while elsewhere, as in Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland, almost every trace was obliterated. In Spain, impoverished by the loss of colonies and civil wars, there remained, as heritage from the past, social sentiments and resentments which were, and are even today, very strong.

When statesmen, sociologists, economists or ecclesiastics of the past century deplored the misdeeds of liberalism, sacrificing as it did the welfare of the then cruelly exploited working classes to the principle of liberty, they could see the consequences, but were not aware of the causes (so clearly analyzed since then by Leo XIII from the moral point of view), foremost among which was the divorce of economics from politics. The bourgeoisie, entrenched in its position as the dominant political class, was using liberal theories in order to forward its own advantage, and so created not the "liberal State"—which in fact has never existed—but, properly speaking, the "bourgeois State." Freedom was for the bourgeoisie a one-way street, to be extolled, that is, whenever freedom was useful to itself; when, on the other hand, freedom was demanded in favor of other classes

or, in some countries, in favor of the Church, it denied freedom, invoking the celebrated maxim: "The State must defend itself!"

No wonder the Marxian myth of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as two struggling forces spread so quickly, and the theory of historic materialism was so readily accepted as the key to social dynamism. What was merely a transitory phase, caused by the industrial transformation, became with Marx and the Marxists the fundamental scheme of society. According to Marx, the way to overcome the division of classes was to foment the class struggle which would eventuate in a classless Communistic society. The capitalistic bourgeois State and the proletarian Communistic State became for many the opposing camps engaged in a fight for victory.

The Legal Status of Unions

Neither of these conceptions represented the real state of affairs; both were theoretical and polemical exaggerations of a reality that was gradually ripening toward a climactic crisis. To this process, Catholic elements did not remain extraneous. Pius XI underscores this fact when he writes in *Quadragesimo Anno*: "In fact the Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, completely overthrew those tottering tenets of liberalism which had long hampered effective interference by the government. It prevailed upon the peoples themselves to develop their social policy more intensively on sounder lines and encouraged the elite among Catholics to give such efficacious help and assistance to rulers of the State that in legislative assemblies they were not infrequently the foremost advocates of the new policy. Furthermore, not a few recent laws dealing with social questions were originally proposed to the suffrage of the people's representatives by ecclesiastics thoroughly imbued with Leo's teaching, who

afterward with watchful care proposed and fostered their execution."

The enactment of so-called "social" laws favoring Labor, whereby European and American States, abandoning the "liberalist" economy, accepted partially the interventionist thesis, was not due, as some might think, to economic motives, but rather to a political fact of great significance. The formation of workers' parties in Europe, alongside of trade unions, of workers' syndicates and leagues organized under various banners—Socialist, Syndicalist, Communist and lastly, the Christian Democratic—had an important bearing: the workers were beginning to participate in political life in a constitutional regime and to act no longer as revolutionists and anarchists but in the political and legal arena of the State. The bourgeois parties deemed it well to subject their stand and their theories to a new examination; the very conservative groups themselves, whether for the sake of votes or out of mere snobbishness, posed in certain cases as upholders of the interests of the working-class. At the same time there were not wanting disinterested men, humanitarian and Christian, who recoiled in horror before the conditions of the workers of that time and attempted to find a remedy.

Despite all that, however, professional workers' groups, whatever their name and shade, were looked upon with suspicion and barely tolerated. Social laws were thought desirable, but only if granted by the State (*viz.*, the bourgeoisie) and not if pushed through by proletarian associations. Consequently, the unjust laws against which Leo XIII had raised his voice remained in force. Workers' unions were considered as *de facto* associations, not *de jure*, and as such they were subject to police supervision without civil and economic rights.

Gradually a new legal status developed whereby certain rights and duties of members and officers were regulated.

The elaboration of this status has been a long, uncertain process, with unequal development in different countries, until with the end of the First World War and the institution of the International Labor Office there came recognition having international validity. Another notable forward step was that of giving a certain legal validity to collectible labor agreements negotiated by unions.

It is not our task to write a country-by-country history of this development which lasted nearly three-quarters of a century. It is enough to observe here that the help of the Church and the contributions of Catholics have played an important role in removing from the workers' movement the old antisocial and anarchical stigma, in tempering the Marxist revolutionary tendency, in piloting a section of the working masses of certain European countries into Christian trade unionism, in dissipating class prejudices and the false notion that class struggle was a real social necessity.

Thus the theories of economic liberalism and of political individualism, which had been used by the bourgeoisie to exploit their advantageous position in the mechanism of big industry, received mortal wounds when they proclaimed State intervention in social matters. At the same time, too, the "bourgeois State" itself was mortally wounded, and the workers made their first appearance in popular assemblies in the person of representatives or deputies acting in their name.

II.

Unions' Problems

Between the end of the last century and our own day—a period which, roughly speaking, began with the issuance of the *Rerum Novarum* and ended with the publication of the *Quadragesimo Anno*—three problems were debated with reference to the relationship between the State and pro-

fessional groups. Of these, (a) one was a juridical problem concerning the nature, character and extension of such groups; (b) the second was an economic problem: How to reconcile free initiative with the intervention of such groups and of the State in economic life; and finally, (c) the third—a technical issue: How to organize these groups within each nation and in the international sphere.

Catholic pioneers in this field and Leo XIII himself had great difficulty in making themselves understood either by the bourgeoisie, or by the working class. They were accused of wanting to resuscitate the past with its guilds and corporations, without taking into account industrial changes and the formation of great proletarian masses. The masses themselves, politically organized in powerful parties with socialist tendencies (some of them with an uncompromising Marxian creed), represented an international power and were not at all anxious to lose their autonomy by yielding ground to local guilds and mixed corporations. They had at their disposal the weapon of the general strike and of mass demonstrations (let us recall what May Day once meant in Europe and how the bourgeoisie trembled at its approach). Theirs was a revolutionary idea.

Two schools were then developed within workers' organizations: the *Socialist* which made use of the electoral or parliamentary systems of constitutional regimes in order to come into power and set up so-called State Socialism; the *Christian-Social*, aiming at a State reform which would permit legal recognition of professional unions or groups as autonomous class organs with a function intermediate between public and private economy.

The Socialists for a long time opposed legal recognition of unions because they did not want them to be subject to juridical discipline that would fix their moral and economic responsibilities, thereby eliminating the revolutionary influence of political parties. On the other hand the Chris-

tian Democrats wanted their recognition and the granting to them of a juridical status so as to achieve a peaceful and gradual evolution from liberal economy to what they called "organic economy."

Facts are more convincing than theories. European Socialists and Laborites had been gradually organizing unions, workers' co-operatives, mutual assistance societies, and had been devoting hard work and money to such enterprises, creating new instruments of welfare such as housing projects, credit institutions, retail commissaries, obtaining for these purposes agreements with banks, municipalities, the State itself, for financial commitments and legal and fiscal privileges. From then on they began to develop on an increasing scale a sense of responsibility for these enterprises, a desire of capitalistic gain, a *petit-bourgeois* spirit of accumulation and even a bureaucratic formalism.

It is enough to look at what the Socialists had achieved in Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, Italy and elsewhere to realize how many economic interests of the working classes had been placed in their hands. A good many Socialists continued to act as revolutionaries at party meetings and in the press, but were careful to avoid acting in that role when appearing before administrative bodies which they sought to penetrate in every conceivable way in order to gain as many advantages as possible, claiming for themselves, at the same time, the privilege and exclusive right of representing the working classes and their interests.

As the number and practical interests of workers' organizations increased—even the Christian Democrats had organized throughout Europe a close-knit network of mutual aid associations, co-operatives and leagues—the revolutionary flame subsided and belief in the class war declined. And while Left-Wing Communists and syndicalists continued to be a nucleus of notable strength, the bulk of workers' groups

were tending toward a "reformist" and "possibilist" outlook. The revolution was in the "creed" but not in the "practice."

After the war the International Labor Office was created near the League of Nations, but with an autonomous character. Among the many advantages which it brought to the workers' cause and to social order we must list first of all the legalization of workers' representatives from every country, meeting with delegates of the employers, through the intervention of a third party—the representative of the State. The manner in which the workers' representatives were selected is not above criticism, but we are interested, at this point, mainly in the ethical and juridical principle of a workers' delegation sitting at the same meeting on a par with an employers' delegation. During its twenty-four years' existence, the State-representatives of the International Labor Office have often joined the employers' representatives, thus putting the workers in the minority. At times, this was doubtless the part of wisdom, but one cannot help feeling that, on other occasions, such action represented a defense of class interest, to which the States acceded because of their solidarity with capitalism and their distrust of laborism. But, apart from the fact that no social organism is always able to overcome or evade the warping stress of personal interests, since perfection is not of this world, it can be said that on the whole the International Labor Office has performed functions of information, education, technical and social assistance of a high order.

Whether in consequence of events at Geneva, of previous initiatives, or subsequent developments, it is a fact that workers in every country obtained legal recognition, varying in degree according to the country. At the same time industrialists and landowners were reorganizing their associations and legalizing their delegations. When compared with the time when workers did not have the right of forming associations, the advance represented by the International Labor

Office is striking, although, as we shall see, that development was, and still is, incomplete.

Unification of Workers' Movement

The problem which came to the fore in many countries both before and after the International Labor Office was established—and which still remains unsolved—is that of a unified workers' movement. In free countries not all workers are unionized. Unions are voluntary organizations and there can be different unions because of political contrasts, technical reasons, or grouping of related professions. Geneva solved the problem by admitting as first workers' delegate the representative of the organization having the largest number of members. He alone had the right to vote, the others being admitted simply as technical experts without voting rights. In practice the Socialist delegates had almost the totality of votes, whereas the Christian Democrats and independent delegates were decidedly in the minority (the latter coming from Holland, Ireland and in some cases from Czechoslovakia and Poland). Where workers' representatives from many countries were admitted in public committees or councils, the same rule was adopted, as, for example, in France, pre-Fascist Italy and elsewhere in Europe.

Here again the Socialist unions were nearly always placed in a more advantageous position. This caused resentment on the part of workers affiliated with Christian Democratic unions, which after the war promoted their own international federations with headquarters in Utrecht—with a membership of not less than three million Christian workers in its flourishing period. The number would have been greater had Germany, which had then an organization of more than three million Christian workers, participated; but in point of fact only 1,142,956 German workers were represented at Utrecht and at Geneva. The same was true of

Yugoslavia, which in 1928 had two hundred thousand organized peasants; also of France with about four hundred and fifty thousand organized workers in 1938.²

Once Fascism came into power in Italy, it organized its own syndicates, suppressing all others, and then it went to Geneva sustaining the legitimacy of its own workers' delegation. The workers' representatives in the International Labor Office voted against the Fascist claim, but the State representatives and those representing employers voted in favor of it. This had the effect of focusing attention upon the limits of State intervention in the formation of occupational groups and upon the representative capacity of the latter in the political field.

State totalitarianism was bound to bring into the labor field the same revolution of principle and practice that it brought into the other fields of politics, economics and morality. It could not leave to the workers, after having

² For the benefit of the many who are unaware of the importance of the Utrecht Confederation (dissolved by the Nazis after Holland was occupied by the latter), I subjoin here the data for the year 1922. It was then that Fascism started the totalitarian movement which, among other consequences, had the effect of abolishing in Italy all free unions, including the Catholic ones.

1922 MEMBERSHIP IN THE UTRECHT CONFEDERATION

Country	Number of Adherents
Austria	78,561
Belgium	200,202
Czechoslovakia	15,000
France	125,000
Germany	1,142,956
Holland	199,095
Hungary	113,855
Italy	1,052,694
Luxembourg	500
Spain	42,319
Switzerland	14,959
Yugoslavia	9,990

The workers' organization of Ireland never affiliated with Utrecht; the British Trade Union Council (including Catholics), on the other hand, affiliated with the Socialist Amsterdam International. As for the United States, there never have been organized Christian unions in that country.

denied them to all the other organisms of social life, either liberty or initiative. We shall return to this point later; suffice it to say now that the problem of a united workers' movement was by no means solved through a law compelling everybody to pay his tribute to privileged Fascist unions. The Socialists of Continental Europe had always and everywhere aimed at a *de facto* monopoly. The Italian Fascists established a *de jure* monopoly.

In Anglo-Saxon countries a different situation exists. In England the trade unions are in fact the only workers' organizations morally entitled to represent all the interests of the workers, and in the great majority they adhere to the Labour Party as being their own organization. The small group of four Independent Labour Party men in the House of Commons and the lone Communist member do not enjoy any real following among the masses; that, at any rate, was the situation before the outbreak of the war. In England, however, trade unionism, never a Marxist movement, has always been tolerant and respectful in religious matters, so that Catholic workers, too, participate in it and occupy responsible directorial positions.³

In France and other European countries, even in free Germany and Italy of the past, where the Socialist unions were not only Marxian in creed but frequently antireligious in morals and anticlerical in politics, such a thing would have been inconceivable.

In the United States the first important workers' association was known as The Knights of Labor, founded in 1869 at Philadelphia, with the characteristics of a secret and mystical association. This organization gave occasion to a well-

³ Catholic workers in England have a cultural organization of their own—the "Catholic Social Guild," and their own newspaper, *The Catholic Worker*. This paper is not the organ of said Guild, but stemmed from *The* (American) *Catholic Worker* founded in New York in May of 1933. The Catholic Social Guild, however, does publish a monthly bulletin, namely, *The Christian Democrat*.

known controversy and was saved from Rome's condemnation (demanded by the Canadian hierarchy) through Cardinal Gibbons' intervention with Pope Leo XIII. Nevertheless, the Knights of Labor went into a decline. The American Federation of Labor was formed at Pittsburgh in 1881. That was the era of craft unionism rather than of the industrial union, when the jealous preservation of the "absolute" rights of private enterprise, the frequent publication of blacklists, together with the *blackleg* abuses, were the order of the day. It was not until the beginning of the present century and even later—in the period of the First World War—that unions developed in big industry, strong in numbers and sympathies, so that the existing administration was compelled to come to terms with them in order to step up war production.

The split in the labor movement is of recent date: the Committee for (now Congress of) Industrial Organizations has been growing into a powerful force antagonistic to the American Federation of Labor. Agreements between unions are difficult when, above and beyond professional interests, personal ambitions come into play. Antiunionism in industry, too, was another factor making for discord; ever active, it tended to repress the labor movement which, on the other hand, was gaining in favor with the Federal Government and which, particularly after the *Quadragesimo Anno*, succeeded in enlisting the support of a large section of Catholic opinion.

The American bishops as early as 1919 had reasserted the right of the workers to organize, stating that "it is to be hoped that this right will never again be called into question by any considerable number of employers." This stand was reaffirmed in 1933. The following year the Secretary of the Conference of American Bishops addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in support of the bill "to diminish the cause of labor dis-

putes" (which later became the National Labor Relations Act) stating, among other things: "From a practical standpoint, the workers' free choice of representatives must be safeguarded in order to secure for him equality of contractual power in the wage contract. Undue interference with this choice is an unfair labor practice, unjust alike to workers and the general public."

The strongest opposition to labor unions in the past has always come from employers, either in the form of discrimination, espionage, the yellow-dog contract or—what was still worse—by way of maintaining so-called "company towns," which placed the workers wholly at the mercy of the management owning all the houses, shops and public halls in the community. A certain section of the press, too, by seeking to arouse hostile public opinion, fostered this opposition to unionism. Thus, during the war, in spite of prolonged efforts to organize labor in the United States, the total membership of the unions hardly exceeds 20 per cent of the country's working class.

In 1935 the position of American unions was strengthened by the Wagner Act, which guaranteed the workers the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and which described as unfair labor practices such actions of employers as tended to interfere with the workers' freedom in the above matters. The Wagner Act must be viewed rather as a defense of the right of the workers to organize than as a clarification of the juridical status of their unions. On the other hand, since the working class in the United States does not enjoy the backing of a powerful labor party as in England (or of a Socialist or a Christian Democratic Party as in Continental Europe before the advent of the totalitarian regimes, or of the war), the struggle for the protection of the workers' rights takes place not in the legislative assemblies but in the workshops. Hence those numerous strikes for the acquisition of elementary

rights of association that have so troubled American economy. At present the workers have gained only a part of what must be theirs in an organic conception of the State.⁴

Technical Issues

The technical problem, given its national and international repercussions, the complexities of modern industrialism and the political nature of workers' organizations themselves, was not one that could be solved *a priori*. Experimentation was the best way, but so long as the unions failed to attain a legal status, they continued their agitation on the margins of the law and political life, undergoing defeats which involved heavy losses to society. At length the moment

⁴ American Catholic workers are members of national unions. They have their own association—the A.C.T.U. (Association of Christian Trade Unionists) founded in 1938 “to foster and spread in the American labor movement sound trade unionism based on Christian principles, first by bringing to Catholic workers in particular, and all workers in general, a knowledge of these principles, and second, by training leaders and supplying an organization to put these principles into practice.” The present development of the A.C.T.U., whose New York branch publishes a paper called *The Labor Leader*, is very promising, and it may be added that the interest taken by the N.C.W.C. (National Catholic Welfare Conference) in social questions is very great and appreciated for its equilibrium and practical approach.

The fact that a good many workers are interested in union affairs tends to give union leaders a too powerful control over the unions and prompts them to demand real privileges, such as the *closed shop*. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the closed shop is, in many cases, the only defense against employers' hostility. The question of the closed shop is a very difficult one from the moral, social and political points of view. This is not the place to deal with it. Rev. Jerome L. Toner, O.S.B., M.A., has written a dissertation on it entitled *The Closed Shop in the American Labor Movement*, published by The American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., in 1942 and previously (in 1941) by The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. It is very interesting and well done, though I do not agree with the author in certain instances. What is of fundamental importance is to combine the right to free association with the right to work. The present situation shows the necessity of better legislation giving the unions a well-established legal status together with a definition of their rights and responsibilities. The Smith-Connally antistrike law, passed on June 25, 1943, is a wartime measure that does not meet the needs of unionism in America; indeed, some of its provisions show an antilabor feeling.

arrived when, having obtained a *de facto* recognition and while still awaiting the *de jure* recognition, their character and functions came in for a great deal of discussion.

1. *Class representation.* As long as the union is a free one and does not represent a majority of the workers, can it be recognized by law as the legitimate representative of the workers in its field? Here the unions have met with opposition on the part of both the employers and the State (legislatures and courts), although exercising in fact, at least in particular cases, the function of total representation. But even today headway is not made without a struggle.

2. *Collective agreements.* If the unions represent the entire class, they can not only negotiate labor contracts with employers but validly sign them and see to their recognition, even before the courts, as binding and applicable to all the workers.

3. *Hiring of workers.* If the unions represent the professional interests of the workers and stipulate labor contracts, they must be heard in the establishment of regulations for the hiring and firing of workers and apropos of the conditions of employment.

As a result of these three fundamental claims, we witness, on the one hand, the disappearance of the free individual worker (who, in point of fact, had not been so very free) and the appearance of a collective bargaining organization. In order to temper its monopolistic effects, the *Social Catholic* school advocates a plurality of free unions rather than one single union. On the other hand, it becomes necessary to assert the rights of the employer regarding the choice of the workers, the establishment of working conditions and the application of the contract. Hence the necessity of mixed shop committees to effect a real collaboration for the protection of rights on both sides and to ensure the observance of reciprocal duties.

Gradually the common interests of both employers and

employees in production has been acknowledged, and two practical consequences have followed: (a) the collective and permanent representation of both in organizations, having local or national jurisdiction, to protect the common interest of a given branch of production; (b) the growth of profit-sharing plans. The particular form of profit-sharing that the Christian Democrats have advocated has been stockholding on the part of the workers.⁵

If economics could be divorced from politics, we might stop at this point. But politics and economics go hand in hand. If capital and labor were left to manage by themselves, the first consequence would be the creation of an intolerable monopoly, both in the sphere of production, where all competition would be suppressed, and in the sphere of consumption, where monopolistic prices would be exacted. Such a thing can happen even in a liberal regime in which we have capital monopolies with trusts and horizontal as well as vertical cartels. Inevitably society reacts—a crisis is precipitated; all political crises have in some degree an economic substratum.

The State is obliged to intervene in order to protect just economic freedom and the consumer. The mode of intervention in every country is related to the political and juridical system; the main thing is to assert the general interest of the community to which the particular interests of classes must be subordinated, thus putting a stop to selfish overstepping of social boundaries by any particular group.

On the basis of these principles, both Pius XI and Pius XII have outlined an ideal scheme intended to serve as groundwork for the solution of the technical problem of labor organization. Of relevance here is the following passage taken from Pius XII's allocution of June 1, 1941, in com-

⁵ The Italian Workers Comederation (Christian Democratic) offered to the Giolitti Government in 1920 a bill on workers' stockholding, the bill being printed in the *Parliamentary Acts*.

memoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the *Rerum Novarum*:

He [Leo XIII] had no intention of laying down guiding principles anent the purely practical, we might say the technical, side of the social structure; for he was well aware—as our immediate predecessor of saintly memory, Pius XI, pointed out ten years ago in his commemorative Encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*—that the Church lays claim to no such mission.

In the general framework of labor, to stimulate the sane and responsible development of all the energies, physical and spiritual, of individuals in their free organization a wide field of action opens up, where public authority enters with its integrating and co-ordinating activity, exercised first through local and professional corporations and finally in the activity of the State itself, whose higher moderating social authority has the important duty of forestalling the dislocations of economic balance arising from plurality and divergence of clashing interests, individual and collective.

It is interesting to hear this restatement in 1941, in the full flowering of social and political totalitarianism, of Leo XIII's theory of free workers' organizations through the voice of his successor, the present Pope Pius XII. Leo XIII lived in an era of State liberalism when the rights of free workers' organizations had to be upheld in the face of a theory that forbade them in the name of economic freedom. Today the selfsame fight is being waged against the totalitarianism of the State, which itself organizes unions or workers' "syndicates" granting to these monopolistic rights. The Popes extend freedom of organization to the enterprises thus deprived of freedom in the totalitarian States. Hence, this affirmation takes on a cardinal importance transcending the contingent motivations of the times (whether of Leo or of the two Piuses) because it bears upon the sacred right of human personality.

In order to co-ordinate these free associations among themselves and in the general interest of production and consumption, there is need of a higher body. The Popes have named it, in the parlance of Latin countries, a "professional corporation." In English-speaking countries "corporation" would be termed a "corporate body." According to the Papal conception, the representatives of employees and of employers, plus the local or national representatives of public authority, would constitute such a "corporate body" which, for the rest, might very well be called even in English a "professional corporation." In fact, the Whitley councils in England bear a certain resemblance to the body in question. Such bodies or councils decide questions of a professional and economic nature as between labor and management, or producers and consumers. The function of representatives of public authority in such corporations must be—according to Pope Pius XII, who is repeating what Pope Pius XI had written—that of "integrating and co-ordinating activity," such activity to take place within the "local and professional corporations" (meaning both local and nation-wide corporations of each profession or branch).

We ascend in this way to the level of the State, the character of whose intervention Pius XII describes in these clear words: "[The State's] higher moderating social authority has the important duty of forestalling the dislocation of economic balance arising from plurality and divergence of clashing interests, individual and collective." Is this a defense of the principle of intervention as exemplified, for instance, in the American New Deal? Leaving open the question of whether the New Deal has been, in the concrete, erroneous, or incomplete, or too particularistic, the State's right, in the abstract, to intervene (actually exercised in the United States since 1933) is something that cannot be questioned.

Unions in Totalitarian States

Thus it is evident that the teachings which uninterruptedly for over half a century have come from the Vatican have been directed against: (a) individualistic liberalism, denying to workers the right to associate; (b) the unorganic system of class struggle between capital and labor proclaimed by Marxian Socialism; (c) totalitarianism, which has created a syndicalist monopoly and a bureaucratic corporativism of the State.

The first of these three has today been left behind by the facts. The few theoreticians that still uphold it are negligible. The diehards who weep over the past do so in the name of private initiative and just competition, which indeed should be safeguarded not by economic liberalism, but by the social organic system as propounded by the *Social Catholic* school.

The second still exists in an endemic state occasioning social convulsions, although nowadays the general feeling is that class struggle represented a stage of transition leading to vanquishing individualism as an obstacle to adequate organization of the forces of production.

The third has been and is still the really dangerous evil threatening us. Its fate was bound up with the outcome of the war and with the fate of the totalitarian States, representing a conception of the whole ethical and structural complex of society. But since ideas germinate beyond the sphere of historical facts and since war never kills an ideal it is advisable to look into the facts as they developed in totalitarian Axis countries before the war.

We cannot analyze here the Russian system. In Russia the State is at once the capitalist, management and master. All private initiative and competition having ceased, the class struggle has ceased too. Workers' associations have only the task of watching over the working conditions (not the rights)

which they discharge through adjustments, petitions, protests—provided these do not, as is likely, lead to harsh repressions. The reports we have had on the position of the working classes in Russia vary from a bland optimism to a dark pessimism. From the theoretical point of view, the problem must perforce be discussed on the basis of the State system founded upon totalitarianism and the abolition of all real liberty.

In Italy the Fascist Government granted its syndicates a monopolistic position, barring every other syndicate from legally representing the workers—from the right to bargain with the employer and to supervise the hiring of workers. Before that time there were in Italy two great labor confederations: the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, not to mention a third of local import—the Syndicalists.⁶

These confederations fell under Fascist attack, although theoretically the law allowed their survival as private associations. In 1927, when Catholic Action promoted a social institute that classified its members according to their professions, the Fascist Government protested, fearing lest in this way—as a study association—the White Confederation (this being the nickname for Christian Democracy) might be reborn. The Catholic Actionists were, of course, obliged to yield.

Pius XI referred briefly to the matter in the *Quadragesimo Anno*, where he said: "The State here [in Italy] grants legal recognition to the syndicate or union and thereby confers on it some features of a monopoly; for, in virtue of this recognition, it alone can represent workingmen and employers respectively and it alone can conclude labor contracts and labor agreements. Affiliation with the syndicate is optional to everyone; but in this sense only can the syndical organization be said to be free, since the contribution to the

⁶ The Socialists had 1,500,000 members, the Christian Democrats 1,200,000, the Syndicalists 300,000.

union and other special taxes are obligatory for all who belong to a given branch, be they workingmen or employers. The labor contracts drawn up by the legal syndicate are likewise obligatory. It is true that it has been authoritatively declared that the legal syndicate does not exclude the existence of unrecognized trade associations."

This text is in reality a criticism of the Fascist syndicalist monopoly. The last sentence beginning with the words "It is true," was added not to omit the technical point the Fascist Government advanced in its own defense, which made it appear a concession to the Catholics, but a worthless concession that in fact was meaningless. Coincidentally with the publication of the *Quadragesimo Anno* there convened in Rome on May 15, 1931, a great congress of representatives of workers' unions from many European countries. This meeting, which took place at the monument to the Catholic worker in the Lateran, as a tribute to the memory of Leo XIII, so irritated the Fascists that it precipitated the struggle to do away with the last trace of Catholic unionism.

Pope Pius XI himself did not fail to stress certain other criticisms which had been advanced against the Fascist labor system. In almost immediate sequence to the aforesaid passage he wrote: "But in order to overlook nothing in a matter of such importance, and in the light of the general principles stated above as well as of what We are now about to formulate, We feel bound to add that to Our knowledge there are some who fear the State is substituting itself in the place of private initiative, instead of limiting itself to necessary and sufficient help and assistance. It is feared that the new syndical and corporative institution possesses an excessively bureaucratic and political character and that, notwithstanding the general advantages referred to above, it risks serving political aims rather than contributing to the initiation of a better social order."

It would be difficult indeed in such a dignified document

as a Papal Encyclical to pronounce a more serene, objective and measured criticism than this one by Pius XI. The full significance of his observations on the Italian *corporative State* was not fully understood until recently; but now, in the lurid light of the Second World War, men readily come to see how regulated planning and autarchy were the substratum underlying State corporativism, a system that had been acclaimed as the social system of the future, a system that some naïve Catholics had hailed as a return to medieval tradition—an application of the *guild system* to modern economy.

The situation in Italy was in brief as follows: 'The workers' syndicate was a monopoly of the Fascist Party, whose head was the head of the government; the corporation (a bureaucratic body, set up for every field of production and representing employers, employees and the State) and the National Council of Corporations were party and governmental monopolies. The technical functioning of the corporation and of the Council were subject to the political directions of the party and the political decisions of the government. Hence one single individual had the complete and sole responsibility for the country's economic life; the head of the party and the head of the government—one and the same person.

Discussion of the Italian *corporative State* has gone on at great length without any attempt to understand fully its true meaning. We must bear in mind that in the course of the past century continental *Social Catholics*, in their oppositions to the individualistic parliamentary system, had contended often that one branch of parliament ought to be representative of social bodies like the municipalities, the provinces, the universities and the corporations.⁷ But it is

⁷ In its 1919 program the Italian Popular Party favored the creation of an elected Senate (the Senate in Italy being at that time composed of royal appointees nominated for life) to represent local and professional bodies, the universities and other cultural associations.

evident that the invariable presupposition was that such bodies were to have their own autonomous directive councils, freely elected, and that they should be free also in the nomination of their representatives in parliament. The situation in Italy was entirely different. The corporations had neither free choice in the selection of their councils, nor freedom in the nomination of their representatives in parliament. Moreover, parliament had no vitality of its own nor had it any legislative autonomy. Consequently, the whole elaborate façade of the so-called corporative State falls to the ground, unmasking the stark reality of the totalitarian State.⁸

In Germany Nazism similarly suppressed the trade unions that were in the hands of Socialists, Catholics and Protestants⁹ and in May of 1933 confiscated the assets both of workers' unions and employers' associations. The system of

⁸ The opinion of certain writers that all political representation should be based upon economic bodies cannot be accepted for the economic aspect must not be deemed the only factor of social life nor the sole exponent of the State's political life.

⁹ In Germany there was a Christian trade union movement and also Catholic and Protestant workers' associations, both collaborating very closely with the *Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland*, founded by Windhorst. The union of the "*Angestellte*" (white collar workers and higher employees) and the *Deutschnationale Handlungsgewerkschaft*, together with the Christian trade unions and certain associations of railroad workers, were united in the so-called *Deutscher Arbeiterkongress*. After the war, the *Arbeiterkongress* was supplanted by a permanent national organization, the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*, which in certain sections of private business had a majority, nay, totality of members and had succeeded in driving the Socialists out of many important positions they had held before. Its membership was over three million. Furthermore, there was a co-operative movement which was very successful, especially among peasants and workers of the Rhineland, Bavaria and Westphalia. During the revolution of November, 1918, a central voluntary organization was founded to maintain constant close collaboration between the two trade union movements and the top organizations of German industry and agriculture. This was the *Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft*, which was extraordinarily successful. That agency nominated the members of the *Reichswirtschaftsrat*, the corporative advisory parliament provided for in the Weimar Constitution. What weakened the effort of the *Social Catholics* in Germany before 1933 was firstly, the misunderstanding between Catholic and Protestant groups as to how to meet Marxist and Communist penetration, and secondly, Nazi infiltration in conservative quarters.

collective bargaining was abolished as well as that of the labor councils—in brief, every form of social and economic representation.

With the National Labor Act of January, 1934, every relationship between workers and management was put under the control of the State; the representatives of the State, the so-called "labor trustees," decide all points at issue. They must hear both sides, but under the "leadership principle" they are free to fix the collective regulations which have superseded the abolished collective agreements. On the other hand, both the regulation of labor exchanges and the fixing of wages is a State function. The State is empowered to dictate any shift of workers from one working place to another and to decree compulsory labor. Labor was regimented, for all the etiquette of the "Labor Front," to subserve political motives which soon revealed themselves as aiming at the setting up of a war economy.

Other countries followed the Italian and German systems, mitigating some of their rigidities, and they have done so in the mistaken belief that they were applying Papal teachings. But given the fundamental mistake of denying freedom of association to the workers, while monopolistic groups under State tutelage were organized, the foundation stone of a system inspired by the teachings of the *Social Catholic* school was missing.

The war affected world economy and the whole of our social life. It could not be otherwise since this is a total war from which not even neutral and nonbelligerent countries are immune. The relationships between State and professional groups during such a war were modified both in intensity and extension. The difference between democratic and totalitarian States was that in the former, workers, maintaining their free associations and guarantees, voluntarily submit themselves to war discipline and co-operate politically in the common effort while accepting such restrictions as

necessity imposes. In the latter, it might well be that a national sentiment developed among the working classes likewise accepted the harsh discipline of war. But the lack of liberty, the social restrictions, the exploitation of energies, the absence of all juridical and moral guarantees weighted heavily on the working classes, realizing that their status was one of slavery from which they had no prospect of emerging.

It was claimed that Russian workers, artisans and peasants fight with a courage and an ardor they never showed in the same degree under the czars. However difficult it may be to understand the psychology of peoples detached from our civilization, it must be noted first of all that Russia had been attacked and her territory invaded; consequently, these workers and peasants were defending their own fatherland. Furthermore it cannot be denied that the working classes, deprived under the czars of all participation in civic and political life,¹⁰ inadequately provided with schools for vocational training, had no party spirit comparable to that which the Soviets have been careful to foster.

With this prefaced in the interest of an exact diagnosis, we cannot accept the view which places Soviet and democratic labor unions on the same level. This matter was often debated at international workers' congress after the First World War where, on the basis of a false appreciation of realities, British labor fought for several years in favor of admitting the Russian unions, which German and French workers' representatives, among others, opposed for the reason that the unions in question were not free.

As a rule, all totalitarian systems, including the Russian and satellite countries, stifle that free breathing possible only in the air of liberty. Hence they have no alternative but to recur to the repressive devices of stricter bureaucratic and police organization. War accelerates the rhythm of human

¹⁰ The old local organization of peasants and artisans in Russia was confined to the economic and domestic spheres and had no political bearing.

activities by means of general restrictions. In totalitarian countries these restrictions have not eliminated liberty, which did not exist, but have taken away from the workers even the possibility of adapting themselves to the system of slavery—an adaptation that might slowly have become, as it did for the slaves of antiquity, a kind of pseudo-liberty—the only sort that mankind knew for thousands of years.

For this reason, the situation of workers' groups in the democratic State during the war was completely different from their situation in the totalitarian State both as regards the factual condition brought about by the war and as relates to the reconstruction period after the war.¹¹ The former can talk of rights, can make their voice heard, can debate their interests even while making allowance for the difficulties of a crisis affecting the whole of economic life; the latter, if they aspire to break the servile bonds that bind them, can only look forward to the possibility of exploiting some revolutionary crisis as a means of regaining their freedom.

And this brings us back once more to the question at the root of the workers' problem in the modern world (a question we have repeatedly touched upon in the course of this study): How is it possible to induce the working class to abandon its position of antagonism to the State and to reverse this into one of co-operation with the State? If the working class has no freedom to organize along occupational lines and no voice in political life, as is the case in totalitarian countries, then, notwithstanding the pseudo-system of political representation, it will be impossible to give labor effective parity with other classes, in a broader scheme of social co-operation. Only the workers of democratic coun-

¹¹ In the steel industries, the *labor-management* committees, where established, have proved to be a "tremendous contribution" to the war effort according to the statement of Gordon Lefebvre, Vice President and General Manager of the Cooper-Bessemer Corporation, who remarks that said committees "had the effect of educating management—and I hope labor—to the other fellow's viewpoint." (See *The Commonwealth*, March 5, 1943, pp. 484-485.)

tries will be able to attain this goal, provided the voluntary and effective understanding reached during the war is continued, developed and consolidated during the period of peace.

III.

Labor Parties and Middle Classes Between Two Wars

The formation of labor parties or groups, within and alongside existing bourgeois political organizations, began in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. The effects of industrialization, Socialist propaganda and universal suffrage aroused then in the masses the first stirrings of political consciousness.

The questions raised by workers were for the most part economic, aside from some hints of domestic policy in defense of liberties, of their liberties, of course, from the encroachment of conservative or authoritarian governments, as well as of foreign policy either with a pacifist tinge or a flavor of the "international."

Later on there arrived on the scene the so-called Christian Socialists or Christian Democrats who differentiated themselves from the Catholic Conservatives of a bourgeois type, and took the position of a center party, stressing the importance of the family as an economic unit; instead of class warfare on the Marxist pattern they stood for collaboration among all classes with special measures for the improvements of labor conditions.

Before the First World War, however, neither labor or workers' parties—even the revolutionary extremists—nor the Christian Democratic groups had any real function in the domestic or international politics of any nation. Social legislation was often conceded or promoted by Liberal or Catholic Conservative parties, and even by capitalists them-

selves. The working classes (aside from some terroristic demonstrations) expressed themselves directly only through strikes, May Day parades, newspaper discussions and systematic opposition in various parliamentary bodies.

During the last century the unionized worker was looked on by many as an enemy of the State, a social menace, a wild animal to be tamed. But the social revolution, so feared in those days, never took place, because the working class organization was only in its infancy while landowners and industrialists continued to dominate world economics and politics, because the workers' parties represented only a fraction of their class even in the big industrial cities. The labor system was then in most instances traditional, just similar to the past systems, and no workers' party could effect a real social transformation without coming to grips, through political action, with the whole economic structure of the nation.

After the First World War it was natural that the classes responsible for it should suffer. The hardest hit was the middle class dependent on a small income or pension, including intellectuals and professional men with all but a few exceptions of unusual merit or privilege. The proletarianization of a great part of the middle classes and the migration of many of its members to countries where life was easier deprived the nations of Continental Europe of much of their stability. An effect of the instability of the post-war period was the increasing political centralization and the extension of bureaucracy in an attempt on the part of the State to create a balance between the capitalistic and the proletarian classes.

A new political revaluation of the labor parties (Socialist and Christian Democrats) and their direct participation in the government was a natural result. If the bourgeois parties (Nationalists, Liberals, Radical Socialists and Catholic Con-

servatives) had not feared the labor parties' taking a defensive position against them, then the crisis called Nationalism, Fascism, Nazism would never have come to a head. The crisis did not come about in Italy and Germany alone. It penetrated almost all of Continental Europe: in France it made use of long-standing political conflicts exacerbated by the *Action Française*, *Croix de Feu* and other reactionary groups; in England it involved conservatives and laborites alike in a fear of Bolshevism and a policy of appeasing the Fascists and Nazis in order to maintain international "peace." The same thing happened in the United States, which followed British and French policy in regard to Europe while pursuing its own capitalistic aims in South America.

Thus it came about that the bourgeois parties controlling the greater part of the world (except where there was a moderate State-Socialism as in the Scandinavian countries, Australia and New Zealand) set the stage for a Second World War while attempting to defend themselves against the social revolution then preached by mass demagogues. The workers' parties, on the other hand, were unable to influence the international policy of their own countries; they limited their activity to obtaining economic advantages for the workers and in this they paved the way for the passage of many of their own adherents into the ranks of Nazi Fascist or semi-Fascist reaction.

In all this play of interests and parties we see a steady decline of the importance of the groups which for centuries were the backbone of society and the balance between two extremes, that is, the middle classes, including professional men, government officials, small farmers and real-estate owners, all of them removed from capitalist greed and the instability of the proletariat. The best of the middle class had traditionally quite impartial political views (as far as possible) and had supported the general struggle for free-

dom. This class lost strength; it swung between the Right and the Left, between nationalism and social revolution. Most of its members remained faithful to the State in whatever form the State took on, simply because they were either in government employ or in some way or other dependent on the general public. This was the course of one of the most important social and political transformations of the period between 1914 and 1939.

Social Changes after the Second World War

The Second World War caused and will cause still greater changes in the economic and social structure of Europe and these changes will have their effect all over the world. Some middle-class groups remained or once more emerged in western Europe between 1919 and 1939; they never totally disappeared and were slowly reviving wherever there were urban or rural small property owners. Today, however, in the cities the middle class has been dealt a violent, almost mortal, blow. It has survived more successfully in the country by virtue of its attachment to the land, whose products, at this time of scarcity, are of immense value. But this class today is neither compact nor strong; it does not stand for the interests of the general population, indeed, it is in temporary but acute conflict with these interests, and so it can only attend to its own preservation and seek to block the rapidly extending powers of the State. Small landowners are instinctively coming to occupy the political position held half a century ago by anarcho-syndicalist groups among the workers, opponents of any and all governmental control.

Bankers and industrialists, on the other hand, have still a trump to play in the rebuilding of Europe's economy, that of joining the working class in economic and political collaboration to make an alliance, effective or apparent as the case may be, between private enterprise and socialization,

so as to bridge the gap for future transformations through various socially autonomous groups.

This alliance is neither a plan nor a program, but merely a dim vision of a hypothetical future. Two forces are working against it: reactionary capitalism on the one hand, and the Communist myth on the other. Both are working on a national and an international scale and it is not a mere journalistic commonplace to say that the former is centered in the United States and the latter in Russia. It is a plain fact that many workers turn to Moscow as the Mohammedans to the Mecca, and without the United States reactionary capitalism would have only a local, half feudal character, confined to the most backward portions of countries not directly touched by the war, such as Spain, Portugal and some Latin American countries. Reactionary capitalism in the United States will struggle to defend itself against the extension of government power in the form of another "New Deal" and against the growing might of the labor unions; at the same time it will try to attract into its orbit international capitalism and to settle upon a plan of attack when there comes the inevitable crisis.

I say "reactionary capitalism" as distinct from "moderate capitalism," which inclines toward an understanding with Russia and a balance, characterized by mutual influence, between government control and private initiative. This moderate capitalism prevailed at the conferences held at Bretton Woods, San Francisco, Potsdam and is still prevailing. It aims at co-operation with Britain's Labor Government for British reconstruction without damage to American economy; it believes in making financial and political concessions to Russia in Europe, Asia and Africa because it counts on a permanent and frank understanding between capital and labor. It is clear that moderate capitalism does not intend to lose its power either at home or abroad, but

although it wishes to keep the initiative in its own hands it accepts the rules and regulations which most limit its power if it is to share the face of the earth with others.

It is hard to tell which of the two forms of capitalism will prevail in the future because success for either depends upon the mistake of its rivals. Of these rivals the foremost is the Communist myth. I call it a myth because neither the present economic or political setup in Russia necessarily leads to Communist experimentation all over Europe. But the myth, as sociologists call it, is an idea-force which takes shape and agitates the minds and heads of a people. This people is now the unemployed, those who have dropped out of the middle class, the homeless in countries which have been destroyed, the displaced persons, all those in some way incapacitated by the war. Such a myth is strong enough to have an influence in destitute countries. Russia has already set up a sphere of influence including the Baltic countries, the greater part of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, and has made important advances in Greece, Italy and France. The attraction of Russia and its political domination are playing a decisive role in Europe.

Without going into the subtleties of the political game played by the "Big Three" or the "Big Five" or the fifty or more members of the United Nations organization—a game whose character may change from one day to the next and whose only certain prospect consists in another war or uneasy peace—we can already foresee that the alternatives of "freedom and dictatorship" or "democracy and totalitarianism" will depend in international politics on "the sphere of influence" and in international economics on "the economic zones" and in each nation on "the mass parties." These three factors will combine or conflict during the period of instability which will last for years after the war.

European Labor Parties in Power

The parties with a social platform—the Communists, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats—from their first appearances in Italy in 1943, in France in 1944 and later in the rest of Europe, including Austria, Poland and Germany, have already given us an indication of the part to be played by the working class in post-war politics. It is true that these same parties (or others similar to them) took part in political life in the period between the First and Second World Wars, but they were always on the edge of what was going on, either as a parliamentary minority or as opposition outside of the parliament, or else as junior partners with secondary role in a coalition government.

The first labor cabinet in England, in 1924, represented a minority and its life hung in the balance for the space of a few months until the opposition swept it away in October of the same year with the false Zinoviev letter. The Socialist Government in Prussia in 1930–32 had no real political function (in view of the Weimar Constitution) and was in reality a mere Socialist bureaucracy. The so-called Popular Front in France in 1936 did not go far toward carrying out the Socialist ideas of Leon Blum and it eventually fell to pieces on account of disagreement between the Radicals and the Socialists. The mixed Socialist-Communist governments which held power in rapid succession in Spain during the Spanish Civil War were war cabinets and only the necessity of war held them together in spite of their deep-rooted factional differences. In other words the parties representative of the working class were effective only on the margin of bourgeois politics and they gave proof of great immaturity when they came to power in the midst of a still fundamentally capitalist society or a semifeudal one.

After the Second World War we see that leadership in both national and international economics and politics has

passed into the hands of the workers' parties or those connected with them (such as the Christian Democrats) while the Conservative and Liberal Parties have either been displaced (as in England) or have maintained a purely secondary role (as in Italy and in France). In the central European countries, where the influence of Moscow prevails, no truly free government is possible and the coalition of the Communist, Socialist, Democratic and Christian Democrat Parties (the exact local names do not matter) has a very precarious life.

The labor victory in England in July 1945 is a milestone in not only English but also European history. The British Labour Party has never had any close affinity with the Marxist, revolutionary and anticlerical character of Continental Socialism before the war. Now that on the Continent Communism has drawn new strength from the support of Moscow, Continental Socialism must decide between following the lead of British labor or that of a Communist revolution.

We see thus that there are three types of working-class parties in relation to varying economic and political conditions in the post-war world. There is an extreme Communist segment with the accent on dictatorship of the proletariat aiming to absorb the masses politically before the actuation of economic communism; the segment patterned on British labor which accepts democratic methods and political freedom as guarantees of proposed reforms to be carried out by a new ruling class (the labor class), leaving some marginal room to capitalist initiative; and, finally, the Christian Democrat segment, based on many of the same premises as those of labor but with the accent on the social function of the family and the small landowner and the ethnical aspect of domestic social policy.

It is premature to tell what will be the mark left by each of these groups on the economic and political life of various

countries. Nor can we foresee to what extent the bourgeoisie will be removed from its commanding position. It is hard to imagine just how long the workers will be able to hold out against the coming capitalist reaction and manage not to provoke a revolution which would in turn bring about a counterrevolution. Future events may disprove our hypotheses. It is certain, however, that in Europe the working class and the leaders of the working-class parties (who are not always workers) are replacing the capitalist conservative, bureaucratic and intellectual bourgeoisie which held the political scene before the war. The change is just as significant as that marked by the transition from the nobility and clergy to the bourgeoisie at the time of the French Revolution.

The Repercussion in the Western Hemisphere

It would be interesting to study the probable repercussions in the Western Hemisphere of what is currently happening in Europe. South America has enormous possibilities of economic progress eventually but not in the near future, because of a lack of technicians, trained workers, open markets and free trade. If Europe goes Communist and becomes a closed compartment where the people feed on their own poverty, South America will suffer as well, because it will not be able to export its capital, exchange its products with those of Europe or reinvigorate its economic machinery with a view to a prosperous future. On the contrary, it will have to defend itself against "European," that is, Communist propaganda by tightening up its reactionary policies and turning toward the United States, which can serve neither as a market for all its products nor as a sole and uncontested center of political affinity.

The United States is faced with having to fight any tendency to isolationism; it must use its strength and authority to preserve its prestige in Europe; it must bolster up with

capital the shaky economic situation of Great Britain and take Britain's place in economic relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Meanwhile it will have to carry the dead weight of a defeated and dispossessed Japan, aid economic reconstruction in China and the South Pacific and put up with the largely unwelcome presence of Russia in the Far East.

If we add to these burdens of the United States that of an impoverished, Bolshevized and revolutionary Europe, the burden would be intolerable. It would be even worse if such a Europe should claim the right to build up a Communist economy with American dollars. This would rub the United States the wrong way psychologically and politically; moreover, it would bring about the coexistence of two incompatible economic systems. In the long run economic conflict would lead to a breakdown of political relations, just as was the case when Hitler was or considered himself unable to count further on Anglo-American capital.

Meanwhile American capitalism has a seeming enemy within its gates, the labor movement. I say "seeming" because in order to maintain the high living standards of the American worker organized labor must stay within a capitalist framework. In spite of this fact strife between capital and labor will increase and will be carried over into politics.¹³ The Communist myth will have full play on both sides until there is a clear vision of the practical effects of not-so-unlikely revolution in Europe. Then we shall hear outspoken praise of Hitler, Mussolini, Pétain and Franco as the forerunners of a new North and South American Fascism. Will this be merely a sentimental infatuation or the sign of a re-

¹³ The P.A.C. (Political Action Committee) of C.I.O. is principally an electoral instrument of the unionism linked with the Left Wing of the Democratic Party and the other "progressive" political groups in America. The alleged sympathy of P.A.C. to Communists is not general nor strong, though the Communistic infiltration is spreading and deepening in some American political quarters.

action to Communism? Only the fear of another war can bend the United States to a renewal of appeasement, until the day when a straightening out of world economy becomes so necessary that the shackles of the past must be shaken off and there must be a return to saner principles of domestic and international policies. Meanwhile what dangers lie in waiting, how many victims and how much more suffering for humanity?

Were it not for the shadow of the atomic bomb we might easily foresee the makings of another war. Fear alone, however, cannot restore the world to more normal ways. The labor classes which can now strive for political power on an equal footing with the bourgeois and middle classes (which held the power in the past) must be guided by a sense of responsibility and moderation to achieve an efficacious cooperation with other classes both in domestic and international fields. Both classes must renounce any reaction of a Fascist type or a revolution of a Communist type, but the capitalist must understand that his function is limited, his power is controlled, and his century-old political monopoly is over and done with.

6

The Modern Wars

I.

Character of Modern Wars in the Nineteenth Century

THE WARS with which we are concerned in the present chapter are those which had their beginning with the American wars of independence and, in Europe, with those of the French Revolution followed by the Napoleonic campaigns. From that time up to the present—a period of more than a century and a half—all the wars waged by states and people called civilized, though differing from one another in military technique, because of their political and moral motives, and in their extent and importance, have had certain characteristics in common, which from the sociological point of view enables us to group them together. For that reason, we call them all *modern wars*.

The first characteristic mark which distinguishes them from the wars of *ancien régime* is that they are no longer dynastic but national wars. The fall of the monarchic-paternalistic system in Europe and of colonialism on the American continent coincide with the revolutionary formation of national states. War is the means—often the only means—for the conquest of national independence and constitutional popular liberties.

Another characteristic feature, resulting from the first, is that of national armies. The recruiting of the army changes

completely; it is no longer a military, hereditary aristocracy, no longer a military troops enlisted by the king and recruited anywhere at all. The army is drawn from the whole nation and where *conscription* is introduced, advancement is more or less possible for all. Military technique changes, too, because of the number, the quality and the character of the new armies; the man who has the intuition for initial changes and can foresee their effects, as Napoleon did, has the immediate advantage of an unexpected superiority. It was the case with Hitler.

Still another characteristic feature is the *finances of war*. Formerly it was the kings who applied to established bodies—parliaments, guilds, municipalities, general states and the like, according to the country—for contributions in order to initiate or carry on wars; private bankers, even aliens (Peruzzi or Rothschild), were not lacking to sustain the constant financial deficits of the monarchies. In the modern period it is the *nation* which sustains the expense of war, by means of taxes or public loans, voluntary or imposed by law, and it is the parliament which gives them their popular and legal character.

One cannot suppose that daily the past dies and the new supplants it. In history, transitions, slow or violent, are always complicated and often recurrent, so that the new resembles the old, and the old is reborn with the new or persists to a greater degree than is commonly believed. Thus, autocratic and feudal Germany, authoritarian and police-controlled Austria, absolutist and tyrannical Turkey and Russia, all resisted the revolutionary influences of the first half of the nineteenth century, not, however, without modifying, undoubtedly, their orientations and aims. Thus, the French bourgeois, the English aristocracy and the wealthy classes of North America formed an obstacle to popular democracy; and the party "bosses" in Spain and

South America fought one another under the banners of liberalism or reaction.

Despite the complexity of political motives and social tendencies, what remains up to the present in the entire civilized world is the modern character of war. In the intricate web of national, economic, and hegemonic motives, this dominates the course of political events and continually develops with an internal logic, from local wars to general wars, involving entire continents and stamping its rhythm upon all countries, all spheres of human activity.

In the development of modern wars in Europe, we can distinguish four periods: the first from 1792 to 1815—the revolutionary wars and Napoleonic Wars; the second from 1821 to 1860—wars of independence and liberty (this period can be further extended by twenty years in view of the revolts and wars of the Balkan countries against the Turks); the third period—wars for hegemony from 1866 to the end of the nineteenth century; the fourth period from 1911 to the present—that of the cyclic world wars.¹

In the first period are developed: the national sense of wars, the formation of the popular army, ideological propaganda. In the second period, the liberal ideologies and aspirations to political independence gave full development to

¹ We have indicated the date 1911 and not 1914 as the beginning of the wars which we call cyclic, because we begin with the war of Italy against Turkey waged for the possession of Libya. A thoughtful observer will see the connection at once. The Libyan war weakened Turkey; the Balkan countries seized the opportune moment to fall upon it. When the first Balkan war ended, the second began, facilitated by the intrigues of Vienna intended to weaken Serbia. The outcome of these wars brought about the maturation of Austrian designs in the Balkans. Well known at this time is the request of Austria made in 1913 to the Italian Government to move against Serbia and Premier Giolitti's refusal because that would have been a war of aggression not covered by the Pact of the Triple Alliance. What Austria did not dare do in 1913, she did in 1914, taking as the pretext the crime of Sarajevo and refusing every proposal of mediation. The year 1914 is closely connected with 1911, just as 1939—the beginning of the present war—is connected with 1935, the beginning of Italy's war against Abyssinia. The sequel is well known.

permanent armies with preventive military service and with annual military budgets. The wars of the third period make better use of the industrial inventions and military technique and bring about a continual increase in the military expenditures which burden the budgets of practically all states, large and small. Finally, present-day wars absorb all the economic, financial, technical and moral resources of every nation, constituting a single front between the zone of operation and the interior. To war on land and sea is added war of the air, which has no geographical limits and which can rage in every corner of the countries in conflict.²

Such tremendous development on the part of modern wars could have been predicted from the ideologies on which they were based, although their industrial and military technique were not predictable. The idea of the nation was at the center of the new political system. In France it supplanted the monarchy and represented in the State the organized popular will. In Germany, the nation was conceived mystically—Fichte was its prophet—as a growing unity of internal force, independent of the form of the State. In Italy, the nation was the product of the independence and political unity achieved with the *Risorgimento* and was tied up with the liberal idea. But, be it the State-Nation, the mystical nation or the liberal nation (and so it was, more or less, in all Continental Europe), it represented a myth (in the dynamic sense of the word), superior to every other principle; for that reason, militarism, as the natural defender and protector of the growing nations, was closely bound up with it.

National armies replaced royal armies; the kings became their leaders, but as constitutional kings, no longer as autocratic kings. Where the kings retained a dynastic and feudal position, as in Germany or Austria, the directive bodies of the army had, in a certain measure, acquired a double

² May we add the atomic bomb as a normal, permanent weapon of the future wars?

autonomy both from the Court and from the parliament, by regarding themselves as a *national* body in a different sense from that in which the soldiers, bound to the destinies of the various populations of such empires, were regarded as *nationals*.

Parallel with the nationalistic ideologies guised as liberalism or even democratism, there continued to develop social economic ideologies which took the name of Socialism and Communism. These emphasized an opposition to the State, whatever it might be; the proletariat State against the bourgeois State. One of the first affirmations of such parties was that of universal proletarian fraternity opposing all wars and demanding for the abolition of armies and for the cancellation of military credits from the budgets of the State.

It was no new idea that wars depended upon the predominance of families, classes and castes. The French revolutionists imputed the continuing and long wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the monarchs and court aristocracy, but bourgeois and proletarian parliaments accepted and promoted wars as the old absolutist kings. The National Assembly of France in 1792, in declaring war on Austria, claimed to be acting in the defense of its own territory and not for the purpose of conquest. The events which ensued were varied: the revolutionary nation in its turn became militaristic and committed to conquest. In the same fashion, the Social-Democrats of Germany, after having fought the great battles year after year against the militaristic policies and budgets of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, and after having upheld the view that the international proletariat should form a single front against wars, in 1914 yielded and performed an act of loyalty to their own government for the defense of the nation. And when the Social-Democrats were in power during the Weimar Republic, by themselves or with the Centre Party, they gave a free hand to the military group which was preparing the revenge.

Russia has had the same experience: Lenin in the name of Communism did not want any territorial conquest, and wanted an army of defense alone. But little by little the army became a technical and powerful body; the policy of defense was transformed into the policy of expansion and territorial conquest. The fear of a rearmed and very strong Germany induced Stalin to sign with Hitler the treaty of August 23, 1939, and to retake in the name of the rights of the people those territories formerly given up by Lenin.³

But the tendency toward a peaceful international order is innate in the soul of the people; for this reason, either the liberal conception of the State-Nation, or the democratic conception of popular sovereignty, or the class conception of the Socialists and Communists, in spite of everything, tends to go beyond domestic limits for an understanding between States. What makes such an *entente*, always yearned for and never actually realized, difficult or ineffective is the problem of how to bring about the transition from the organization of a rule of force to the organization of a rule of law.

The Socialists of the nineteenth century did no more than transport the terms of the problem from the political to the economic sphere, in the same manner that the proponents of the *jus naturale* of the seventeenth century had transferred it from the religious to the judicial sphere, and the democrats of the end of the eighteenth century from the juridical to the political. The facts prove that in each of such stages, the fundamental problem remains always the same—that of the practical organization of international law by a community of States, guaranteed by international force. The reverse happened: the States took over Christian ethics and canon law from the Church; the law of nations (*ius gentium*) and natural law from the jurists; the principle of the na-

³ The imperialistic policy of the Kremlin has been clear during the war and is clearer now.

tional State and popular sovereignty from the Liberal-Democrats; and the protection of labor from the Socialists, but they never accepted any diminution of their own sovereignty for the sake of a superior organism. The rules of international law were accepted only in their own interest and defended only with their own forces, when, of course, it was considered expedient. Thus all those movements, which were intended to regulate international life, could have efficacy up to the threshold of war. Once war had broken out, the heads of such movements, impotent as they were in the political or military field to dominate the events of the struggle, all submitted to the predominance of the forces of the State.

In the nineteenth century the factor which assumed a greater extension and international consistency, escaping the grip of the State and acquiring an invisible autonomy, was the new type of capitalism of exploitation which overcame the mercantile capitalism of the eighteenth century. Such capitalism is usually accused of having provoked the armament race and the tremendous developments of the technical means of war. Such a contention would be too ingenuous. What can be said with exactness is that from time to time capitalism has made use of governments and the governments have made use of capitalism. Large industry, in its initial stages, absorbed many of the forces of the young national States, and these, in order to rule, defend and develop themselves, conceded as many favors as possible to large industry. *Militarism* belongs to the nineteenth century, a century which wished to be pacifist, humanitarian, liberal; in this sense, it is *national-capitalistic*, in sense it can also be called *anti-international*.

In the face of this background of European politics, as the end of the past century presents it to us, the fine beginnings of the Hague Conferences, intended to create a less inexact and more extensive juridical basis for international relation-

ships and to avoid the motives of war and even to halt the armament race, seemed like applying hot poultices on a wooden leg. Of course, they had their useful side, that of recalling the mind to a reality in itself serious and menacing, and of showing the necessity for creating stable international organisms which would prepare for the arrival of a community of civilized peoples. In fact, though fearing that the catastrophe was imminent, no State was disposed to give up even a minimum of its sovereignty and power. Thus we came to the eve of the great World War.

II.

A Gap Between Christian Theory and Practice in Modern Wars

Before examining the period of the great World War, which we, ourselves, have seen and lived, let us see what has been the position of Catholics, their line of thought, and the attitude of ecclesiastical authorities toward the war.

Medieval moral theology and the casuistry of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries has handed down the doctrine and determined the norms to be followed in case of war from the double point of view of ethics and law. While ethics dealt with the state of conscience of the individuals who prompted or accepted war and of those who co-operated in it, canon law fixed the norms of the objective evaluation of the justice and legality of each war; the two criteria taken together provided the rules for judging the necessity and the rules of war.

Such a doctrinal and practical system was based upon some fundamental ideas which we gradually find disappearing during the various periods of modern wars, especially the assumption of a common ethics, Christian morality. True it is that from the Reformation on, some dissident churches were set up as State churches (not to mention the Greek or Rus-

sian Orthodox which formed a world apart); but from the point of view of ethics, though with notable differences of criteria and of application, one always arrived at the theory of the *just and necessary war*. But with the modern conception of the nation as autonomous principle, as source of its own morality, the Christian conception of just war had no place in modern politics.

Another quite notable difference came from the method of conceiving the law of warfare. Until the extensive development of the *jus naturale* theories, the prevalent conception among the monarchies was that of the so-called *patrimonial state*; questions of territory and the rights of the State had a *dynastic* character. Basically, even then, the old medieval conception of private war prevailed, notwithstanding the assertions of the jurists and politicians of the time on the public character of war. Wars were, in fact, *royal wars*, particularly if they were concerned with rights of succession or pretended vindication of injured honor. From the juridical point of view, the moralists of the eighteenth century were more generous than their predecessors in justifying dynastic wars; they would end by admitting that war could be justified on both sides, whereas the common and prevalent doctrine up to that time had been that while wars could be unjust on both sides, they could be just only on one side at most.

Finally, since the motives of war (the jurists call them the *causes* of war) often remained the secret of the court, and since the monarch was the sole judge of its necessity (*ultima ratio*), the moralists limited themselves to leaving the responsibility for war to the king's conscience before God and his people.

It is true that all the moralists were in agreement in asserting that if the war was obviously unjust, neither the public bodies nor even the armies could participate in it, under pain of being guilty of all the evils and losses which

war brings, and that the victorious monarchs in an unjust war did not have for that reason a just title to deprive the defeated of their rights. Such an extreme instance remained as a safety valve, in case parliaments, ecclesiastical bodies and municipalities took the initiative in refusing to co-operate with the monarch and to allot to him the credits necessary for the war. But, in general, in view of the difficulty of judging and because of the passions stirred up by war, recourse was taken in the *criterion of presumption*, that is, that the action of a monarch who declared war (and thus, on the other hand, the action of the other monarch who accepted it) was presumed to be just until its injustice was demonstrated.

The question was how to maintain that ethico-juridical pattern in a society partly different from and partly opposed to the one in which during the course of the centuries it had been stabilized with various adaptations. In the national States, the monarchs had either been deposed or had taken the form of constitutional kings who "reigned and did not govern." Parliaments, public opinion, plebiscites and the referendum took over the place of secret court councils. In addition, the states of the nineteenth century, even those which were called "Catholic States," were "national States" by their new political character. The casuistry of dynastic war could no longer be applied to the situation, just as confidence could no longer be placed in the conscience of the monarch, nor could it rest upon the presumption of a just war now that its motives had to be made clear to parliaments and to the press. Besides all that, a tragic contrast, whether admitted or not, had been implanted in society; a *national* morality which had not been inspired by *Christian* morality. In the supreme event of war, the entire political machinery could have no other morality than that of the nation itself.

It is true that even under the old monarchies the remark

could be repeated which a witty Englishman had made of his compatriots: "They are on the side of God, but only when God is on the side of the English." So thought Louis XIV of France or Francis I of Austria or Charles III of Spain. However, at that time, if there was a sinner, there was also a penitent; and there were those who could summon the sinner to repentance. A historical comparison will make this point clear: St. Thomas à Becket was murdered by assassins in order to please Henry II of England, but the assassins were punished and Henry II did public penance. On the other hand, Napoleon could cause the murder of the Duke of Enghien and Mussolini could rightly assume the responsibility for the assassination of Matteotti, without in any way feeling guilty or being treated as such by society.

What began to insinuate itself into the moral life of the people was the state of mind that every national claim was not only just, but, also, that it justified any war. Thus, for all the national wars of the nineteenth century, the question of the justice of the war was never raised from the point of view of Christian ethics; the presumption of justice for such wars was not a juridical or casuistic expedient; the fighters held a conviction of their justice, this being conceived of as a national morality.

The moralists did not have time to re-elaborate their doctrine for the new society; perhaps they did not even suspect that the world had changed so much. In practice, some Catholics and clergy of that time were found who openly approved the national claims against the old absolutist sovereigns or against foreign dominations. But in general, the attitude of the Church in the first half of the nineteenth century was opposed to revolts and wars called "national." And (quite apart from the question of knowing whether such wars were or were not just from the moral point of view) the Church was opposed because of the liberal ideas which

were their basis and which changed the actual status of monarchies, aristocracies and clergies.⁴

At the conclusion of such war (except in the case of Italy up to the time of the Lateran Treaty) the Holy See adapted itself to a recognition of the new national states and the various popular governments, notwithstanding the changing of heads of States, the one undermining the other, as in France—not to mention the republics of Latin America—tolerating even revolts and endemic wars, or rather leaving the attitude to be taken to the judgment and prudence of the local clergy and Catholic laity itself. In general, the supposed lesser evil was practically always favored; the governments in power rather than the rebels; those of the Right rather than those of the Left; the Liberal rather than the Socialist, with an almost spontaneous adaptation; at times interested and nearly always more political than moral. In this period it seems that the ethical position in wars or revolts practically disappears in favor of a political position, or even one of present policy, advantageous, or supposedly advantageous, to the Church.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, the situation changes further. The new States or new types of government created or modified by revolutions and national wars take on a fixed aspect; their rights consolidate, the dethroned monarchs remain in some capital city or in some castle as

⁴ Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, the celebrated Italian priest philosopher, in a letter of May 9, 1818, to his representative in Rome, D. Carlo Gilardi, gave his opinion that the address of Pius IX on the Italian question did not solve the moral problem of the war against Austria. If that war was unjust, not only the Pope but no other Italian prince could wage it; but if that war was just, the Pope, as a temporal chief of his State, could not refuse his help for a common effort. He wrote, among other interesting things, the following passage: "If the world was led to believe that the Pope never could wage a war because he is the common Father of all, it might also believe that temporal sovereignty and Papacy are incompatible."—See: *Commentario della Missione a Roma di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati negli anni 1848-49*, Torino, Paravia, 1881.

harmless pretenders. On the other hand, the wars which continue to take shape are of a character halfway between nationalistic and imperialistic wars. The new factor, which displaces the equilibrium of forces and which will create the motives for subsequent wars, is the Prussianization of Germany. The wars of Prussia and Austria against France, those of Italy against Austria and against the Pope, the Anglo-Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War and the Spanish-American War (apart from those of civil or regional character) give rise to discussions on the justice of war from the point of view of positive law as well as from the general point of view of civilization and humanity.

Just after the initiative of the Scotchman David Urquhart, who in 1867 had written the famous "Appeal of a Protestant to the Pope for the Restoration of the Law of Nations," which was followed by various petitions from England and France, forty bishops formulated a series of "Postulates" to submit to the Vatican Council. But because of the suspension of that council and fall of the temporal power, the effort had no consequences. Apart from this episode, which is worth recording, the idea of a Christian morality in the international field, both as a guide of political actions and especially as an appraisal of belligerent actions, in that period practically seemed to disappear. The Catholics who concerned themselves with it in their writings and congresses were few in number and got no hearing. The serious fact was that Catholics, either through thoughtless conviction or in order not to seem less patriotic than others, likewise accepted the political justification of the wars of their own country, and like nearly everyone else directed their criticism against the wars of other countries.

Not even in this case did the general attitude lead to evaluations of an ethical, Christian character, but rather to political attitudes. Even Catholics allowed themselves to be influenced by such an atmosphere. The majority of them

were for the Boers against the English, for Spain against America, for Japan against Russia, for the Austria of the Hapsburgs and the France of Napoleon III against the Prussia of Bismarck. Political motives and religious preconceptions took preference over a sound, ethical criterion.

However, among Catholics, too, there was no lack of far-seeing and thoughtful persons who realized the serious crisis which hung over the Catholic thoughts of the past century, and who in preparing for it were waiting for the word of liberation in a matter so serious and delicate as the morality of war.

III.

Catholic Thought on War Till the Second World War

The active part taken by Leo XIII in all fields of intellectual, political and social life induced him to take an interest in the "armed peace." It was the period of the armament race, of the study of international problems as "balance of power," of the new military technique; it was felt that war was looming up in menacing fashion—the war which at that time was given the name of the "European conflagration." Leo XIII, in recalling the world to Christian principles, intended to contribute to the avoidance of war. At the first Hague Conference the Russian czar and the queen of Holland wanted the intervention of the Pope, but Italy opposed it; despite that, however, the voice of Leo XIII was heard by means of a letter of his which was read to the closing session.

The Church does not deny the right of war, if it is "just and necessary," but, always, and at all times it has maintained that its duty is to assist in laying down the moral foundations, or even the political foundations by which no war would be *necessary*, despite the fact that, *stricto iure*, it could be called *just*. Leo XIII himself had on two occa-

sions exercised international arbitration; the more such an idea was welcomed by Catholics (and even by a notable portion of non-Catholics), so much the more did the fame and authority of Leo XIII make itself extensively felt in the world. Among Catholics there was a sort of nostalgia for a papal Middle Ages viewed in romantic colors; not for nothing had De Maistre written his, then, celebrated book on the Pope.

But the preventive attitude was only precautionary; it collapsed on the very day that a war was declared. Could the theory of a just war be applied in such a case? What would be done by the bishops, clergy and Catholics of the countries at war? What would the attitude of the Holy See be? This is what disturbed the far-seeing Catholics in the first years of this century. For some of them the war of Italy for the conquest of Libya in 1911 was a very sad event. The Banco di Roma, then at the disposal of the Roman clericals and considered the bank of the Holy See and the religious orders (which was not accurate), put itself at the head of the proponents of that war, and various Catholic newspapers, some of them the most widely circulated in the peninsula, were enthusiastic for the conquest. Those Catholics who were opposed to the undertaking were accused of antipatriotism, or, unhesitatingly, of Socialism, in view of the fact that the Italian Socialists were openly opposed (at that time Benito Mussolini instigated the revolt of the women against the departure of troops). But, it was said, that was a colonial undertaking, a war against African Mohammedanism, which would open the door to Catholicism in Libya. Italy had a sort of investiture over Libya, which would be an outlet for peasant emigration.⁵

Thus the ethical problem was brushed aside by Catholics who accepted in full the political justification of that war.

⁵ Such justifications have been repeated by pro-Fascist Catholics in the war against Abyssinia.

It was at that time that there appeared in Paris in 1912 two books by Vanderpol on "*Le droit de guerre d'après les théologiens et les canonistes du moyen age*" and "*La guerre devant le christianisme*"⁶ which were a recall to genuine ethical Christian thought on war; the author noted the deviations from and attenuations of Catholic doctrine, and cited many theologians, particularly De Vittoria and Suarez. This interesting work reached only a few. At that time it received scant attention from either the general press or the specialized press.

The great war came suddenly, notwithstanding the fact that for more than twenty years it had been spoken of as an inevitable fate, and it presented itself in a confused manner. Why did so many Catholics of neutral countries at the beginning favor Austria which *attacked* Serbia, and Germany which *attacked* France, violating the neutrality of Belgium which it had guaranteed? Unfortunately political or pseudo-political sentiments took precedence over ethical judgment. Serbia was Orthodox and bound to St. Petersburg, while Austria was Catholic (politically, let us say); if Germany was dominated by Lutheran Prussia, the France of 1914 was still that of the anticlericalism of Combes. And Catholic Belgium? "Yes, it is true, she was attacked, but why did she not allow the passage of the German troops? In two weeks they would have arrived at Paris and the war would have ended; instead, Belgium had them for more than four years!" Similar talk was indulged in at that time, as if the violation of pacts between States were a negligible thing. The formation of a moral conscience in political matters was lacking.

The few democratic Catholics of those years were soon on the side of Belgium and France; then by degrees the general opinion of Catholics continued to change, but not completely and not for ethical motives effectively felt and cou-

⁶ The two volumes were put into one: "*La doctrine scolastique et le droit de guerre*," Paris, Pedone, 1919.

rageously expressed, but as a vague sentiment which made them inclined to admire the resistance of the Allied countries and thus to hope for a peace of compromise.

The Catholics of the nations at war were immediately behind their governments, loyally fighting and co-operating for the triumph of their own flag. For many, a scandal was caused by the appeal of the German bishops which tended to justify the *war initiated by the Kaiser* and to minimize the responsibility for the violation of Belgium. The French bishops answered with better fortune, justifying the position of assaulted France which was fighting a just war in her own defense. But the discussion of the justice of a given war was never so impassioned and so general, as during and after the World War; not that anyone could doubt that Austria and Germany had premeditated the blow, but men were anxious to evaluate the responsibility for the war on both sides. What was often lacking was the ethical criterion with which to measure the responsibilities of the governments at war. For that reason many instinctively asked religion and the men who represented it, such as the Pope, for an authoritative word on the justice of such a war.

If this word had come, would it have been listened to? Here was the first problem which presented itself to Benedict XV, named Pope when Belgium had just been violated and after war had blazed up on the French and Russo-Serbian fronts. The other problem was still more serious for him: how to say peaceful and just words without having an exact knowledge of the motives which had thrust the two parties and their allies into the struggle? And how to do that without being invested with a mandate from them? Certainly, Belgium had been invaded and France attacked, but what was their previous responsibility? In substance, at that moment the decision of the Pope would not have stopped the war and it would have handicapped his every contact with the clergy and the faithful on the side which he would

have judged to be in the wrong. The Church was not prepared to face such a situation, nor was the general opinion of Catholics ready to sustain the Pope in case of conflict against the heads of their own States or the heads of friendly States.

We do not write this to defend the memory of Benedict XV (that would be outside our present scope), but, from the historical point of view, to investigate the depth of the moral crisis in the international field, as well as in the Catholic sphere itself. Benedict XV preferred to organize the exchange of prisoners and to give religious, moral and social assistance to the parties at war, to make an appeal for peace in 1916, and, finally, to present on his own account a plan of peace with his letter of August 1, 1917. That letter will remain as the loftiest and most far-sighted peace document which has been written and one which corresponded to the common feeling of the people. The Church was not heeded either by one side or the other, and the consequences of this error were subsequently felt, because instead of a *peace of conciliation* an *imposed peace* was chosen.

When the war was ended, the League of Nations was founded as the beginning of a new era with no more wars. This is not the place to discuss the good and evil of the Geneva institution; we have spoken of it at length and for the most part favorably in *The International Community and the Right of War*,⁷ in *Church and State*⁸ and in other writings, and we have set forth the causes of its great failure. Now let us ask why in the initial period of the League of Nations practically all Catholics, barring a few outstanding exceptions, were diffident and hostile? The historian has the duty of seeking the causes of this condition. Let us note some feelings and resentments which to a certain extent prevailed

⁷ New York: Robert Smith, 1930.

⁸ New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939.

everywhere. "The League of Nations made no provision for the Papacy; it was invented by Wilson and taken to Geneva, the ancient city of Calvin, in order to make of it an anti-Rome; its instigators were international Masons . . ." and so on. Today, these charges seem out of tune, but at that time they got extensive hearing. In France it was the nationalist Right Wing, it was Charles Maurras and the *Action Française* with its followers in Belgium, Italy and Spain, which exploited similar arguments. In Germany, the Catholics were suspicious; in England, Ireland and Holland, many were in favor of the League; in America the political battle against Wilson in the after-war crisis caused the United States to shut itself up in rigid isolationism.

After the initial hesitations, the Catholics who were favorable to the League, mostly those of democratic ideas, started their work. They founded the Catholic Union of International Studies and set up at Geneva a center of religious and intellectual manifestations in favor of the system of international co-operation and the various initiatives of the League, especially that of disarmament. Several times the bishops of Lausanne, Geneva and Freiburg made speeches that excited world-wide interest, and the Papal Nuncio to the Swiss Federal Government served as an intermediary between the Holy See and the League. Let us recall, too, among many other things, the declaration of Cardinal Bourne in the name of the English hierarchy in favor of the League (1924). The Christian syndicates and their international at Utrecht had a place in the International Labor Organization, and were respected, despite certain monopolistic attitudes of the Socialists. Two Jesuits, first Father Arnou and then Father Leroy, formed part of the personnel of that office. In 1924 at Paris there was established the international secretariat of democratic parties of Christian inspiration (which functioned up to 1939) with a program favorable to the League. In many states of Europe and America various

conferences or unions for peace were established. In America the late Monsignor J. A. Ryan was the exponent of the League. Despite that, propaganda hostile to the League of Nations never ceased among Catholics. The Catholic press, with the exception of some publications of democratic inspiration, was almost always critical and mistrustful. In their battle against Geneva the French nationalists were first joined (from 1922 on) by the Italian Fascists, and, later, by the German Nazis. Catholics came under the influence of these groups and accepted their prejudices against the League.

Thus we arrive at the crisis of 1935, when the Fascist Government decided to wage war on Abyssinia. Could there be any doubt that such action was a plain case of aggression? Was it not stipulated in the pact of friendship between Italy and Abyssinia in 1928 that every controversy not settled amicably should be submitted to arbitration? Was not Italy bound by the obligation of the pact of the League of Nations? The juridical and moral position of Italy in waging war on the Negus had no foundation. Why then did not Catholics take a clear-cut position in favor of the League of Nations? Why was the Catholic world press, with a few laudable exceptions, in favor of the Fascist Government? What disturbed the issue was the attitude of the clergy and the Italian Catholics at that time. These had three ways of justifying themselves: (1) Italy needed expansion because it was overpopulated and without resources; Pius XI had said, and the *Osservatore Romano* had repeated, that though that was true, it did not constitute a right of recourse to war; (2) Italy wished to bring civilization into a country still barbarous—but this motive (which caused floods of rhetorical discourses to pour forth) was judged an insufficient justification for war even by the *Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome; (3) Italy had the right to reparations for wrongs received at the hands of the Negus—but in fact, no one could demonstrate that such reparations (if really due) could not be obtained by

other means than a war to the finish and the destruction of an empire and its reduction to a colony. Moreover, first at Paris and then at Geneva, in August and September, 1935, France and England had made proposals very favorable to Italy, on the basis of which it was hoped to obtain the consent of the Negus.

Many Italian Catholics, then, and all who were in accord with them, found themselves a bit short of reasons to justify their conduct. So, there was no lack of persons to give expression to the motive of traditional casuistry on the presumption in favor of the just war willed by the king and by his government.⁹ But two judgments, publicly given, weighed against such a presumption. The first was that of Pope Pius XI, in the discourse of Castelgandolfo on August 28, 1935, when he made the two hypotheses of defense and aggression and recognized that defense did not lead to war because that would be an excessive measure, and that aggression, if there was any, would be unjust.¹⁰ The second was

⁹ This idea was taken up again by Professor Carlo Colombo of the Faculty of Theology in Milan (cf. *La Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, Milan, Luylio, 1940). Among all Italians, the one who has best understood the traditional Catholic doctrine on just war, in its right spirit, has been Professor Giorgio La Pira in his "*Principi*" (*Supplemento di "Vita Christiana"*, Firenze, 1939). But it was the theologians meeting in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 1932, who attempted a revision of the moral theory of war. For their conclusions in this matter see *La Vie Intellectuelle* of Paris (February, 1932) and the *Bulletin de Litterature Ecclesiastique* (Toulouse, 1931).

¹⁰ I have been accused in the American secular press of having forced the sense of such address of Pius XI, and attributed to him an unfavorable judgment on the Fascist aggression against Abyssinia. The words of the Pope, as far as my critics are concerned, were too measured, too conventional and very aloof from the reality of the facts. But they do not remember that Pius XI spoke in August 28, 1935, just when the conference of English, French and Italian representatives in Paris was a failure, and no hope for avoiding the war was given, then, to the coming reunion of the League of Nations in Geneva. In fact, a committee of five was appointed by the League in order to find a new basis for an accord. In such situation Pius XI was eager to manifest his mind against the war, and at the same time he was careful not to make an untimely or imprudent interference in such affairs. That his mind was against any war, it was clear four months before that time through another of his addresses, in which he repeated the well-

that of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and this judgment, although it had been given on political and not juridical grounds, also denounced the violation of the pact thus removing all validity from the presumption of a just war.

We omit reference to the Spanish war (we have already expressed our views on it in *Church and State* and *Politics and Morality*)¹¹ because that would bring us to a discussion of the morality of revolts, which is outside the subject matter of this study. But it is known that in our opposition to the armed intervention of Italy and Germany in Spain and our criticism to the policy of France and England during the Spanish Civil War both in opposing Franco and the Falange, we do not condone the mass murdering of the Leftist Government of Spain.

But, when Hitler marched on Vienna, why did few

known passage of Psalm 67: "Scatter thou the nations that delight in wars." Nobody thought that the hidden reference of Pius XI was directed to the Negus of Abyssinia.

However, I understand the position of some of my critics. Aside from those critics who are strongly anti-Catholic and like to find fault among clergy and Popes, the others were impressed by the fact that the Catholic press did not take the trouble to explain the Papal address of Castelgandolfo. Instead, the same press was in favor of the Italian war in Africa and against the sanctions of the League of Nations. And after the defeat of the Negus, most of the Catholic papers reported with impressed complacency the few words of Pius XI at the International Vatican Press exhibition in noting the coincidence of such inauguration with the news of victorious peace of Italy, for which he rejoiced with his children (May 1936). I remember how those words shocked many Catholics, and myself, too; but a friend of mine who knew Pius XI for a long time, when he was known to all as Don Achille Ratti, told me that the Pope on this occasion spoke spontaneously, not from a moral or political point of view, but from a sentimental one, as a grandfather, or perhaps as an old Italian patriot, as he was in the time of his youth. Not all Italian anti-Fascists would agree with my friend; for many of them "Pope Ratti" was tinged with Fascism because of his conservatism and also because of the solution of the Roman Question, and only in the last years of his life did he understand what kind of evil the Fascist regime was for Italy and the Church.

¹¹ See Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State*, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1939; and *Politics and Morality*, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1938.

Catholic journals react against it? Besides the *Osservatore Romano*, among these few we note the Christian democratic journals of France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the *People and Freedom* of London, and various American magazines. But how many were there who did not say: "Oh, well, a matter of no importance; after all, Austria is a German country!" Only a few noted that the Pact of the League of Nations had been violated; that a breach had been made in the promise given by Hitler and Mussolini to the government of Schuschnigg; that violence had been done to the popular will; that the right of a nation to independence had been trampled upon—and all this with indifference or almost complacency on the part of general public opinion.

And were there no Catholic journals and periodicals which maintained that Hitler was right in claiming the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia—people who had never been subject to Berlin? And did they not repeat that the Czechoslovak Government was Masonic and Bolshevik? Even if this had been true—which it was not—would there have been a reason to deprive a nation of its rights? ¹²

When Fascist Italy on Good Friday of 1938 took Albania almost with no fighting, no one protested; only Pius XII made a bitter allusion to it in the Easter discourse in St. Peter's. The Catholic journals which pointed out the aggression in order to condemn it could be counted on one's fingers.

With a mentality of this kind, amoral and antijuridical, diffused everywhere, it was no wonder that some Catholics (because of an "inferiority complex" or because of a political adaptation to Fascist propaganda which often caused them to submit to their environment) contributed, even if uncon-

¹² For more than fifteen years Catholics collaborated in the Czechoslovak Government. Their chief, Monsignor Sramek, was named First Minister of the Government in Exile (London, 1940); after he was Vice President of the Prague Cabinet. But now, unfortunately, Czechoslovakia is under the influence of Moscow.

sciously, to the creation of the motives of a new war and the inevitable realization of the new conflict. Nor should one believe that, even during the war, such a mentality had disappeared; it persisted, clothing itself in different guises, and was recognizable among the belligerents as well as among the neutrals.

IV.

The Second World War and the Church

The position of Pius XII in the last war was practically identical with that which Benedict XV assumed in the First World War, but there are some differences to be noted. As soon as war broke out, Pius XII publicly showed his sympathy for crushed Poland, and in his Christmas address for 1939, hastened to fix the cardinal points for a just peace, thus furnishing the guide for judging the purposes of the war either on the side of Germany or on the side of the Allies. The five points of Pius XII are a summary of Papal thought from Leo XIII to the present, adapted to the character of the last war: (1) Guarantee for all nations, large or small, powerful or weak, of their own right to life and independence, and recognition of the right to reparations for evils suffered in the war according to the rules of justice and reciprocal equity; (2) the necessity of halting the armament race and of avoiding the danger of the material force becoming tyrannical; (3) international, not unilateral, reorganization, with juridical institutions guaranteeing the faithful fulfillment of peace pacts; (4) recognition of the just rights of minorities; (5) international pacts validated and animated by morality and by religion.¹³ The same Pius XII, in making his usual address to the cardinals on Christmas, 1940, gave ample development to this last point—morality and religion

¹³ See full text in *The Pope Speaks—The Words of Pius XII*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940.

in the international field—by pointing out what must be overcome in order to attain it: *hatred*, which is the cause of divisions and struggles between people; *distrust*, which renders every sincere international accord impossible; *utilitarianism*, in place of law and right; *greediness*, which renders difficult the just participation of nations and various classes in natural resources; the *spirit of cold egoism*, which leads to the violation of the honor and sovereignty of States and of every disciplined liberty of citizens. On Christmas (1941), in a very long document broadcast to the whole world, he determined the charter of the new order.¹⁴

The manifestations of Pius XII during the war in favor of conquered Poland, invaded Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, and vanquished France correspond to these noble and Christian sentiments. Some criticism has been directed against Pius XII, just as formerly against Benedict XV, who, in the midst of difficulties and uncertainties, was a far-sighted and courageous Pope. The present Pope, also, has had to face some serious difficulties, having been placed in a different position after the Lateran Treaty. Benedict XV made public protest in the past war against the Italian Government when it occupied the Palazzo Venezia, which belonged to the Austrian Embassy accredited to the Vatican. This protest drew some replies from the newspapers; but, if it had been made before 1923, what sort of a reply would the Fascist Government have made?

What has not been placed in sufficient light by the press in general, and by the Catholic press in particular, is the extent to which the repeated assertions of the Pope, though they transcend the particular facts of the conflict, comprehended its ends and purposes. We are not attempting to make anyone believe that the Pope took the side of Great

¹⁴It is interesting to study the documents of Pius XII during and after the war. See Guido Gonella, *World to Reconstruct. Pius XII on Peace and Reconstruction*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944.

Britain; but on different occasions and in unmistakable actions he did defend the right of the conquered countries, Poland, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Norway. But which of the two sides at war had violated the right of these peoples except Germany? And which of the two had denied the principles on which the Pope bases peace except Germany and Italy? Was not Mussolini the one to say, as soon as Warsaw fell, that the Polish question was "liquidated"? And did not the Fascist Government approve the invasion of the Low Countries and also that of Norway? We do not wish to strain the facts, but only to present them clearly.¹⁵ It is very easy to reconcile the five points of the Pope with the aims and ends of war made by the Allied nations; but one cannot reconcile them with Hitler's or Mussolini's declarations of war aims.

The question is often asked why the Pope said nothing when Italy entered the war against crumbling France, and, later, against neutral Greece, both cases more or less similar to those of Belgium and Holland. Are we perhaps authorized to give an answer? Ours could only be a more or less approximate interpretation of such silence. In conceding that the position of the Pope in Italy is more delicate today than it was in the last war (and we have already said that), and that the Pope wished to avoid a complete rupture, we would be in perfect truth; but we might add that the entire con-

¹⁵ On January 27, 1941, the speaker of the Vatican radio, commenting on the attitude of the Catholic Church toward different governments said: "The Church refuses to interfere in the methods of governments favored by the different regimes, but she will raise her voice whenever men attempt to render her mission impossible. The Church will never permit the children of the faithful to be brought up in an atmosphere of cruelty. She will never submit to the uncertainty arising from the fact that the existence of Divine Law is being denied in relations between peoples, so that the co-existence of strong and weak nations becomes impossible. Men must be free and therefore the Church will never submit to the claim that 'Might is right.'" It was much easier to apply such words to Germany than to Britain and her Allies.

duct of Pius XII in this war is sufficient to make us understand his thought in the case of Italy.

In all this analysis which we are making, there is one point rather delicate for an honest historian, who at the same time has some sympathy for his subject. There are sharp-tongued historians who see everything under the heading of interest, personal interest or group interest, even deep religious interest, but always interest. There are other skeptical historians who never judge man worthy of consideration; they treat history as if they were the superior judges of all the culprits of the past; no one knows why they are historians. Finally there are those who sympathize with their own subject, and for that reason have the privilege of historical intuition, or the onus of inexactness of interpretation. I hope to avoid this last, even if I shall not have the privilege of historical intuition.

The problem which I am not alone in setting before myself, but which Catholics and non-Catholics have often set before themselves, can be expressed in the following question: "How does it happen that the Pope speaks so well of international questions, and then when the time arrives to uphold the teaching and warnings of the Popes, the clergy and Catholics pay no attention to them, as if it were a matter which does not concern them? Wars of aggression, violation of pacts between States, excessive nationalism, oppression of the weak, etc., are condemned; but when war breaks out, the Catholics along with their clergy are at the side of their own governments even when these governments have violated pacts, have used methods of violence, and are openly aggressors. It even appears that the Pope himself not only tolerates such conduct, but even recognizes it as legitimate." With the problem thus expressed, let us see about putting it in more exact and less exaggerated terms.

In an important discourse of Pius XII, addressed to the

representatives of Italian Catholic Action on September 4, 1940, where he recalled the glorious history of the Action and its high religious purposes, there was a passage which, referring to the Encyclical of Leo XIII of January, 1890, said: "In this way [i.e., obedience to civil authorities] the members of Catholic Action, which is not and must not be a party association but an elite of example and religious fervor, will show that they are not only most fervent Christians but also perfect citizens, who do not escape from their national and social duties, who love their native land and are ready to sacrifice even their lives for it, whensoever the legitimate good of the country demands this supreme sacrifice." This is the portion in which the newspapers saw an allusion to the present war. The entire address reveals the general tone of Catholic teaching, with no particular references; here there is nothing but the traditional doctrine. Moreover, the words of Pius XII are quite measured:—"Legitimate good of the country." Does the intervention of Fascist Italy in the war really correspond to the "legitimate good of the country?"

The Pope, in another speech (April, 1941), addressed to Catholic University students, while exalting charity and humility, brought out the fact that these virtues do not weaken courage and do not prevent citizens "in a just war to fight for the defense, the honor and the welfare of their own country." Can anyone affirm that Italians are engaged "in a just war, one that is for the legitimate good of their country?" In Italy no one can conscientiously make that assertion. But as a matter of fact, even Catholics (not all) took for granted that the war was for the legitimate good of the country, hereby performing an act of loyalty to the responsible political heads.¹⁶ But it must be remembered, too, that when the Greek Catholics with much more con-

¹⁶ See the article of Monsignor Luigi Civardi in the *Osservatore Romano* of September 11, 1940.

viction and with good reason, spoke of a just war because Greece had been attacked by Italy groundlessly, the *New York Times* of November 28, 1940, reported the news that the Pope, in answering the Catholic bishops of Greece (who had got him to bring pressure upon the Italian Government in order to prevent the bombing of Athens), counseled them, among other things, to maintain their civic loyalty toward their government.

This idea of "civic loyalty" brings to mind the declaration of the Archbishop of New York. On October 17, 1940, the Pope made a special appeal to the Catholics of the United States to support a "peace between the peoples and the nations of the world based on the equitable adjustment of differences and the union that comes with the right order." Archbishop Spellman (now cardinal), nobly answered the address of the Pope, underscoring that "our loyalty to Christ and to Christ's teachings and our veneration for thee as Christ's vicar involve no possible disloyalty to the legitimate authority of our civil state." In a democratic country one can use the negative phrase "no possible disloyalty"; in an autocratic country, however, "civic loyalty" must be affirmed. But, apart from the freedom of expression allowed in a free country, when we come to the concrete fact of a declared war, the problem of *disloyalty* and *loyalty* arises, and the free action of the clergy and especially of the bishops is rendered very difficult.

At first we knew very little concerning the actual position of the German Catholic bishops; our only certain knowledge was the fact that they had issued no collective document approving the war. Then the news trickled out that they refused to make declarations on Poland in line with Nazi wishes. And as for the appeal for German victory made by the army bishop, though it might have been written in more reserved terms, it can be discounted as one of those usual

appeals to maintain the morale of the soldiers.¹⁷ Later news concerning Bishop von Preisnig and Dean B. Lichseberg, both of Berlin, the Bishop of Trier, Cardinal Faulhaber, showed that in Germany the Catholic clergy was not failing to react against Nazism. Finally, there came the important letter of protest issued by all German bishops on Passion Sunday, March 22, 1942.

Fundamentally, what really occupies the clergy, bishops and Pope above all else is spiritual assistance to the populations at war and their respective armies. And, since from the point of view of "total war" there is no distinction today between the civil population and the army at the front, the Church has the obligation of redoubling all its activities, so that along with strictly religious assistance there may be no lack of all that aid which priests, brothers, nuns and laymen of Catholic Action can give to the populations at war. Thence the concern (often exaggerated) of not calling into question the character of the "fatherland's necessity" which is given to war by every belligerent country, and often, too, the open adherence to the war itself in order not to engender in the faithful distrust toward a clergy apathetic, critical or detached from the common cause.

In the wars of today—and all the more so according as they are more dangerous and engage all the energies of a people and all the resources of a State—the nation takes precedence over morality. The Church, as far as it can, tolerates conditions of fact which are beyond its power to modify. Obviously, in the actual organization of national States, as we have studied them in the course of the analysis of modern wars, the clergy of each nation have lived through its formation (and even in various cases through its national

¹⁷ A practically identical appeal was made in January, 1941, by Monsignor Bartolomasi, army bishop of Italy, where it was said that the war must be won, cost what it may. Monsignor Colli, head of Italian Catholic Action, in a circular letter, asked the members to be good citizens during the war, "praying and working."

deformation), losing the Christian universalism which should be their principal mental and spiritual conception. If it is natural that the clergy, forming part of their own social organism, have the same concern, interest and affection for their native land as all other citizens, it is neither natural nor Christian that they should acquire the nationalistic psychology, which in certain cases can become pathological, losing that superiority of judgment and appreciation which flow from a universal morality.¹⁸

But real exaggerations are exceptional, however deplorable; the attitude of the Holy See is balanced and practical; the spiritual care of the faithful and the moral and material assistance of the suffering populations is usually the first and foremost task in time of war. It can be said that little by little two functions of the clergy and hierarchy have been taken separately: the pastoral function in direct contact with the faithful (parish priests and bishops), which is concerned with their individual, daily spiritual needs, and, as far as possible, social needs also; and the directive function of the Holy See, which makes its voice heard by peoples and gov-

¹⁸ At this point it is my duty to recall that the Prince-Bishop of Trent, C. Endrici, who in 1916 refused to publish the pastoral letter of the Austrian bishops justifying the war against Italy, was put under arrest on military orders and threatened if he did not agree to resign from office. He resisted, refused to nominate a vicar in his place, and appealed to Rome. The Austrian Government desired an immediate disposition of the case of the bishop; but Benedict refused to make it, postponing the examination of the matter to the end of the war. There will be similar examples today, but the press of the totalitarian countries is not free and the correspondents of the foreign press either do not know how to write or cannot write news hostile to the regime. It is to be noted also that the Bishop of Trent in 1916 felt that he was supported by the population, and the Austria of that day, however authoritarian it was, certainly was not totalitarian. During Fascist war a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Cremona was seized by the government agents in violation of the Concordat. The Fascist Government suppressed, also, an Italian newspaper which had reproduced a letter by Chaplain Pignedoli against the hatred of one's enemy. "You know from your Christian faith," the letter read, "that your enemy does not cease being your brother because he fulfills, as you do, his duty toward his country. . . . Consequently, respect him, and do not pronounce hateful words against him. For hatred is the sister of impotence."

ernments, by combatants and neutrals, marking out the duties of all, and giving orientation toward the organized Christian peace. To these two centers of direction and action are related religious orders, Catholic Action, international associations of peace, and the press, each one co-operating in its own place, with its own means and its own responsibilities, to the end that the charitable, pastoral work of the hierarchy may expand and the directive efforts of the Papacy may be better understood and put into practice. And if in this process, there are noted some deviations, some refusals, some lack of understanding, some deficiencies, what wonder is it? Should we wish that the Church had been made up of angels and not of men?

V.

Moral and Sociological Solution of the War Problems

The difference which we have noted existing in practice between the attitude of the Holy See and that of the clergy in the countries at war—a diversity which can in certain cases disturb the conscience—is not the normal condition of the life of the Church. The ethical judgment on every war, in fact, deviates from Christian thought when that judgment is secularized and tied to the concept of *Nation*.

It is not exact to say that the Church “tolerates” this practice of placing the nation ahead of morality, the Popes have always affirmed Christian duties in case of war. But, the application of the principles to particular cases did not and could not take place, because such application cannot be made, because such an application must be made in a collective and public manner, since war, by its character, is also collective and public. That a superior morality—the Christian—or even the natural morality of international law may be effectively applied, there is needed a superior and

international organism based on moral principles. Otherwise, private opposition, even if it be in the name of the Church, would give the appearance of a faction actively opposed to the war and would lead to the very disintegration of the national State.

It is well to halt at this point, and suggest some general considerations with which we can conclude our investigation.

From the sociological point of view, all wars can be divided into wars between peoples of the same civilization (and for this reason we could classify them all as *civil* wars), and wars between two different civilizations which come into conflict. To the first is applied a common criterion of justice which can be formulated as the law of nations (*ius gentium*), or as Christian ethics, or as international law compacted upon and agreed to. To the second are applied only those norms which the two civilizations have in common as reciprocally binding (if they have any); but the struggle transcends the character of a common ethics, and on its outcome are dependent the moral and social existence of the warring factions. Under this aspect such wars can be called *religious* in character, insofar as every civilization has its own specific character and religious content, as the most penetrating sociology realizes.

The wars between the Christian peoples of Europe and Islam, lasting more than a thousand years, were wars between two civilizations, religious wars. One can discuss in retrospect whether some of these wars fought against Islam were just, conforming to the natural law; and one can admit that some of them were unjust, either because of lack of respect for pacts, or for some other reason; but, on the whole, they maintain a favorable presumption; the wars against the Moslems were presumed to be just. The religion, civilization and liberty of Christendom were defending themselves against Islam. And the Church, with the Popes at the head, took the initiative in such wars; it formed leagues and

aroused princes and the faithful to take up arms, not only throughout the Middle Ages, but up to the eighteenth century, when Europe was already divided into several dissident churches and the role and even the idea of Christendom had already ceased.

Another cycle of religious wars, though among Christians themselves, was that of the properly so-called wars of religion. Since one side, the Reformers, contradicted their opponents, the Catholics, not upon the plane of political interests which could be adjusted with equity and justice, but upon the plane of dogmatic convictions, the struggle could not be conceived and felt except as a struggle between two opposing civilizations; a struggle between angels and demons. The Christian morality, which ought to be common to two Christian groups of States, was abandoned by the two sides in favor of a religious ideal which, in the minds of the combatants, was substituted for morality itself. I do not say that all judged it to be so, and that the authority of the law of nations was not felt among the combatants; but the belief that in killing the enemy one performed an act of homage to God weakened every moral rule that enjoined them not to do so. Apart from that, it was quite natural that in such wars the Popes and bishops would be on the side of the Catholic princes and would give them aid, guidance and support. I do not thereby say that they approved or were obligated to approve the entire conduct of Catholics and their leaders; but that, in fact, they could not help being involved in things which they could not approve, as was the case in the Massacre of the night of St. Bartholomew.

Modern wars that represent a clash of civilizations (though within the same community of civilized peoples) were those of the period of democratic and liberal revolutions, and, in our times, the two World Wars. It is true that these do not have a religious character and do not base themselves upon a religious idea; the States are secular and the wars

are presented under a secular aspect. But religious sentiment in such wars is not lacking, and so they are wars of civilization. Those of the nineteenth century affirmed the ideals of liberty and popular government, and in suppressing the restrictions of the *ancien régime* they took away from churches their character as State-Churches, and from the clergy their category as an aristocratic class. The wars of today, though they present themselves under a political physiognomy, as wars for hegemony of one side over the other—Germany and her satellites versus England, the British Dominions, her Allies, her associates, and France—have acknowledged the contrast that exists between authoritarian (now totalitarian) governments and free governments, between the domination of one race over the world on the one hand, and the balanced coexistence of all people in a possible international organization on the other hand. The first phase of the last war was the destruction of the League of Nations; the second, the subjugation of small and middle-sized States; the third, the suppression of all political and religious liberty. Consequently, it was not inexact or exaggerated to say that in the last war (a continuation of the other) Western Christian civilization and the achievements of modern life were at stake; there was, therefore, a truly religious complex, even beneath the worldly and secular aspects of the conflict.

The extension of the war, first to Russia by Germany's aggression, then to the United States by Japan's aggression, did not change the meaning we give from the religious point of view to the conflict between the civilizations. Can we say without irony that Russia represented the religious side or, still more, the Christian side of the struggle? She was attacked, and, in defending her soil, she was on the side of justice. Moreover, she took up (in good faith or not) common cause with Great Britain and the United States, and in signing the Atlantic Charter and the Washington Declara-

tion, Russia has accepted the principles contained therein, even religious liberty.

Let us now see why traditional morality does not fit into this sociological complex. Its first blow came from the predominance of secular national States, but it still persisted as positive international law, a typical product of which was the League of Nations. But, when the conception of a privileged and superior race was developed, dividing humanity and changing the real basis of Christian civilization, the decisive war broke out (like wars of religion of the sixteenth century), because the bond among those national States which still depended upon positive international law, accepted by common accord, no longer resisted and finally collapsed. International tolerance, let us call it, was abolished by an ideal conflict which surpassed it. In that conflict those who represented the civilization they defended were incapable of imposing laws of international coexistence, and were forced to fight in the name of a civilization which cannot be called but "Christian."

And it is precisely here that we are tormented by an equivocation which is nearly insoluble. I recall that in London at a friendly journalistic gathering in May, 1940, an Englishman said that they were fighting for Christian civilization; a French lady protested, saying that that did not correspond at all to reality: "Many no longer know what Christianity is," she said, "and ours is a scientific and positivistic civilization." It is possible that both of them were right, because today the democratic countries are divided between the two conceptions, the Christian and the naturalistic. But, at the very moment when the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism was declared—and it is a conflict to the bitter death—the first will be able to overcome the brute force of totalitarianism only by means of spiritual virtues, which Christianity alone has always affirmed and is able to render valid. Otherwise, in international life there

will rule neither liberty, nor equality, nor independence, nor order, nor authority, not any other moral value which one wishes to defend and reassert.

Granted this "sociological position," the Church cannot assume the character of a belligerent, as it did against the Turks or heretics. And granted that on the side of the democracies there were and are, one may well say, both *Turks and heretics*, that is, those who deny Christian values; or better, granted the secular character either of modern States or of modern war—however, the Church, or the Pope in its name, reaffirms those moral values which are peculiar to Christianity and which in large measure coincide with the ethical positions and directive ends of the struggle in which the democracies are engaged against totalitarianism. If some of the local clergy do not come around to that point of view, either because of lack of comprehension or in order to safeguard their own pastoral activity, that should cause no wonder. Such practical difficulties are always found in the Church, which is made up of human beings with all their virtues and weaknesses. But it must be added, as an excuse for them, that for many it is not easy to grasp the affinities between the democracies of today and the ethical values of Christianity, because often the democracies have not known how to maintain these values, and, what is even worse, from the point of view of the social defense of the working classes, such democracies are confused with the plutocracies, and from the international point of view they have carried on a policy of complacency and weakness toward the dictators, whom they have made bold enough to face the supreme struggle that the present war is.¹⁹

¹⁹ Protesting with energy against the propagandists who do not hesitate to accuse the Pope and the Holy See of having pronounced words and of having committed acts favorable to the Axis powers, the *Osservatore Romano* wrote in July, 1941: "They dare spread the news that the Holy Father has said that the peoples must adapt themselves to a new European order, and they have said that it has been for a long time known that the Holy See

Someone will say, "Well, then, of what use is this moral judgment on wars, on which this study has insisted so much?" Moreover, that judgment is a norm of action, and not the historical judgment which, in the centuries to come, the professional historians will make as they search of documents which provide little proof in order to determine what responsibility in a given war the two parties in conflict and their respective allies actually had. But the moral judgment is really such, if it is followed by the individuals who accept it and by the community which validates it. Now, in the case of modern wars, it is difficult in a democracy (as we have seen) to put the problem of war on a moral footing. Despite that, it is only in a democracy that the moral judgment can reach political assemblies and public opinion; and it is only in a democracy (the Anglo-Saxon at least) that the individual judgment of conscientious objectors is legally tolerated; and it is only in a democracy where a conspicuous portion of the country can even offer refusal to a war believed to be immoral by facing the risks of a civil war.²⁰ But in the totalitarian countries the moral judg-

was contrary to all forms of democratic government. It has been reported that a representative of the Pope gave his encouragement to officers and soldiers of a nation which has rallied to the flag of another belligerent nation. It has been said that the Pope has blessed the armies of a single nation. The news has been published that the Pope believed that France would do well to avoid complete ruin by substituting a treaty of peace for the Armistice now in force, without waiting for the end of hostilities. At Christmas, the news appeared to the effect that certain concessions had been obtained which facilitated the participation of Catholics in religious ceremonies in the occupied territories. Later the news has been spread that the Holy See had pronounced itself in favor of the adoption, by Latin America, of the race politics of Spain. Perhaps news of this sort can have some effect on weak spirits who, as the Holy Father said in his Christmas talk, serve as intermediaries for theories, born in quarters foreign and hostile to Christianity; theories which aim at deceiving the souls of believers."

²⁰ The well-known French Jesuit scholar of international law, P. de la Brière, pointed to a similar case in connection with possible French intervention in favor of the Republicans of Spain, in 1937. See Luigi Sturzo, *Politics and Morality*, Chap. X, and *The Citizen's Rights in Time of War*, London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne.

ment on war not only cannot be effective, but cannot even be formulated.

Fundamentally, of course, in the instinctive search for a morality of war, every war must be moral for those who fight it. Thus one arrives today at the false thesis, but a thesis which corresponds to the nationalistic conception of the State, that every war, insofar as it is one's own and is sought for one's own advantage, has an immanent morality and must be considered moral.

Will someone say, then, that on the subject of war Christian ethics should declare its own bankruptcy? The positivistic sociologists think so. We will answer these objectors on their own sociological ground.

The achievement of Christian ethics (which has a basis in natural ethics) on the part of the civilized world is not without difficulties, nor is it maintained without struggles, nor can it become a common morality without juridical and religious institutions which maintain it and make it effective, each in its own sphere. For every particular moral achievement, history teaches us, four conditions are necessary: (1) an educational formation; (2) a political order; (3) a social maturation; and (4) a continual process of acquisition and readaptation. For that reason stable ethico-civilized achievements are difficult and slow.

Let us take the example of slavery. In order to abolish it, there was first of all needed an educational spiritual preparation; that was the task of Christianity. By affirming the unity of the human race, the divine brotherhood of man in Christ, the Gospel took away every ethical basis for slavery, brought the slave nearer to his master, attenuated his wrongs and facilitated his emancipation. But a political order was needed which would not only recognize and guarantee the rights of the emancipated and prevent their exploitation, but would also intervene to render their economic condition less precarious. It required centuries and centuries to overcome the

sad effects of a poor and primitive economy based upon slavery. We have to wait until the thirteenth century to see the abolition of slavery juridically proclaimed—the Commune of Florence being one of the first to decree it. But was slavery ended on this account? The discovery of the New World gave it another stimulus, and this was not the last. How difficult it was to abolish the slave traffic, organized and maintained by European States! Was, in any sense, the declaration of the abolition of slavery made in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna its last definite phase? And what about the American Civil War? Let us recall, also, the Encyclical of Leo XIII against slavery and the work of the League of Nations against the white slave trade.

The declarations and provisions against slavery were not sufficient to eradicate it from society, just as they were not sufficient to eradicate theft and fraud from it; but they served to organize preventive and repressive measures, served to deny it a moral foundation, to suppress its social and economic causes, and to prevent its recurrent crises. In short, everything must aim at the continual reconquest of liberty and its organization against the various and insidious forms of slavery which still exist.

We note the same process in other barbaric institutions, such as polygamy, family vendetta, and serfdom. It is said that Christianity was incapable of eradicating slavery, which can be said to have lasted up to our own time. But anyone who repeats this accusation shows that he does not comprehend that the character and direct purpose of Christianity is that of being a personal religion, adapted to all times and all persons, under all regimes and in all climates, for all races and conditions. It has the potentiality of transcending every earthly situation by elevating it to higher ends. Consequently, the Church aids and facilitates every good social transformation, condemns the immorality which creeps into human institutions, and indicates the necessary reforms; in

this she places all her authority and all her influence, but she does not substitute herself for public powers, not is it her mission to adapt the economy and politics of States to social reforms.

The same can be said in regard to the Church's stand on war. So long as it has been admitted as a legitimate public institution, to which States can have recourse in order to regulate their controversies, the Church can do nothing but maintain the moral rules of the war and co-operate in bringing about peace among nations. And, when this peace was bound up with armed defense (as was the case in the wars against Islam), it even came about that the Church could promote war for the purpose of safeguarding Christian civilization.

Today, however, when war has not only achieved such technical and political development that it has become an instrument all out of proportion to the defense of every just right, but has such a destructive weapon as the atomic bomb; when the evils which follow it are so many and so great, not only for the combatants but for the whole world, there is no other recourse than that of blocking every war by means of an effective international organization upon the basis of *Law* and *Power*. This truth was recognized for some time; the reality, however, did not correspond to it. The Geneva attempt was insufficient and ineffective, because, while it tended to create a "society-law," it lacked a corresponding "*society-power*" to make the law effective. It wanted to leave national independence untouched and did not recognize the necessary interdependence of States. On the other hand, the true character of totalitarian phenomena, which was infesting not only one State but all States, was understood only by a few. Now, after the Second World War, we begin to understand that the struggle is not one between two imperialisms for political and economic hegemony, but between two conceptions of life; it is not one of simple terri-

torial adjustments, but a clash between two conceptions of civilization. Consequently, two urgent goals present themselves to us: to overcome the totalitarian *heresy* which is spread even in democratic countries and religious circles; to build up the new international organization, based on Law but provided with sufficient Power.

The Church is not only unable to remain aloof from such a social palingenesis, but it must be one of its most active promoters. It does not have the task of organizing the new society of States, nor of fixing the juridical limitations of the power with which this society will be invested, nor of specifying the conditions under which each State may have access to it. Its task is that of clarifying, educating, encouraging, and preparing men fit for the formidable tasks. We now have disturbances of classes and nations, miseries and famine, unemployment and revolts. And when will it end? But one must have faith that from the chaos of today, a real international order will arise, by which war as a juridical means will be abolished, just as polygamy, slavery, serfdom and family vendetta were legally abolished.

This is the answer which history and sociology give us, ever since Christianity began to be preached to the world.

Empires and Imperialism

I.

Historical Characteristics of the Empire

THERE HAVE always been and there are still, today, big and little States; so, too, there have been and are empires of diverse types and formation. Those who think that uniformity and leveling, in economics or politics, would be possible and desirable, should take into account the fact that, because they are not possible, they are not even practically desirable. Man has fed himself and will continue to feed himself on utopias—it is a means of evasion, more or less euphoric, from reality.

Ancient Empires

The word “empire” comes to us from Rome. The Roman Empire has remained historically the typical empire, the one with which other empires are compared in order to deduce their differences and study their character. Thus we apply the notion of “empire” even to political complexes preceding those of Rome, and we speak of a Persian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian Empire, of Alexander the Great’s Greco-Macedonian Empire, of the Chinese and the Japanese Empire. However, the historical-sociological differences of such empires are so many that the fundamental

notion of a central government and of a metropolis in relation to subject people express nothing else but a very schematic side of the reality.

For the purpose of this present study we must make a fundamental distinction between empires organically developed and historically stabilized and precarious empires formed through the prevalence of arms and without internal consistence. It may be that the latter, born occasionally through the military genius of a leader, may find the ground suitable for an unforeseen development; but, taken by themselves, they are only moments of success which decay for lack of vitality or are annulled by contrary forces.

In such a category we must put such most brilliant and astonishing historical successes as those of Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Napoleon. Those empires did not last beyond their founders; Napoleon saw his empire fall at Waterloo on the very day of his defeat. It is interesting to study these adventures, and similar ones, from the historical point of view. Even the sociologist is interested in such phenomena because of the social changes that they mature, but, for a sociological-political study of empires, they have the same interest that the appearance of a beautiful comet has for astronomy.

The subjugation and forced unification of diverse nations, the eviction of conquered peoples, their deportation or reduction to the state of slavery, does not create a stable empire—there are needed human elements of unification which counterbalance the use of force and material subjection. There have always been superior factors which have made empires stable—religious unification and legislative-administrative unification. Before Christianity, religious unification was formed in the theocratic symbol of the despot or emperor: whether the imperial family was deified, the person of the emperor, or the metropolis (like Rome), the unifying tendency was made in the passage (law of tran-

scendence) from force to cult—the imperial myth served as a mediator for the people's adhesion to the center of power.

Legislation and administration, in regulating the fundamental relations of citizens and subject peoples, often with the help of religion which sanctioned class and caste rights and privileges, formed the connective link for those heathen empires established before or outside of Christianity.

Christianity dethroned the family lares, the gods of the cities and the imperial divinities, whether idealized or impersonated in the emperor. The emperor became a consecrated person, but he was also regarded as one of the faithful, subject to the authorities of the Church, and, in particular cases, even as a sinner and public penitent. Christianity became the empire's religion, but it surpassed imperial interests, overcame the concept of an absolute power, penetrated into the masses as the religion of all, even the barbarian invaders, and vivified the new kingdoms that kept forming outside the imperial sphere. The division of language, rite and political interests between East and West led to the division of the empires, offered a motive for ecclesiastical collisions between the two sides, and then ended with the detachment of Byzantium from Rome.

In the meanwhile, another empire had formed, it, too, on a religious basis: the Islamite, which for almost a millennium was the enemy of Christian. Christendom, also, under various aspects, seemed to have an imperial character by creating the Franco-Roman Empire with Charlemagne; later, the Holy Roman Empire (Roman-Germanic), or by tending to unify Christendom in the medieval Papacy. These three new and typical forms of empire had no political stability, either because of the feudal character of the new Europe which was emerging from the remains of the Roman-Barbarian epoch, or because of the inner and unavoidable conflict between Papacy and Empire. But this imperial weakness left free the matrix of autonomous citizenries which developed

in Europe, animating thus the new spirit of the Renaissances of the eleventh, the twelfth, and the fifteenth centuries.

However, the development of Islam in the East in Africa and in Europe was hardly acceptable to the Byzantine Empire or to the Papacy. That also was a religious empire *sui generis* but much more theocratic and militant than medieval Christendom as it was based on forceful proselytism.

Driven out beyond the boundaries of France under Charlemagne, expelled from Italy and the Mediterranean Islands through the intervention of the Normans, Islam strengthened itself in the East and succeeded in taking Jerusalem, opening thus the period of the Crusades, until it conquered Byzantium, on one hand, causing its dying empire to fall, and, on the other hand, forced to abandon the Iberian peninsula. The struggle continued in Europe on the northern and eastern side. Poland, Hungary and Austria were the ramparts against Islam; in the Mediterranean, Venice resisted for centuries. European history would be incomprehensible without this imperial clash among civilizations and religions.

During the Middle Ages there were in northern Europe very different groupings, which also belong to the sociological phenomenology of imperialism. Danes, English, Normans, invaded Great Britain, but they were assimilated, detaching themselves from their country of origin, so that their expansion did not create empires but, only, fixed emigrations. This is what the Normans did in France, in Sicily and in southern Italy. Lithuanians, Swedes, Danes, had their empires of unstable and fluctuating character; the Teutonic Knights, their domain in the Baltic countries. We mention them merely to note that civilization movements are connected with the expansionism of peoples. The Mediterranean and Black Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea were in the historical centers of the formation and dissolutions of the empires of antiquity and the Middle Ages up to the time usually called modern.

Colonial Empires

The discovery of the New World and the great trans-oceanic voyages mark the beginning of colonial empires, in America, Asia and Africa. These empires gave to European States an exceptional power over the rest of the world, until the time when the American continent, winning its political independence, constituted, in its turn, new types of empire.

Portugal, Spain and France have only an almost insignificant residue of the vast empire that they had up to the sixteenth or seventeenth century; Holland, too, passed to a secondary rank after an exceptional powerful period; only Great Britain, notwithstanding the secession of the American colonies, remained the mistress of the world until the two great wars by which she has been enfeebled; France, too, had a colonial revival in the last century, and is now suffering a serious crisis.

However broad were the words and honest the aspirations of the kings of Spain and Portugal, among them Alexander VI, who—using a medieval right of the Papacy—divided the New World which afterward became Latin America, in reality there was the complete subjection of the indigenous peoples to the exploitation of other peoples, or more exactly, of the privileged classes of other peoples, and, through them, of the respective ruling houses. It is not denied that the colonization of the New World by the Spaniards and Portuguese had its good side, such as the introduction of Christianity, the institution of schools and hospitals, a kind of administration and justice, which, though imposed from without, yet was stamped by criteria and legal systems that marked a progress. Unfortunately, all its good was exceeded by the introduction of slavery, by the greed of the conquerors and by wars often unjust and cruel. The colonies became a source of income for the Metropolitan State, for

its kings, leaders and functionaries, with a continual impoverishment and exploitation of the colonized countries.

In the North, France and England fought until the elimination of France from all the colonies with the exception of a few islands. But the indigenous peoples underwent such pressure that they were expropriated, driven from their territories, an inferior race destined to destruction.

In Latin America, conquerors and conquered, older colonizers and new emigrants formed a new type of civilized people; few indigenous tribes remained on its borders, living in remote territories or reduced to some kinds of extra-legal groups, refusing to be assimilated. Instead, in North America and Canada (as in more recent times in Australia) the European emigrants, old and new, did not assimilate the indigenes whose existence became precarious, marginal and insignificant.¹ In order to have manual laborers, the Americans imported as slaves African Negroes who even today form an almost unassimilable stratum of society, notwithstanding the fact that legally they are citizens with equal rights.

These brief notes clarify a capital point of our study. The colonizing State that acquires and maintains its possessions is, as such, the importer of a civilization—its own—which is imposed on the subjected people. The response of this native people to the new civilization is more or less facilitated by the many moral and material advantages which the colonization brings to it. Otherwise, a duel to the death is opened between conquerors and the conquered until one is overpowered by the other; either the conqueror abandons his attempt at colonization, deferring it to a better time with more adequate forces, or the conquered people, refusing to submit, are exterminated.

A civilization cannot be conceived except in religious terms. The civilization spread in Europe after the barbaric

¹ In Tasmania, occupied by the English in 1803, of all the indigenes only one woman, the famous Tucanine, remained alive after a few years.

invasions was Christian. The civilization of Islam from East to West, wherever it sprang up, was Moslem. The civilization of the New World America and Oceania was Christian (Catholic or Protestant).

The colonized peoples may have remained in their primitive traditions resisting against Christianity. But the civilizing element which it contains penetrates even where faith does not penetrate. The religious element is mingled with the civilization because, in fact, even those who do not accept Christianity as a religion, accept, consciously or not, the social elements of the Christian ideal.

This fact has brought prejudice against Christianity itself because it has appeared, in many historical instances, as allied to the oppressor State of the colonial peoples. This prejudice was corrected, wherever and in the degree that it was possible, either by the attitude of the independent clergy (as in the case of Bartolomè de Las Casas), by the political and military leaders themselves, or by the multiplication of charitable, educational and hygienic institutions for social improvement conducted by the religious orders.

The other important factor for colonial empires has been economic development, the introduction of methods more suitable to production and trade, the formation of commercial centers, and so on. The picture has its reverse side because economic improvements brought, and still bring, exploitations, so that the colonial populations took only little advantage of what was their productive effort, since a great share of the advantages went to the dominating country. The assimilation of a civilization (albeit on an inferior scale) and the economic development (albeit with exploitation of the colony) raise the social level to the point where the colony begins to live its own life and tends naturally to its emancipation.

That the heads of the European States of the eighteenth century should have taken little account of the possibility of

the independence of the New World is not surprising. For them, at that time, the Americas were too far away and, under certain aspects, already exhausted in resources. Thus France, Spain and Portugal had arrived at the point of considering them as liabilities, or as possessions where it was worth sending only functionaries, business men, penniless aristocrats, and priests or bishops to take care of popular education. But the two revolutions: the American and French, and the other local following revolutions, the revolts and wars made possible the detachment of the whole New World from Europe.

The "colonial" type of European empire was ending forever. Other empires would be born, of a different type and with different resources. If the period between 1492 and 1815 is worthy of being mentioned for anything, it is that Europe created new peoples with the old Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and Anglo-Irish blood by mingling it, in some places more, in some less, with the blood of the native races.

While, in the New World, Europeans were forming true colonial empires, in Asia, they were penetrating with trade, forming centers suitable for the defense of navigation against pirates, commercial houses against local bandits, and extending their interests under the protection of their countries and kings. Thus were born the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French possessions, along with their cultural and religious influence, in India, Burma, China, Japan, and in the Pacific Islands.

It is obvious that it gave rise to suspicion and mistrust among the natives who feared that commercial penetration would lead to dominion. The instinct of defense from the foreigners often became religious persecution and xenophobia. Japan expelled and killed all foreigners, persecuted native Christians, and for centuries refused any outside contact until, scarcely a hundred years ago, it was obliged by force to reopen her doors to international trade. China underwent

several wars, from the one for the Opium Trade to the Boxer Revolt; she was forcibly mutilated of the best commercial cities by the big powers. India became British Empire; Indonesia, Dutch Empire; Indo-China went to France; all these, in addition to the old Portuguese possessions, and other recent possessions made and lost by Germany. Even Italy had her small concessions in China.

The same happened in Africa, where, unfortunately, the most flourishing business was the slave trade made under the name and banner of Christian (Catholic and Protestant) kings. Words do not suffice to stigmatize such an exploitation of human beings, lasting for centuries. The official and public stopping of such traffic did not, alas, mark its end in effect; nor did the humanitarian sentiments that provoked that decision succeed in preventing the exploitation of indigenous peoples.

The colonial possessions of the nineteenth century were formed along two paths: the first, that of the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire which, because of decay, corruption, and inability to evolve, could not resist against the pressures of Western powers, so that it lost the control of North Africa and dominion over the countries of the Balkan peninsula; the second, that of the transformation of Trade Companies or chartered enterprises into true colonies.

The first to create an empire *sui generis* of an exceptional importance was Great Britain; she got the control of all the seas and all the continents. Next came France; from the occupation of Algiers (1830) she extended her empire in Africa and Asia. Holland maintained and exploited her colonies, Belgium created an unexpected one, the Congo. Germany, already unified, had her colonies in Africa, but these did not form an empire, nor did those poor African colonies of Italy, the last of the great powers which tried to have lands for emigration, form an empire.

In fact, however, all these powers formed in the nineteenth

century a new colonial regime, bringing to the conquered lands, methods, concepts, types of study, administrative systems, hygiene, culture, religion, which, in spite of rebellion and local wars, brought notable advantages to native populations. It cannot be denied that there were capitalistic exploitations, military oppressions, political incomprehensions which made difficult the work of moral and cultural elevation, tending to give the subject populations a personality of their own and to lead them to self-government. If one compares the destructive methods applied already against natives in America, Australia and Canada with the methods of preservation of modern colonial population, it must be said that the Europeans had made great progress. Merely in looking at the hygienic and sanitary achievements, scientific studies, and practical applications in this field, we must recognize that the colonial system has had its good side. If those populations were still closed to the contact of Western and Christian civilization, they would have remained static in social hygienic, moral and cultural evolution, as is the case in many lands outside the cycle of our civilization.

Territorial Empires

In order to finish the picture, it is necessary to speak of territorial empires, whether or not they are called empires. The France of Napoleon Bonaparte took the name of empire, but it ended with the fall of the hero; in fact, it was an empire of the ancient type, controlling half of Europe, which, therefore, it could not dominate, since Europe was of the same culture, civilization and economic-social position as France. Military victories and the force of armies can never by themselves constitute an empire. Napoleon III reassumed the title of emperor more through vanity than because of the reality. The war against Austria to sustain Italian independency caused him to gain Nice and Savoy; the Mexican ad-

venture did not enhance his prestige; the War of 1870 made him lose Alsace-Lorraine and his throne.

Three territorial empires were standing between the two Napolcons: Russia, having participated in the anti-Napoleonic Wars, and having obtained Finland, was extending to the South toward Turkey and Persia, aiming, as always, at Constantinople, and, acting as the protectress of the Balkan States, she contested Austria's power; the Ottoman Empire which was losing power and force (the great invalid) and which was sustained by England's balance of power policy; Austria-Hungary, mined from within by the spirit of nationality in the countries that composed her, and threatened from without by the growing power of Prussia and the rivalry with Russia.

In the second half of the past century there appeared within the constellation of territorial empires, a new one: the Germanic Empire formed by Bismarck on the basis of the Prussian autocratic and militaristic spirit, in spite of the parliamentary system established by the constitution and the formation of the Socialist and Centre Parties. The victories obtained by Bismarck against Denmark, Austria and France, besides marking notable territorial gains, placed a seal on the myth of the unity of the Germanic race. The Triple Alliance (Germany with Austria and Italy) served to create in Europe a new alignment of forces that was counterbalanced by the Anglo-French Entente and the Franco-Russian Alliance.

Another empire had already been built in America, not in name, like Brazil and Mexico, but a democratic republic which was developing on a territorial basis. The Thirteen Eastern Colonies that formed the initial Confederation of 1776 extended toward the South and toward the Midwest, as far as the West, so as to stretch from one ocean to another, annexing regions diverse in traditions, language, and customs, such as California, New Mexico, Alaska. After the war with

Spain, the United States gained control over Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Caribbean Sea. All this was not looked upon as imperialism, it was not conceived of as the conquest of countries to be subjugated, but rather as the territorial expansion of the nation: the annexation of boundless territories that, little by little, over periods of assimilation, were coming to be part of the Union, with parity of rights, except for the islands that were either retained for security reasons and economic interests, or restored to their more or less apparent sovereignty.

Yet, without having the name of empire, and with a type peculiarly its own—incomparable with other empires—the United States, too, is to be classified among the territorial empires formed in the nineteenth century.

There were, also, empires in name: India, which formed a part of the British Empire; China, which ended by getting rid of her emperor, and which became partly the prey of the European powers who had established themselves there in the most interesting points of world trade. On the other hand, Japan, victorious over Russia, was increasing in power and influence, developing with her own rhythm the traditional characteristics of an empire.

This was the political geography on the vigil of the First World War, preceded already by the Italo Turkish War for the conquest of Libya and by the Balkan Wars. These last wars, initiated by driving Turkey from Europe, ended in an intestine and ruinous struggle. The liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, already in decline, was aided by the jealous policy of the great European powers. The alignment was made on the breaking out of hostilities that led to the great war: Turkey and Bulgaria with Germany, Serbia and Rumania with the Allies, Greece under English occupation.

Russia, because of the Bolshevik Revolution, withdrew from the war and lost, apparently, her character of empire.

Defeat liquidated the Austro-Hungarian Empire and transformed the German Empire into a republic tending toward democracy. America renounced all war gains and withdrew into her isolationism. Instead, England, France and Japan improved (with mandates in Africa, the Levant and in the Pacific) their imperial positions, while France regained the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.

China should have got back on her feet, but she obtained no concession from the Allies, and shortly afterward she was attacked by Japan and lost Manchuria because neither the League of Nations nor the Great Powers, signatories to the Pacific Pact, defended her, as was their duty and interest.

The marvel of this period lies in the fact that Germany, vanquished, deprived of colonies, economically ruined, could rise again to become a threat to the world and to attempt again her adventure, starting the Second World War, which brought her face to face against the three strongest empires: Great Britain, Russia and the United States. On her side were only the Japanese Empire and that empire on paper that was Mussolini's dream. Naturally, China was with the Allies in the hope not only of saving herself, but of regaining her territories and restoring her empire.

The last war has brought the complete eviction of Germany and Japan, the decline of France as a first class power, in spite of her membership in the Pentarchy (the Big Five of the United Nations); the weakening of the British Empire, so that the two really big and antagonistic post-war empires are Russia and the United States of America.

The historical evolution from the Spain of Charles V until today gives us an unbroken and constant chain of empires that rise and fall through a kind of historical necessity that weighs down upon the world across the action of active and decisive men who represent its power, its worth, and its finalism.

II.

Sociological Characteristics of the Empires

The epoch of empires has not ended, nor has their geographical map been forever stabilized. There are three empires today: Great Britain, Russia, the United States; perhaps tomorrow there will arise a new French Empire, perhaps China, overcoming her present crisis, will become a true empire. Perhaps even India, freed from English protection, will find the road to an imperial policy. Perhaps the empires thought to be dead and buried, Japan or Germany, will arise again. In saying this, we do not intend to make forecasts; we are merely affirming a principle: empire as such will not disappear from the face of the earth, because it answers to interior laws of society.

Ruling People and Ruled Peoples

Let us try to fix the sociological picture of an empire. To be called such, an empire should have a ruling people and ruled peoples. What the historical crystallization of these two elements is matters not at all; for the characterization of an empire it is sufficient that these two factors should exist. The three empires which today emerge from the war, masters of the world, show diverse types of these two elements. In the British Empire the ruling people till the last century was that of the motherland; today it is also that people which has emigrated and developed over the whole empire and which, for brevity's sake, we shall classify as Anglo-Saxon (of English descent). The dominions first subjected to London now participate more and more in the directive policy of the Empire. Russia seems to be a Federation of Socialist Republics; in fact, the compenetration of the imperial type with the totalitarian type makes it so that the directing center remains the

Kremlin with its bureaucracy, and that the sixteen republics are in reality only a subject people. Furthermore, there are the peoples subjugated by armed expansion; they can be characterized as "satellites," they are dependent peoples.

A similar classification can be applied to the United States; true here there is no London—once the center of business and power, of which it preserves today its rank like those nobles who count more on the tradition of the coat-of-arms than on the patrimony of their ancestors, burdened as it is with mortgages—nor a Moscow, seat of a mysterious policy, incommunicable to the profane crowd. The United States has, instead, Wall Street in New York and the Treasury in Washington which form a center of dominion over the rest of the world and which create an empire *sui generis*. The first hegemonic victory of this empire was over the City of London, during and after the First World War; the second victory, and the more decisive, has been during the Second World War. Now America has no more competitors—in this field—and, therefore, has "subjects" of a new type. She is obliged to create for herself the guarantees of "imperial subjection" if she wishes to resist two contradictory effects, isolation or risk, with consequently serious losses in economics and politics. Thus, the United States is thoroughly implicated in Japan, China, the Middle East, Europe; she needs naval bases in all the seas, creates political, military and economic monopolies in transcontinental aviation, in the exploitation of resources, in the internal life itself of debtor countries such as England and France.

There may be some who imagine that all this does not signify holding foreign peoples "subject." According to the ordinary idea of empire (usually one thinks of the British Empire of India), it may be said that the peoples who deal with America are still free; but let us not forget that the dollar policy, the theory of the recognition of governments (which it is now said will be abandoned), that of spheres of

influence (which, unfortunately, is still working), that of national security (made to prevail in Central America and in the relations with Mexico and the Philippines) are all indications of an imperial policy which presupposes either an empire already acquired or one to be consolidated.

The first and basic characteristic of empire is today present in all the three great powers of the world.

Military Potentiality

Another characteristic is a military potentiality superior to that of all the countries on which the beam of influence is shed, such as to assure the imperial positions and the development. An empire without sufficient military forces is not to be considered effectively such. The past Brazil and Mexican Empires, the so-called Empire of Mussolini had nothing but the name; they lacked every necessary condition, or had it in a purely relative measure, so that they might be considered merely tentatives at empire. It matters not that an empire should be supported by a fleet, another by land armies; these things depend on its own geographical and historical conditions. What does matter is that an empire should have a permanent and adequate force on which to count for present defense and future expansion within that range of action in which it may be considered as really hegemonic.

The idea of empire is tied up with that of hegemony, that is, of domination in its sphere without limitations, and of expansion without obstacles. Therefore, to the diplomatic and economic means are to be added military forces, in order to obtain that decisive power that could not be acquired by economics and diplomacy alone to face potential adversaries.

It is true that history shows us that certain hegemonic empires can coexist for a long time, as, for example, the English and Russian Empires: but such coexistence has been conditioned by the fact that for centuries the reciprocal interests

and the respective expansions did not meet except here and there in special spots (let us say, too, in a broad sense, the spheres of influence), but the moment when England and Russia came into contact, diplomatic or military competition was established and in the North Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean never ceased or could cease. If they never came to a decisive duel it was because until yesterday they were separated by other empires which today have disappeared: the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian and the German. Only today does the danger arise of a hegemonic struggle between Russia and the British Empire, because their interests overlap each other.

Once the struggle has been engaged upon between two rival empires—rival because neighboring or because the expansion of one is to the damage of the other—it is difficult for that struggle not to lead to the decadence of one of the two, or even of both, when, at the same time, a third empire is about to arise. Thus, in the past, the wars of hegemony between France and Spain, or, rather between Francis I and Charles V led to the displacement of power toward the North, with the emergence of the sea powers of Holland and England. Thus, today, with the defeat of Germany and Japan and the partial weakening of Great Britain, there emerge, on the first plane, the United States and Russia who are gaining the first place in the world.

There is an internal law of the fate of empires which, over and above the historical circumstances of each one, is operating in all the epochs. The empire increases spontaneously through favorable ethnical, political and economic circumstances; having formed its bones, it tends to expand and to overcome obstacles either through political ability or through strength of arms. If it meets a rival—another power with imperial characteristics—it is compelled to engage in a duel, a duel of hegemony that may last even for centuries. Having arrived at maturity, the two rivals face one another for a de-

cisive war, or are compelled to the wear and tear of periodical wars, until one yields and the other emerges; or else the two wear themselves out, thus creating the favorable conditions for the rise of another empire, or, if it has already risen, to reaffirm itself and prevail.

This law, like all historical laws, is not fatal; it can be corrected by the will of men. (History shows us many emperors, chiefs of state, statesmen, generals, wise and wary, as well as fanatic and stupid.) But every correction brought to the thrust of events does not succeed in modifying very much that historical conditioning which, through its importance and complexity, surmounts the normal limits of human sagacity and wisdom.

Inner Urge to Expansion

The increase of an empire may depend on the ability of a leader, or of a generation of leaders or genial men (Peter the Great, Bismarck, Pitt, Gladstone, Disraeli or the two Roosevelts); but if there is not an internal push to make such a development effective, it will not be possible to found an empire. It would be a passing phenomenon like the genius that created it (Alexander the Great or Napoleon). This internal push may come from the geographical position of a prominent people: the Egyptian, the Greek, the Ancient Roman, the Iberian (Spain and Portugal) at the discovery of the New World. It may come from prevailing economic factors (coal for England); from the need of outlets to the sea (the Baltic and Black Seas to Russia); from the centralization of business in wide territories (Venice in the Mediterranean; Denmark on the North Sea; Holland, France and England in the oceans). The United States has had three factors: economic and migratory development, so as to create a complete territorial unity between the two oceans; trading activity

with foreign countries; and immense industrial development with its consequent accumulation of riches.

Another factor of expansion is population, if it has not sufficient space. This cannot be a prevailing factor; it can only be a concomitant factor which pushes others, more apt for creating an empire, such as military power, industrial development, geographical position. In this way emerged the German and Japanese Empires of the second half of the past century. The necessity of vital space for the population at a high level of life orientated Germany toward a subjugation of neighboring peoples and even the elimination of ethnical minorities,² on the one hand, and, on the other, toward the systematic "exportation" of military, technical, cultural and capitalistic elites to those countries open to immigration in order, little by little, to take part in the direction of business and politics. In this way Germany was preparing for the dreamed-of conquest of the world. Japan, with her coprosperity policy in Asia, obtained mandates in the Pacific, conquered Manchuria, invaded China, initiating the industrial utilization of occupied lands. Because pacific expansion is slow and does not succeed in overcoming an armed opposition, war is the ordinary means of imperial expansion. Whatever may be the nature, characteristics, occasions and result of war, an empire always has the means of consolidating itself and developing (even in its partial defeats and consequent withdrawals) until it is confronted with war that will break off its existence or jeopardize its future.

Expansion is the internal law of an empire, even when the will of the people is hostile, even when the leaders wish to stop the war adventures—that expansion imposes. The United States has experienced the conflict (a conflict which hasn't as yet been spiritually overcome) between imperial expansionism and political isolationism; between the renunciation of war and the expansive exigencies of the econ-

² See Chapter One, "Nation and Nationalism."

omy; between sentimental pacificism and the necessity for armed defense.

Those who in the territorial expansionism of empires see only aspirations to greatness, satisfactions in having as many subject peoples as possible, titanic plans of domination in the world, err in the sociological evaluation of the empire. There may be Hitlers and Napoleons with such dreams, and they pay for them; but nature, just as she resists those who violate her, likewise, demands docility of those who follow her impulses. Territorial expansion is often demanded by the inner exigencies of an empire in formation. The United States wished to make its own, territories which belonged to Mexico or could have belonged to Mexico eventually. Those immense stretches, that ocean coast, were a zone of natural security. It is true that Mexico, because of her economic and moral condition would never have been a true antagonist of the "Thirteen States" to the North of her; but it is also true that in every continent northern populations spread out toward the South by a natural urge. Once the United States had spread as far as the Gulf of Mexico, the security of the Caribbean Sea became a political necessity besides being an economic interest; once she had arrived at Cuba, opened the Panama Canal, occupied Nicaragua and Puerto Rico, her new interests exacted a kind of wider guarantee to be obtained (even if pacifically or through intrigue) from Mexico and in the other republics of Central America. No wonder that there developed the policy of friendly governments, of political favors with loans, of the grabbing of economic positions, oils in Mexico, oils in Venezuela, the dollar policy in the hemisphere; means of expansion and motives of defense of those old and new aggrandizements which always demand greater and greater guarantees.

I have mentioned the United States for giving evidence that the formative characteristics of the American nation were such as to impose a policy without the people's having

a clear knowledge of it, indeed, without wanting it; nevertheless, it led, step by step, to its imposing imperial formation.

Imperial Idealism

All this would not suffice for the creation of an empire that would have its own living individuality, if there is lacking a common ideal which keeps the parts united at the center and which vivifies and transforms the material force of dominion into a superior will to life—an ideal. The empire has it, too, an ideal of its own, and if that ideal is lacking, it ceases sooner or later to be an empire.

Feudal empires had the ideal of the loyalty of the vassals to the lord; the Holy Roman Empire had the Papal investiture and the concept of the defense of Christendom; Venice, mistress of the seas, idealized Western and Christian culture; Islam, the affirmation and the propagation of the Koran—in epochs of Christian ideals, religion consecrated the empires.

After Columbus discovered the New World, Spaniards, in establishing the colonial empire, idealized their faith to bring the Cross to pagan lands; but they declined rapidly because the conquering countries were far from the conquered countries, the cost of conquest was raised, the religious impulse attenuated and stained by wars, slavery, cruelties, and exploitations. The colonial empires had their counterpart in the European wars of religion as well as of hegemony, which created modern nationalities. Then, the national ideal in France, Spain, England and Holland, surrogated the ideal of feudal and religious empires; and finally, the European bourgeoisie found, subsequently, in national and humanitarian ideals what it needed for stamping the spirit of the new empires.

From the end of the eighteenth century, old and new em-

pires had the following ideal shape: the Ottoman Empire (already in initial decadence) still represented the religious residue of Islam; Austria, the Catholic religious residue of the Counter-Reformation; Russia though isolated in a still feudal, spiritualizing and primitive stage kept the tradition of Byzantium in opposition to the West already "evolved and corrupt."

After the fall of the old colonial empires of the Western Hemisphere, only England recovered and evolved an empire *sui generis* establishing Dominions which obtained, little by little, liberty and independence. The British Commonwealth of this century is a kind of free association of the peoples prevalently of the same language and origin and also an extension of British nationality into acquired territories, where the indigènes and non-British immigrants formed second-class minorities, to be assimilated or tolerated. Moreover, such a fundamental ideal of nationality and race could last and develop morally and materially, inasmuch as it was associated with a fundamental concept of liberty, on the one hand, and, on the other, with reciprocal interests which were assured by control of the seas and the coexistence of colonies or territories under the British flag in all parts of the world.

A civilizing ideal was being formed, almost as the monopoly of a people that had the sense of liberty and that of imperial dominion, both consecrated by tradition. Anyone who wished to bind these spontaneous factors to preconceived criteria, such as those of race (Anglo-Saxon), religious denominations (Anglicanism, vaguely defined) or simple political power game (*divide et impera*), encountered opposition of the people who had the good sense of holding firm to the tradition of liberty and the pragmatic method in affairs.

This quite complex mentality was to clash against the too logical and narrow mentality of the German people who were in the process of creating a new empire, which was

wedging itself between the old three decadent empires of the East and Southeast (Russia, Austria and Turkey) and in becoming implicitly the antagonist of the British Empire. The German ideal was one of a homogeneous and conquering race, a race invested from above because superior, a chosen people who, coupling science and force, was to unify and rule Europe and transform the world. This national-mystical German ideal was not an imitation of Holy Russia (the antagonist in the East) but had its origin as much in the anti-Latin or anti-Catholic Lutheran tradition as in the anti-Slavic tradition of the Teutonic Knights. English mysticism was polarized in individual liberty which animated the imperial power over the seas and in the colonies; Russian mysticism was polarized toward the union of the Slavic peoples of Europe, eliminating the Latin and Catholic minorities to be absorbed into the Greco-Byzantine orthodoxy; German mysticism was concentrated in the homogeneity of the Aryan race, ruler of Europe and the world; Japanese mysticism, too, orientated her military, industrial and political classes to the mysticism of the ruling class of Asia.

Last in the arena came the North American people; the expansion was territorial internally, economical externally; the humanitarian and democratic ideals which have impelled Americans to many beneficent and religious initiatives in foreign countries were not nourished by imperialistic mysticism. The participation in two world wars came against the general feelings of the population; it was due to the instinct of defense rather than the will to expand. The United States may be called an empire in spite of itself, an empire without ideals to propagate within the country itself and among the peoples who link their economy and policy to that of America. That is why the United States has, even today, an uncertain policy, divided as she is between the protection of

the enormous mass of her material interests and the new task of a country at the head of a world organization.

Not even the tradition of free democracy is for Americans an ideal to make respected or a merchandise to be exported, since it produces neither sentimental currents nor practical utilities. "Americanism" itself, as an American way of life, being tied to a high economic level and a practical activity which can find a wide development only on American soil, is not feasible in other regions which have a low level of material life and a more elevated tradition of intellectual life. America still lacks an "imperial" ideal that could animate power and influence riches. Until she finds it, she remains, in comparison with Russia and Great Britain, in an uncertain and inferior position.

The proposal of Winston Churchill to bind together Great Britain and the United States with a single citizenship, by the fusion or stable co-operation of military forces and policies, could have given a new orientation to the Anglo-Saxon race in the world, if it had been less English and more Saxon, and if the two branches of the race (the European and the American) had as much communion of feelings and ideals and as much cohesion of economic interests as they have of political reality. But this dream is not realistic, because Americans lack an ideal of empire and the will to dominate the world; they, instead, would be sentimentally more happy if they were left free in their home, without being disturbed by the outside world. But history does not turn back.

III.

Imperial Spirit and Imperialism

As the national spirit creates nationalism, so the imperial spirit creates imperialism. There is a substantial difference between one and the other of these two collective feelings:

the first has almost always a popular basis and is diffused among whole peoples; the other, instead, is limited to the ruling class or people, and has no true popular diffusion. That is natural because the empire is essentially the rule of a minority (it matters not whether it be of a class, a race, a caste or a nation) which holds in hand the imperial powers, has its advantages and makes its policy.

To be able to create a popular impetus in favor of an empire it is necessary that there be threatened, not the existence of the empire as such (that is, as a territorial-political-economic whole), but the existence of the race or the ruling nation of an empire, and that such a menace be felt by everyone without difference of social classes. It may be, too, that a war adventure may be presented as a necessity of life, an ideal or real advantage in which the ruling nation may be coinvolved. But these cases are rare; of the first type, the most recent case and the most heroic has been the resistance of England and the whole empire to Hitler's invasion in 1940-41. To the second type belongs the war promoted by Germany in 1914, a war in nature purely imperial, which, however, obtained the consensus of all the parties, even of the Centre and of Social Democracy, and of all classes. Instead, Hitler's war in 1939 did not have initially the same consensus as the preceding war, because, already, the people were divided; the Nazis formed the dominant group and their adhesion to the war was all the more fanatical, as was in them the idea that they would control, not only Europe, but the whole world. The certainty of the happy outcome of the adventure drew also the adhesion of the rest of the nation, in spite of the moral repugnances and the political dissensions. Nationalistic sentiments (easy to erupt spontaneously or to be manipulated) must be kept distinct from imperialistic calculations, to be able to analyze from the sociological viewpoint the particular characteristics of each one of such social maladies.

While the empire is based, as we have seen, on natural factors which, though developed and actuated through the ability of the leaders, constitute a stable conditioning of it, imperialism finds its root in the ambition of kings and generals, the greed of business men, the spite of politicians, the spirit of oppression and vengeance, the fear of imaginary or real enemies, of whom the fear itself increases the dangers, all these things give the impulse to those excesses which we call imperialism. History is full of empires agitated by the bad spirit of imperialism. Through it many wars were promoted, not only unjust and onerous, but dangerous and fatal. Once the first step toward the dream of grandeur has been made, it is difficult not to be dragged along by successes, without any longer taking into account the limits of one's potentiality. It is difficult to stop imperialistic adventures, especially when there is not behind the leaders the experience of centuries; this was the case with Napoleon Bonaparte and Hitler. We shall not mention empires on paper like that of Mussolini, who lived on this fatuity and dragged into the abyss a country, which, from the fall of the Western Empire on, had never dreamed of dominating Europe or Africa, nor of holding in its pocket the keys of the Mediterranean so as to make of it a *Mare Nostrum*.

Aside from the follies, silly or genial as they may be (Napoleon did believe in his empire and, along with him, many others, dazzled by his genius), even stable and century-old empires can be dragged into adventures which show the sin of imperialism, as, for instance, England's war against the Boers, the oppression for centuries of Ireland who obtained her independence, though not entirely, through a rebellion supported by public opinion of the United States.

The most serious sin of every imperialism is that of not taking any account of common morality. Pacts that are violated, treaties which are not observed, intrigues, violences, scorn of the personality of other people, slavery and persecu-

tions. It is true that the violation of international morality is not an imperial stigma; every policy, even that of medium and little States, can be dipped in the same tar (and is almost always so); but when the potentiality is enormous and the occasions are many, it is all the more easy to violate the rights of allied countries or of peoples "protected" or subjugated.

The more the imperialistic spirit develops, so much the more sacrifices must be endured by the subject people first, but the ruling groups themselves must also endure them either through the armies of which they are the prevalent part, through fiscal burdens, or through political controls and the subsequent factionalism, revolts and crisis.

British Imperialism

The very empires which internally succeeded in obtaining and maintaining liberty for the ruling country have never been able to give it or maintain it in the ruled countries. The British Commonwealth is an exception because of the fact, unique in history, that the Dominions, elevated to the rank of independent States, have freely adhered to the motherland. Therefore, it is necessary to explain such a fact by its sociological-ethnical data: Australia, Canada, New Zealand are countries where the British immigrant has subjugated the natives and has either assimilated or discriminated the alien immigrants. The ruling population of the Dominions is the same stock and race as that of the motherland; and it has succeeded spontaneously in sharing the position and interests of the British in the world. The nonassimilated peoples and those that refuse assimilation (or subjugation) have remained fundamentally anti-British: Ireland, the Province of Quebec, the Boers in South Africa never were subdued by war nor turned into friends by concessions, while maintaining a tenuous and equivocal tie to

the Commonwealth that their interests compel them to keep. The Boer War, the repressions of the Irish revolts and the present-day division of Ireland into North and South have been indices of a fundamental struggle which derived and still derives from the British imperialistic concept in conflict with national sentiments of the local populations. And though in Canada there does not exist an imperialistic conflict with the French province, still a nationalistic sentiment renders almost irreconcilable their coexistence in some quarters.

I have referred to these facts (and I might cite others; sufficient for all would be the problem of Palestine where the conflict between imperial and nationalistic interests seems incurable) in order to arrive at the point I wish to make that, even in a democracy, even in a most progressive empire such as the British, it is not possible to overcome the imperialistic spirit which develops like a flower of evil from the very crevices of the imperial construction.

It has always been affirmed that imperialism was the product of the British conservative, mercantile class, so that the advent of the Laborites would disenchant the empire from the imperialistic spirit. It is certain that the Laborite leaders are less affected by imperialism than the political leaders of the past; but, on the one hand, they took possession of such a heritage after a war politically and economically disastrous; and, on the other hand, they cannot liquidate an empire whose positions and interests bind together so many diverse peoples, and still constitute one of the world structures to which the present civilization is bound. That obliges the Laborites to resist equally against the idealists in its own household and against those aspirants to the succession of the empire among allies, friends and presumed adversaries. Moreover, that the defense, even though legitimate, of the British Empire should develop a wave of imperialism among Laborites and all the English people is not surprising: this

would be the sign of a midway crisis which can lead either to recovery or to a chronic illness.

Certainly it would be a great progress for the development of civilization to be able to find an empire that might have overcome the acute forms of imperialism and that could also recover from the insidious forms of chronic intoxication with recurring fevers between periods of normality. That does not exclude the possibility that such an empire may appear on the scene of action: there are no limits to human perfectibility; but, in reality, every surmounting of a social evil which inserts itself as a parasite in a natural form of society (in this case, imperialism for every empire) bears with it the transformation of the empire type into another social type. Thus, as it happened in Great Britain when she transformed old possessions into free, autonomous and spontaneously associated Dominions, she may succeed in transforming India and the colonies into autonomous and co-operating States, in a kind of zone of influence or vital sphere in which reciprocal advantages shall be assured by free co-operation. Dream or reality; it will be seen in the future.

American Imperialism

An analogous path, though diverse, must be traveled by the United States of America. Here there is lacking even until today a true spiritual unification of the American people. The country is too big and too young to have passed through the unifying travail of centuries. While the United States is an empire, its people do not yet have a complete consciousness of it; so that it can suffer equally from the illness of imperialism, though with phenomena that mask it, hiding it from the patients themselves, as from the illness of isolationism and defeatism.

And since the American population is not homogeneous

and has within itself fundamental divisions: the Yankees, the Irish, as rulers; other European immigrants: German, Slavic, Italian, and Mexican, Negro, Chinese and Japanese, as compact and pressing groups, more or less discriminated; so, too, the effects of the maladies we have described are felt differently and with varied intensity.

American policy today cannot help being imperial; such it is especially with Japan and in China, such in her oceanic interests. To date it cannot be called imperialistic, because of the lack of time for its maturation; in fact, victory has given to Americans no intoxication. It has given them, instead, the feeling of fear, a feeling which before the war did not exist except implicitly in isolationism, which was a fear of war itself. Today it is also fear that Americans are too big and may have enemies in the future, or, rather, one enemy, Russia; fear of being dragged into a final contest with Russia as America was dragged into it with Japan; fear of its commitments in Europe; fear of the secret of the atomic bomb that it possesses; fear that Russia may also discover the atomic bomb. Unfortunately, the sense of fear so suddenly inoculated into the American soul can bring an imperialistic reaction. In the meantime we witness the maintenance of large armies and "imperial" fleets, the acquisition of strategic points as guarantee for the future. All this is just, it is necessary; no one can deny it. Only, one would desire that, together with the taking of positions, there might be a sound and balanced policy that might affirm the existence of the empire and deny the possibility of imperialism.

Russian Imperialism

After the fall to pieces of the German and Japanese Empires, precisely through excess of imperialism, only Russia is surviving of the old imperialistic empires.

It was thought that with the fall of the Czars, the expul-

sions of the military and bourgeois classes, and the insertion of Communism, not only would Russian imperialism come to an end, but even the empire itself. The fact that Lenin recognized the Baltic Republics Finland, Estonia, Lettonia and Lithuania, made peace with Poland, and abandoned the claim on Bessarabia led everyone to think that a new era had begun in Russia. But this was on the surface. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was obliged to fight the so-called revolutionary wars although they were guerrillas rather than wars, they, as it happens in similar cases, awoke a new consciousness in rulers, high bureaucracy, upstarts of the revolution, all who were forming the new ruling class: the consciousness of military power.

The idea of being encircled by hostile powers produced Soviet militarism. The contacts with conquered Germany who showed a will to revenge caught hold of the Russian military class in formation. Germany was seen for both the West and the East as a potential ally or as a potential enemy. The advent of Stalin marked the passage from infancy to youth of the new Russia. The empire was being reconsolidated internally, developing the new Soviet militarism and industrial planification. The need of a policy led Russians to consider who might be the future enemies and adversaries in a war which the advent of Hitler led them to understand was possible and not far distant. A military staff was obliged to study defensive and offensive plans such as might be actuated at the given moment. But what plans? The old plans, those of the Czars, those for which Russia had always fought, and which were natural developments of her unique position in the world, as the ruler of Europe and of Asia: the outlets into the Baltic, into the Mediterranean, into the Persian Sea, into the Pacific.

For this purpose, Stalin knew how to handle himself as the true head of an empire, from the day he joined the

League of Nations, abandoning political isolation, until the pacts with France, Czechoslovakia, Japan and Germany.

Stalin knew what he was doing when in August, 1939, he signed the pact with Hitler, after having rejected the fresh requests of England and France; he knew that war was becoming inevitable, for Hitler being reassured of the Russian neutrality could move securely against Poland, the Low Countries and France. But Stalin, in the alternative of a Hitler victory or an Allied victory, had made Russia once more an efficient factor in European politics and was preparing for the future.

Hitler's aggression in June, 1941, against Russia was a surprise neither for Stalin nor others; it was a surprise for the world who was not acquainted either with the secrets of war politics or with the historical needs of empires. Stalin had prepared himself for the mortal duel and Hitler hastened it imprudently. But the two felt its impulses in their fundamental concept of hegemony. America and England gave to Russia all the possible help, not because their imperial interests coincided, but to prevent the falling of the Russian bastion which for them constituted at that moment a military defense. The political consequences of a Russia victorious in Europe and in Asia, even if it had been clear to the governments of London and Washington (and it was not), could then not have for them a decisive weight.

Russia has already surmounted the incubation period of imperialistic fever. This fever is at its apex; therefore, Russia impedes or retards the European rebirth, takes strategic positions for the future conflict with Anglo-Saxon countries, and prepares herself for it, extending her power, intensifying her industries, utilizing her prestige among the working classes of the world.

It is no wonder that Stalin should use the same technique as Hitler's, that he should maintain a totalitarian regime without hope of attenuation, that he holds peoples subjected

in tyranny, that he vexes the conquered countries or satellites, exploiting their economy and dilapidating their industrial plants and economic resources; deporting masses of populations from one zone to another, persecuting political refugees and creating a frightening vacuum in the center of Europe. The wonder is on the other side, that the Anglo-Americans can look on at this disastrous post-war scene not only impotently but even co-operate—directly and indirectly—consenting to the pressing requests of Moscow, or else making themselves impotent to resist to them through political incapacity and diplomatic lack of foresight.

Today, after a war made in the name of liberty and democracy, imperialisms, at different degrees, agitate the world anew.

8

Internationalism

I.

Internationalism and Its Various Aspects

WHEN it was generally believed that the inhabited world ended more or less at the borders of the Roman Empire, Christians after Constantine conceived of an international community unified by the new triumphant religion. When the Western Empire fell Christians felt the impact of collapse but they did not lose the faith in the unification of mankind, since the Eastern Empire (Byzantium) on which all hopes were pinned was still alive, though little by little those hopes vanished. With the ascendancy of Charlemagne people dreamed of an empire which would reunite Christendom and meet the danger of Islam in Europe—Leo III performed a miracle. While the Frankish Empire broke into splinters the idea of a Christian empire was again revived, by Pope John VIII, under the name of the Holy Roman Empire (or Roman-German Empire). Unfortunately by that time Byzantium had already detached from Rome many times and later it would be split off from it for centuries. The imperial unification of Christendom was never completed in the West: France, Britain, Aragon, and the powerful republic of Venice, did not take part in it.

The international unification of Christendom was shattered first by the schisms of the East and the West, then by

the religious wars of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Afterward, some kind of unification of the Christian nations was sought on the juridical plane based on the natural law and the *ius gentium*. Among famous pioneers of the period were Alberico Gentile, Hugh de Groot, and Francisco Suarez. In the conflict between religious faiths and temporal interests adherence to legal principles could not restore this unification, so men like Leibnitz with others searched for a religious, moral, and political understanding on which to build European and world unification; but his initiative was unsuccessful; meanwhile as the influence of naturalistic rationalism spread, Abbé de Saint Pierre and Kant interpreted in new ways man's aspirations for political and social unification.

At that time, as the result of economic transformation of industry and commerce, the middle and proletarian classes with humanitarian ideals began to emerge. Since the French Revolution it has been asserted that imperialism and wars were caused by the existence of absolute monarchies and a militaristic-minded nobility. When the National Assembly in Paris declared war on Austria it protested that the war was a defensive one and not one for aggrandizement. The same reason was given for the successive wars of the Convention.

But how is it possible to draw the line between defensive and offensive wars? When Napoleon took command of the expeditionary army for Italy he was defending France; when he won the battle of Marengo he took the offensive and occupied northern Italy which had never been at war against France; he overthrew the republic of Venice and occupied Rome, which were then both neutral States. Was it Napoleon's fault? Or the fault of the leaders in Paris? Or everybody's fault? The fact remains that as soon as it was put to the test that antimilitaristic, antimonarchical, and revolution-

ary bourgeoisie accepted the wars of conquest and the resultant empires.

From then on there was a common theory afloat that only the working class would be capable of creating an international world without empires and without wars. In 1848 Karl Marx published his manifesto in which he called upon the workers of the world to unite. From it was born the First International, with its seat in London, later in Paris. There followed the Second International, known as the Amsterdam International, which awakened among the working classes greater hopes of political successes, because of their powerful leagues which were as eager to launch a proletarian revolution as they were to seize power through democratic means. The second method seemed, to the Left Wing, more tedious and less feasible, so that the Socialist parties passed through a long trial of dissensions and divisions, calling themselves Reformists, Maximalists, Revolutionaries, most of them preaching to the masses direct action against capitalistic society and State. They were in fact waiting for the propitious moment to ripen. The Socialist parties for many years proclaimed universal disarmament, fought against military appropriations in every country, disseminated pacifist propaganda. Everything in Europe seemed to lead in case of war toward a break of the working class with the State and to the proclamation of a revolution.

But once war broke out in 1914 all the Socialist parties, some sooner, others later, on the whole supported the war fought by their own nations. (We have already noted that national sentiment was stronger than the particular idea of social classism). The exceptions were few, though those of firmly convinced men. On the whole the Socialist International abandoned its pacifist ideal. The Social-Democrats of Germany supported the Kaiser, those of Austria the Emperor; the French and the Belgium Socialists had the excuse of defending a country which had been attacked; the Eng-

lish Laborites wavered and then accepted their participation in the war. The Italians broke off into four branches: Bissolati and his faction in favor of the Allies; Mussolini and his followers for a nationalistic war; Turati and Treves, supported by the working men, benevolently neutral; the extreme wing definitely opposed to it.

It was possible at that time for Lenin, who had taken refuge in Switzerland, to write his *Imperialism, the Last Phase of Capitalism*. But today he would have seen how Russian imperialism is again rising from its ashes even through Communism; the ideal of human brotherhood and of international unification cannot be realized under the banner of Communism just as it was not realized under the banner of Socialism. These two "isms" which both derive from Marx have also the same point of departure: all the power must go to the proletariat, which is to become the only social class in the economic and political regimentation of each country. They therefore admitted as a political necessity so-called direct action, which may result in either the seizure of power through revolution with the elimination of all other classes, or in a fanatical civil war in which the opponent classes might possibly win out.

The experience of two world wars has shown us that neither Socialists nor Communists have resisted the waves of nationalistic passions or of imperialistic policies. In either case both parties have behaved no differently than the old nobility before the revolutions of the eighteenth century and like the bourgeoisie and capitalists of the nineteenth century. And as the wars passed from monarchical wars to national wars and from national wars to general wars, they became more extended, showing up popular passions by the very fact that each nation took part in them with all its economic and moral resources and with the support of all its people.

Socialists and Communists claim that up till now, except

for Russia, there does not exist any really proletarian State in the exact sense of the word. The writer questions whether Russia can be called either proletarian or Communist. But aside from this question which is extraneous to the present study one can reply that today the Communists disagree among themselves precisely over the question of national interests: the German Communists want a unified State and are opposed to the internationalization of the Ruhr and the Saar, while the French Communists maintain the opposite view. The Yugoslav Communists want all of Venezia Giulia including Trieste, while the Italian Communists maintain (more or less) that Trieste and the western zone should be left to Italy; the same is happening in every European country where national interests are felt more keenly than elsewhere. It would be necessary to wait for an exceptional world evolution to create a Social-Communist whole. But this dream will be shattered first by the Communist workers of rich countries and such leaders as Lewis. Did not he and his henchmen completely close their hearts and their ears to the appeal of La Guardia who begged the miners to avoid the strike in the name of entire unemployed and starving populations throughout the world, whose slow death seems of little concern to American strikers? Who can believe that the American Communist workers would like to descend to the standard of living of their comrades in Russia, China and even in Europe? Even on the absurd hypothesis that with the coming of Social-Communism there would not be territorial empires, there will surely be economic empires with territorial boundaries guarded by red or green armies or whatever color they may be. Pure internationalism will come neither from civil wars promoted with the aim of smashing bourgeoisie and landowners, as Russia in 1917-18, nor from the leveling of the whole world into one single working class under a single Social-Communist banner and system. Economic and political differences do overcome the velleity for

an illusory world union; national individualism will at least prevail over any international totalitarian dictatorship maintained by force.

II.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations founded in 1919 at the Paris Conference after the First World War was to be a step forward toward a healthy and organic internationalism. Despite divergencies of opinion among its promoters and the difficulties of execution encountered at the very beginning it was hoped that through the good will of the interested governments, favorable public opinion, and because of the specter of a world war won after four years of "useless carnage" (to quote Benedict XV), the League of Nations would be able to abolish the wars and to bring to the world a new order.

After twenty years of an insecure and distressing existence the League of Nations failed in its main task—a new world war began which, though feared and foreseen, the League could not and did not try to avoid.

To attempt to fix the blame for the League's failure as though it were a mechanism which functioned automatically or a body with definite responsibilities is as unrealistic as it is common to blame States, parliaments, unions and other bodies which are means through which responsible men act and actuate their will and the will of the peoples they represent.

The idea which moved the promoters of the League was a noble and bold attempt to eliminate wars through an international political control. But the methods adopted were inadequate and insufficient; it was doomed to failure. Whatever efforts it made to avoid war, it could not do anything except to delay the war for months and years. It was not really the League's responsibility as much as it was that of

the great powers operating in and through it. Today, at the beginning of the second experiment, that of the United Nations, we can better evaluate the contribution of the League of Nations to the slow progress of the world toward internationalism; because the little that was learned from it and the gravity of the crises which followed it indicate the usual road taken by humanity in the realization of great changes.

That we are already on the road toward a more comprehensive world order improperly called internationalism, which going beyond the level of the United Nations will culminate in a "One World"—of that there is no doubt. But we men have difficulty in visualizing the future and we are impatient: we would like our ideas to be realized immediately while nature itself proceeds slowly in furnishing us with the adequate conditioning. Our ideas become concrete slowly, partially, and so differently from the way in which we had first conceived them that we no longer recognize them as ours and even fighting them as opposed to our own ideas. When they are at last realized and belong to the past, we are finally able to see the connecting link, to analyze their deepest significance, and to discover the logical process by which they have prevailed on history and become reality.

However, while we can understand why past international systems have failed and can find in them reason for future hopes, we are not capable of evolving a secure plan by which world internationalism can be definitely established.

This innate human deficiency which makes us uncertain of our results is very useful in that it causes us to intensify our efforts in various directions, so that through experiments which have failed and crises which have been overcome we can ultimately find the right path.

The most difficult problem is that of defining internationalism. We, of course, exclude internationalism of world-wide empire as that of Rome was believed to be; neither

can we count religious internationalism as realized in the Middle Ages, for the simple reason that outside of Christianity there existed many other religions and there were many differences even among Christians. Nor can we count juridical internationalism based on the acceptance of the old *ius gentium* developed in modern international law, because it would lack the authority which could sanction and enforce it. We have seen the failure of proletarian internationalism with the outbreak of two wars, and today it would be only a subsidiary organization for the expansion of an empire such as that of Russia.

In establishing the League of Nations the political plane was chosen; the organization of a body of the States supporting it or admitted to it by the victorious States. But the political plane was largely nominal, because the States retained their sovereign rights with their own policies and their own interests, so that the agencies of the League were no more than transaction rooms for settling those affairs for which a common denominator could be found.

If this common denominator had been an ethical international law, a series of sound and unswerving principles in the common conscience to which political matters and economic interests were subordinated, the road toward internationalism would have been sounder; but what would have been very difficult for the ordinary man was impossible for the politician who feels it incumbent on himself to represent the interests of his own country. Human experience leads us to believe that men, in order to remain organized, need as much the rational element which forces us to accept the limitations of society, as well as the coercive element which prevents us from evading them. Even though the League did not lack rational principles, it lacked the means to translate them into political terms, because the League did not have its own definite policy nor coercive means, since even the sanctions were hypothetical, on a voluntary basis

for each country, difficult to carry out, and as such inefficient.

The political setup of the League of Nations was, in fact, fictitious and apparent rather than real, not only because of the law of "unanimity" which prevented the League to form an active policy of its own and confined it to negative compromises, but also because the League of Nations (as any other similar body) was composed of nations having opposing ideologies, principles and goals: democratic and liberal nations together with totalitarian nations. Hence there developed in the League this international dualism which caused the failure of the Disarmament Conference, the withdrawal from the League of aggressor nations such as Germany and Japan; it made ineffectual the sanctions against Italy, and made it easy to establish the immediate conditioning of the Second World War.

It was evident through twenty years of experience that the League of Nations could not and did not have its own policy which was supranational and international at the same time; but there were various politics by which the most active and powerful States made their own points of view prevail, or they alternately compromised them in order to obtain the most favorable results or to prevent a result they believed to be unfavorable. In conclusion, pure political and economic interdependence can create a settlement chamber functioning on a limited basis, but it cannot create an international order.

III.

United Nations

During and after the war, the victorious nations thought of liquidating the League and of substituting it with another which has taken on the name of United Nations (U.N.). The new charter was approved at the San Francisco Conference

of 1945 and is already at work on the painful task of organizing a new internationalism.

The plan of eliminating the deficiencies of the Geneva body and of giving the new experiment a greater forcefulness is evident. However, the new legislators are as tenaciously bound as their predecessors to the maintenance of the political sovereignty of their own countries and of maintaining and consolidating their positions to the detriment of a real international concept. Comparing the past with the present, one can see the similarities despite the apparent differences. The League was based on the sovereignty of the Assembly and bound by the rule of unanimous decisions; the U.N. is based on the sovereignty of the Security Council and bound by the unanimous decisions of the five great powers with permanent seats. The U.N. has thus maintained the principle of the League (unanimity) while restricting it to the Big Five. The situations in fact are identical. Four countries directed policies in Geneva: Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy. Japan was preparing for war in Asia and did not molest Europe; Italy was treated as a younger brother. When Germany later entered as a permanent member the fatal division among the great States became more evident and fatal. All the other nations, who were blamed for the League's inability to function through that unanimity of assembly which protected them from the encroachment by big States, in twenty years gave the League only little troubles which could have been easily solved if it had not revolved the opposing politics of the big States. That is what happened in the Polish-Lithuanian question of Vilna, and that of the Armenians of Turkey, that of Corfu with Italy, and other similar ones. In fact, as the four or five (really two, Great Britain and France) powers of the League brought to Geneva their political dualism and their lack of psychological understanding and caused the ruin of Europe and the world, so today the five, really three (Great

Britain, Russia and the United States) have transported to the plane of international organization their political interests and their lack of psychological understanding. And as the Geneva Assembly, even though each little nation of a million or so inhabitants had the right of veto, was not able to oppose the policies of the permanent members (and their satellites), so in a greater measure the U.N. Assembly cannot prevent the three, four or five Powers from carrying on their own opposing policies to the detriment of the new organization.

Another similarity between the League and the U.N. lies in the lack of statutory principles that could become a body of law that could be made effective through the enforcement by an independent agency. There are plenty of general statements in the San Francisco Charter reaffirming "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person in the equal rights of men and women and of nations big and small" and similar other statements, just as there were in the 1919 Covenant. By what authority can these principles be enforced if a State violates them? The Security Council? And if the Security Council cannot, perhaps the Assembly? Can one go from the Assembly to the International Court at the Hague to obtain justice? Just as formerly no individual, no minority group, no oppressed people would find justice in Geneva (the Court at the Hague was reserved for specific problems, nonpolitical, and such functioned pretty well), so today, not only is the same thing true but in addition there have occurred events of an unheard-of cruelty, such as the deportation and transfer of populations by the thousands and millions, the enslavement of prisoners and deportees, and the deaths of national and political enemies fostered by the governments of the United Nations, despite the U.N. and the conferences of the three or five big powers.

The lack of a systematic international law which all States

great and small would be equally obliged to observe, as well as the lack of a judiciary body which would see to it that the laws were enforced, has been and is one of the serious misfortunes of the international organization. One should add that the new Charter is in this respect inferior to the preceding one on account of the tight restrictions imposed on the International Court, the nature of the Assembly of States which is only consultative and without free initiative, and the almost dictatorial power of the Pentarchy (the Big Five). What is happening today in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (to mention only small countries with full sovereignty and supposedly free Allies) is at variance with the ethical and legal principles of the San Francisco Charter. If we compare the policy of these three countries under U.N. with that of the Fascist policies of Italy, Spain, Austria, Greece, of the prewar period when they were members of the League, can we say that they were any worse off then than now? But just as the League was then powerless to defend the rights and dignity of human beings and oppressed peoples, so today the U.N. is powerless to give legal force to the principles of the Charter and to make them effectual and respected.

All these facts are due to the erroneous method of the old organization which was repeated by the new one: that of admitting or keeping as members those States which base their politics on principles antithetical to those on which the International was founded. Were not countries in which slavery existed with the connivance of their governments admitted to the old League, and did not the countries who became totalitarian such as Fascist Italy and its imitators remain in the League? Even if Fascist Italy had not attacked Abyssinia and reduced it to a colony, she could not remain in the League, just as the Spain of Primo de Rivera, and afterward of Franco, the Germany of Hitler and so on could not have stayed in the League, because they deprived the respective peoples of their fundamental rights and freedom.

Today conditions are even worse. Whereas neither Hitler nor Mussolini and others pretended to have founded democracies or to have respected political liberties, Stalin and his satellites pretend to have a more advanced democracy than the Western countries, a more moral, social and political system, and to protect their people with methods conforming to the concept of human equality. This propaganda is finding its way into other countries, is confusing people's minds, is weakening the principles on which our present civilization is based, and is creating suspicion between the two worlds which convene in the United Nations, unfortunately dis-united ethically, politically, and economically.

The League arose under the star of disarmament in the sense that as little by little collective security came to be realized, the victorious countries had to reduce their armaments and their military appropriations. With this in mind the Naval Conference which fixed for ten years the respective limits of the naval powers was held in Washington in 1921. It was followed by the London Conference in 1931 which failed because of a changing world, as finally failed the general Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1932. It wasn't only Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany who did not want disarmament; France also wanted to keep the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and the military understanding with the Little Entente and Poland. Actually, there was no disarmament, but rather rearmament toward a second war.

Today no one speaks of disarming. The Russian and American military leaders clearly intend to maintain full standing armies, to continue war production, to try new arms and new techniques, to construct atomic bombs if they have the secret, and to continue feverishly in the search for the secret either by scientific methods or by espionage. England also operates on a war basis. China goes on with its civil war, though France had accepted for the moment the

plan of reducing military appropriations—the cause of General de Gaulle's resignation—she never renounced her military tradition. Of the satellite countries of Russia, Yugoslavia is already in the full swing of rearmament. The prevailing psychology under the U.N. is that of fear of a Third World War; the prevailing psychology under the old League was that of fear of a Second World War. Fear at that time did not result in disarmament; fear today does not allow anyone to speak of disarmament. Are we more foresighted today? Or is this a sign of an early failure of the new international organization?

Finally, the old League in order to apply economic and military sanctions against the State which had violated the Covenant had to obtain the unanimous consent of the Assembly and left to each State the responsibility of applying the measure fixed by the Assembly. The U.N. have instead entrusted the decisions and the executive powers to the Security Council and have or rather will have its own military organization which will act under the Council itself. From the technical standpoint this is a step forward; but the right of veto which the five permanent members have can paralyze any initiative and render the Security Council of the U.N. more ineffective than the Geneva Assembly.

IV.

The Fundamentals of Internationalism

In the writer's opinion, in both attempts to organize nations on an international plane, even though use was made of the various necessary elements for the new structure, the mistakes were made right at the outset. History repeatedly shows that leagues created to wage wars seldom stand united throughout the war, they break up at the moment they try to establish their shares in the victory and peace treaties. The 1919 League was forged as an instrument of the Allies.

The United States disassociated itself from it, England and France followed different paths often diametrically opposed, Japan and Italy openly violated its pacts. The U.N. of 1945 is following more or less toward the same course. The dissent among the three Allies and their two associates (we speak thus of the Big Five to mark internal differences) is becoming such that scarcely is the Second World War over than a third is spoken of, and already there are troop movements and local struggles. Leagues of States created by war and selfish understandings by the victorious States are not the proper materials with which to construct an international edifice for peace. They however give the peoples the psychological atmosphere for discussing on permanent peace, disarmament, and the outlawing of war; that is, to utilize the sentiments which campaign for demagogy of peace. In 1919 this demagogy was more alive and more powerful because it was hoped that the war of 1914 would be the last one; whereas in 1945 hopes are based on the salutary effects of the atomic bomb, so that its fear might compel men to give up war. But as time goes on, studies are made on how to use it in the next war, how to prevent its deleterious effects, and how to organize a defense against it.

Students of international affairs, politicians, and statesmen who are democratically minded and of Leftist tendencies have maintained since the First World War that not a League of Nations but a League of Peoples should be established. Even today, during and after the formation of the United Nations, they keep returning to the idea of an international parliament elected by the people of the associated States, giving the representatives legislative powers and the executive committee political, administrative and military powers.

The two systems are based on opposing principles: the first is based on the sovereignty of each member State of the League; the second on the formation of a supra-State

as an expression of popular will. The first system must depend on power politics as a means of bringing each nation's interests to the fore, as there would be no other means of protecting one's own interests except by compromises or by war. The second, on the other hand, depends on the consent of the majority which in fixing the laws would subordinate national interests to international rules. Those who hold the former view object that since peoples so banded together lack that homogeneity, that mutual interest, that historical tradition which really create a nation through centuries of effort, it would be impossible to form an assembly really conscious of world interests and, therefore, of the real expression of the sovereignty of the associated peoples. To this objection one can reply that the formation of an international consciousness could never be brought about without the actual existence of an internationalism. It is not long ago that many of the intellectual and middle classes opposed universal male suffrage because, they said, the working class, the illiterate classes, do not have a national and political consciousness and would by their very number render inefficient the classes with cultural traditions and experience in public affairs. But universal suffrage was extended to all men, and nations did not fall into chaos; the same can be said of woman's suffrage which has been and is still opposed in some States because of woman's lack of preparation for political life. It's the old question of whether one can swim before getting into the water.

It is clear that, in order to form an international consciousness among all people with such diverse ethical and political mentality, time, education, and experience are needed. If we take notes how difficult it is in one country alone to overcome the class, caste, religious, and educational differences and prejudices, we can realize how much more difficult it would be to attain it on an international level.

Modern nations were formed by passing from local com-

munities, cities, counties, provinces to larger units in kingdoms and national states, a process made difficult and painful by the coexistence of local rights and customs with larger national interests. It is therefore probable that the same process might occur from nations to international groups of both a regional and continental nature, and from this to intercontinental unity, and finally into a representation of all peoples in a world parliament. The most important thing is not the problem of the material and structural organization of such groups, but the problem of the formation of an effective collective consciousness which could make us go beyond national boundaries.

A collective consciousness, whatever it may be, can be formed only in two ways: by the influx of an initial group, which in asserting ideas and materializing them in facts, obtains large assents, and by a new social organization which appeals to others for support. Thus the ideal of the Federal Union was formed and imposed on the thirteen American colonies united in war against the mother country; thus among many initial difficulties, the ideal was attained and translated into practice and defended by civil war against secession. It was thus extended little by little to the populations of the other new thirty-five States even with traditions and language different from those of the original nucleus.

National consciousness is a necessary requisite in order that a nation can be formed, live, and develop. It is always present and working. If there is no national consciousness, the nation cannot be formed; if the national consciousness is vanishing, it does not overcome the difficulties blocking its development. But if such a consciousness exists, the nation will survive even the longest and most bitter oppression, as has happened with the peoples of Armenia, Ireland, and Poland.

The same can be said of international consciousness. An important experiment has been made with the Pan-American

Union. Given the diversity of origins, language, religions, traditions, customs, and economic conditions between North and Latin America, there was certainly lacking a common basis for the formation of a collective consciousness in the Western Hemisphere. The problem of maintaining their independence once the colonies were emancipated from Europe was definitely a common interest, though variously interpreted, it was expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. But after the failure of the Mexican adventure of Napoleon III and after the revolution in Brazil which banished the last Braganza, all danger from Europe disappeared in Latin America, and there arose another danger: that of the colossus of the North, which, having become rich and powerful, would have weighed heavily on the rest of the continent with its dollar diplomacy. The Pan-American Union has served to diminish the feelings of hostility or of diffidence of the South toward the North, although it has not yet eliminated them. Despite fine phrases, an American continental consciousness does not exist. Understandings among governments, political and diplomatic friendships cannot serve as substitutes for the coming together of the people themselves, nor the contacts among the States in the international assemblies of delegates from various governments, as in the old League and in the present organization. The delegates of the various States, as men and women, might reach a reciprocal esteem or disinterested friendship, but that would not further the understanding among people by so much as an inch if nothing else is done to make them feel drawn together by the same interests.

The formation of an international consciousness, as of any other collective consciousness, proceeds by steps and develops slowly from small, zealous nuclei to larger areas still to be won over, until it reaches spheres which are not or do not seem to be directly involved, but which give the impulse for pioneering action. The historical process in all changes of

social unity which are accompanied by changes in popular orientation is a slow one. First of all, to change the collective consciousness, there must be changes in social, economic, and political conditioning, because the factors of our every day lives are deeply engraved in the mind of each one of us. Populations which migrate from one country to another try to adapt themselves not only to foreign climates and food, but also to the new customs and psychology and ways of life; and little by little, from generation to generation, their own collective consciousness is remade until it becomes an active element which influences changes in the customs of the countries that welcome them.

These considerations lead us to a preliminary conclusion: judicial, political, organizational Internationalism, achieved through the will of governments with the goal of permanent understanding, is certainly a step forward toward the coordination of the world; but we cannot ask from such organizations as the U.N. today more than they can give us; that is, a Forum of discussion and an Exchange for transactions. We must not deceive ourselves into thinking that an international consciousness of peoples is formed by such leagues. There is need of a fruitful principle for the formation of any collective consciousness. Just as to form a nation there is needed a national sentiment, to create a free State there is needed the ideal of liberty, to establish a democracy there is needed a people imbued with the urge of governing itself by freeing itself of tyrants, dictators or privileged protectors; so to create a United Nations there is needed faith in Internationalism. I say "faith" rather than ideal or conviction, because since a true United Nations has never existed and since the League of Nations has failed, we need faith to convince ourselves that the effort has not been in vain, and that the apparently insurmountable difficulties can be surmounted.

However, today, through one of those profound crises that

affect humanity from time to time and which makes it despair of itself, neither the leaders nor the people have faith in international organizations. Most people lack an inspiring religious faith in great ideals. Faith in progress has failed because science creates weapons for both life and death, and man uses them to kill other men rather than to create a new security. The political ideals of the last century: liberty, democracy, the improvement of the working class, seem to have become old phrases without meaning. Today the world is divided for and against Communism. It is denounced by one group as totalitarianism and exalted by the other as real democracy and true Internationalism. Here is the root of the crisis today which is affecting the whole world. Man cannot believe in an ideal without fighting for it; the law of duality of ideals, forces, currents, is a fundamental one and cries out against those who, starting from a monistic concept of being and life, want to have a single world without contradictions, without struggles, without differences. Impossible. That would be a lifeless and sterile world.

An ideal that man can follow is always concrete and never abstract, therefore limited in its contours and boundaries and not limitless and vague; realizable at the outset, though extended into the future by its progressive attainability. Today we need an international organization that can function, that responds to the needs of eliminating wars, that contributes to the overcoming of post-war crises, that can give people tranquillity. We must be convinced that this organization can be created and is on the road to being created. This conviction is lacking because there is missing a principle on which to base the institution, and without a principle we only wander around in a void. The mistake of the three great powers has been to give us a Charter (that of San Francisco) without a soul, and to set up a "market" of the interests of peoples, abandoning guiding criteria, to

have created a peace without an ideal of "justice," and to have accepted "accomplished facts" and unilateral solutions regardless of their intrinsic immorality.

Why did the Atlantic Charter awaken world-wide faith in a better future? Because it had at least a minimum of justice and morality. Why did the San Francisco Charter leave the world cold? Because the very principles which were framed in the text were not fanned by vital conviction and are virtually violated by the Charter itself, which grants the great powers negative dictatorship through the veto. The veto of the San Francisco Charter is as destructive to international society as the atomic bomb is destructive of physical life. The year 1945 signalized for human civilization two lost battles: San Francisco and Hiroshima.

One will ask: What is the point of organizing ourselves internationally if wars cannot be avoided and if the world will never become peaceful and united? The answer is that no one can stop the progress of human thought nor limit the aspirations of man toward a better future. Just as suicide is against nature, so is it against nature to stop the historic process. We are heading for a widening of the fields of human activity because, today, we can go around the world in an airplane and cover enormous distances in a few hours, because there is no country which is completely self-sufficient, because all the areas of the world formerly closed to foreign exploration have been penetrated, because wars have become world-wide. Today man cannot do without an international organization to regulate political and economic interests.

We are groping in the dark; this is the nature of human experimentation. We often fail; that is one of the risks that active men take, but it would not be consonant with the progress of life if after that first failure a second attempt were not made, and a third and a fourth, not only in a spirit of adventure but because of vital necessity. If unfortunately for us today we lack a strong ideal, or rather the stimulus

for an ideal which is in the human conscience (we need an international Washington, an international Jefferson or Lincoln), the human race has not lost its matrix. It will push forward at the opportune moment when humanity will again experience other anguishes and other sorrows. The little men of today try this or that road. But they are not contributing to the formation of an international consciousness because they have no faith in the ideal of justice and morality to be applied to the relations between nations; and if they depart from principles admitted by everyone and speak of an equal, just, and lasting peace, in practice they lack loyalty to the principles and yield. These are so many lost battles on the road to progress while other more decisive battles are being prepared. But if by the wayside fall men and institutions paralyzed by the lack of an animating spirit, humanity will find in the recesses of its heart the vital impulses for future conquests. Thus an international consciousness will be born, and it will be seen that only a moral ideal of justice and of liberty can vitalize old and new human institutions.

9

The Post-War International Crisis

LET US consider the post-war international crisis in its actual phases and its deep causes in order to understand the erratic way of mankind toward its achievements. It is not a new event that of a post-war crisis, nor is it a strange happening that such a crisis is deep and without immediate prospect of being overcome. Perhaps it is worse that we have no star in this present and troubled night, as a guide in our traveling. But nobody need despair; history is made up of one crisis after another. We are going toward an international life in spite of our mistakes and failings.

For the sake of convenience, history textbooks may say that the present crisis dates from the end of the war in Europe, or from the beginning of the San Francisco Conference. In reality it began much earlier and its various stages bear such historical names as Casablanca, Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. But since neither world leaders nor public opinion have hearkened to the Cassandra-like warnings arising around them (and if they had been listened to we should not call them Cassandra-like) we shall date the crisis from the end of April, 1945.

I.

The Veto Power

Whatever decisions may have been made at San Francisco on the questions revolving around the veto power given to

every member of the Big Five, there was no change in the world situation, the post-war crisis could not be arrested or even deflected from its natural course of development. The veto itself, reduced to the modest and purely formal terms of the latest agreements between Moscow and the other four powers, was important only to a limited extent. It revealed, however, a fundamental and deep crisis.

The unanimity of the Big Five was directed to divide the world into "spheres of influence" (an imperialistic euphemism for keeping the smaller countries in line), but little did the promoters of such a machinery think that the device might turn against themselves more than against anyone/else.

✓Walter Lippmann maintained that the unanimity of the five major powers cannot be laid down in advance; it must adapt itself to what may happen, and so we must "give it a chance to work." As an example Lippmann cited the veto powers of the President of the United States. But he did not carry through the comparison, for he neglected to say that the United States has an ethical and juridical conception of the power of the State as well as a democratic system in which arbitrary action can be stopped legally without recourse to force. *In the new international organization the veto of one single power can paralyze the whole executive machinery and allow the most unjust acts to be committed without any other remedy than war.*

This is the central reason why the San Francisco Charter can operate only under two conditions: first, a bargaining among the great powers at the expense of the small, with favors exchanged case by case, or, second, an even tighter drawing of spheres of influence so that no great power can interfere with the affairs of another. Even under the second of these conditions there is always a possibility that a problem presented on a basis of principle and with a certain vigor may set the great powers against one another.

This state of mind is apparent in every move which the United States and Great Britain make to checkmate Russia, and, unfortunately, it is identical with the state of mind of the British and French governments between 1934 and 1939 in regard to Hitler. Hence the famous policy of "appeasement" leading to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the occupation of Prague, the annexation of Austria, the suppression of the free government of Danzig and finally the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War.

But the "trap" prepared in 1945 did not exist in 1939. This trap is just for the Big Five themselves, who have taken on a responsibility for peace tied to a permanent understanding among themselves. *In this way they must all subscribe to whatever unjust and hateful act any one of them may commit, threatening to declare war and protected by the definition of the veto.* Such an act may be committed by Russia, England, the United States, France or China (although France and China are today poor relations). There is a tendency to fear an act of this kind on the part of Russia in particular because in Russia there is no opposition party, no free press, no public opinion, and no free elections—in short no control over the dictatorial will of the Russian leaders.

Russia can continue to occupy satellite countries, it can keep out newspapermen from abroad and refuse to admit diplomatic representatives. *The Western Allies can do none of these things in their spheres of influence.* Moreover Russia can threaten the military occupation of almost any part of Europe or Asia and can carry out the threat immediately without further consultation as in the case of Iran. The Western democracies can do nothing of the sort without taking upon themselves responsibilities in which their peoples wish no part.

In this state of unbalanced equilibrium between two possi-

ble antagonists the necessity of unanimity will resolve itself into continuous appeasement. Because this appeasement will be reluctant and accompanied by mental reservations and diplomatic subterfuges it will only increase mutual suspicion and create false psychological and political positions which cannot lead to a true understanding among peoples. Since Russia does not even claim to have the same moral code in international affairs as the Western democracies, whenever the three or four or five major powers come to a compromise Stalin will not have to account for what he has done, whereas Attlee and Truman or others will have to justify their underwriting of acts which are contrary to the conscience of free Christian peoples.

In the case of the transfer of populations involved in the Polish settlement and German provinces, if unanimity had not been required, either Stalin would have given in to the majority made up of Roosevelt and Churchill or else he would have had to proclaim that he was acting unilaterally under his own responsibility and this consideration would have given him pause. Unanimity, on the other hand, justified him before the outside world. *Unanimity is a snare and a delusion.* It will not make for peace but for the setting-up of centers of power and struggle for power. This device which was intended to be so clever is a boomerang aimed at its originators.

The Spheres of Influence

Let us be sensible and admit that the outbreak of a new war within a short time is practically impossible. War does not arise merely from differences of ideas nor from a clash of interests. Both these factors are overshadowed by a long-range psychological preparation and conditioning. Perhaps in fifteen or twenty years the world will be ready for another war; today it is not.

Britain and the United States cannot plan a war against Russia. France, in spite of some accumulated resentments, has no wish to fight England. Russia with its twelve or more million dead and the immense damage done to its western reaches cannot embark upon such an adventure, especially in view of the fact that neither its navy nor its aviation can contend with those of its supposed adversaries, Britain and the United States. The leaders of the Big Five are sincere in their desire for peace and they are supported by the wish of their peoples and by physical, economic and psychological factors.

What is out of the question today, however, may be possible tomorrow. There is a great fear overhanging the major powers, a fear which comradeship in arms and a joint victory have increased rather than dissipated. The fear is that Communism may aim at the suppression of capitalism, that Russian imperialism may not be satisfied with present gains and may aim at future conquests, that the absence of liberty which veils a large part of Europe may extend to the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries and eventually cover the whole world.

Let us lay aside the prophecies of future conflicts (for the world is still young!) and look at the conflicts of today. The present position is this: The Third World War cannot be caused by either Germany or Japan; they are crushed for half a century to come. War can eventually break out between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers, splitting the world asunder in a frightful clash. This hypothesis is present in the minds of the leaders and of their peoples not as an inevitable necessity but as a possibility which they wish to see eliminated. To accuse Stalin and other leaders of the Pentarchy of purposely paving the way for another war is as unjust as it is stupid.

But if the leaders of the Big Five, unwittingly and indeed with the best of intentions, are laying the foundations of

another war rather than of lasting peace we must call public attention to their errors and seek to arouse a public conscience which may pull us through the crisis and make the new world organization truly workable.

Among the many mistakes made during the European war and carried over into the period between the Armistice and a peace conference there are three which may prove fatal.

The first came to light in the Anglo-Russian pact of May, 1942, which contained in embryo the policy of *spheres of influence*. Of course Russia is more interested in Poland than in Greece and Spain, just as the United States is more interested in the Caribbean and Pacific islands than in the Mediterranean, etc. But it is one thing to recognize what interests a major power from a geographical and ethnical point of view and quite another to give free rein to its political and economic influence when this influence may be exercised at the cost of the independence of smaller nations and the regional or continental unity which existed long before the definition of the "sphere."

To some extent, what has happened in Poland and the Baltic countries by way of Russian interference happened in Greece and Italy in the name of the British. What we have seen in the rearrangement of Europe, the Near East and North Africa is due to repeat itself in the Pacific. The so-called plan of "trusteeship" will serve only to mask territorial gains and the division of the spoils of war among the victors, paralleled at the end of the last war by the system of A, B and C mandates.

Worst of all is what is occurring in Germany with its division into four zones of military occupation. The discussions about the size of the zones and their boundaries clearly revealed that each occupying power was striving for a precise advantage to itself. If the occupation were temporary and strictly military the game would not be worth the candle!

The occupation of Germany will last fifteen or twenty

years and the longer it lasts the less likely it is to end peacefully. Russia will be able to make free use of the ancient terrors of the czars and the new-fangled terrors known as purges; France will be a hard taskmaster but its severity will be mitigated by the conscience of the French people and the watchful eye of England; England will carry out its occupation for political reasons in spite of public opinion against it. As for the Americans, they will be in a hurry to leave. One day there will arise the absurd situation of a common frontier on German territory between the two great powers which now flank Continental Europe on either side—Great Britain and Russia—and both these powers will be impelled to follow the adage *Si vis pacem para bellum*.

Britain will no longer be able to play at the "balance of power" game, setting the interests of one group of countries against those of another and weighing down the scales on whichever side is convenient. From now on Britain itself will be directly exposed; it will have to keep a large standing army, to make use of the Germans under its control and to tie its fate to that of France, willy-nilly.

The division of Germany into four zones is dangerous but the division of Austria into four zones is both harmful and ridiculous. (Parenthetically: Why has there been no mention of Hungary lately? Is there at the bottom of this silence some understanding written or unwritten reached at Teheran or Yalta of which we have not yet been informed?)

At Moscow in October of 1943 the foreign ministers of the Big Three laid out the future of Austria as a democratic nation. There is no conceivable reason why Austria should be divided into four zones of occupation unless it be to the same mistaken end that we have seen in the case of Germany. Austria will serve as a common boundary between Britain and France on the one side and Russia on the other.

By now the continental unity of Europe is over; *the breaking-up of Europe is an accomplished fact*. The fact that

all this may come about by unanimous consent of the five major powers or with the abstention of one of them is of no importance. Events are on the march that have already acquired too much momentum to be resisted.

The same is happening in Asia. The United States is confident that the Pacific is its sphere of influence. This was the agreement reached by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo: the Pacific for the United States and the Mediterranean for Great Britain. But in this sphere the United States will find that there are many problems to be resolved with Britain, France, China and Russia. The United States will have many a bitter pill to swallow, many a give-and-take arrangement to make by conceding in Europe what it refuses in Asia and vice versa. Peace is going to be a hard proposition, perhaps even harder than war.

The First Cause of the Crisis

The publication in January, 1918, of Wilson's Fourteen Points produced a strong public reaction in Allied and neutral countries and its gradual penetration among the enemy proved to be very effective. There was criticism, of course, on the part of diehard nationalists, "realistic" politicians and impenitent skeptics, but the mass of the unsophisticated went along with Wilson. Later, to be sure, there was disillusionment, in the guise of the Treaty of Versailles, which seemed at the time to represent a triumph of *realpolitik* over idealism, but which today looks like child's play beside the new "realism" of the Big Three.

History repeated itself in the Atlantic Charter, which appeared in 1941 as a beacon light in the darkness, arousing a lesser enthusiasm but inspiring considerable hope for a better future. Even today, after the many disappointments caused us by Big Three policies, the Atlantic Charter re-

mains a milestone of human progress alongside the Fourteen Points of Wilson.

We must admit, of course, that there is a gap between the ideal and the real in the carrying out of any political program, no matter how high-minded it may be to start with. Neither the Fourteen Points nor the Atlantic Charter could have been put into effect at once; there was need of a gradual and practical adaptation to tide over from the old order (or disorder) to the new. *But it is one thing to work seriously toward the practical application of an ideal and quite another to almost entirely give up the ideal, whether out of weakness or on purpose.*

The ambiguity and confusion surrounding the Atlantic Charter date from the day (a few weeks after its signing) when Winston Churchill said that it did not hold good for India and they were underlined when he later declared that as the war went on a more and more realistic view prevailed and that the Charter remained rather as a guiding ideal than as a solemn promise. (Here we have a casuistry worthy of the age of Pascal!) Eden renewed the pledge to apply the Charter to Poland and hence not to recognize any territorial gains made during the war by third powers, but on the other hand he stated that the Charter did not apply to enemy countries. (Did he mean that the smaller Allies needed a charter to protect them from the wrath of the Big Three?) As a matter of fact, from the day when the Baltic countries were denied the benefits of the Charter, as a concession to Stalin, both its political consistency and its practical applicability were damaged.

This is how it was when Roosevelt and Churchill, in secret conversations with clenched teeth, as if they could hardly bear to hint at it, much less discuss it or allow it to be confirmed, agreed that the Baltic countries should lose their independence and come under Soviet rule. Then, like the soul to which Petrarch refers, they "to their own harm

ran free," but thereafter their hands were tied because, having once sinned, they were caught in the toils of their own sin and in the clutches of him who had bent their will.

The political ambiguity which came into being at this time has continued and is still continuing at an even pace and with inexorable logic. In the House of Commons, in the halls of Congress, the White House and the press there have been solemn statements from Eden, Churchill, Bevin, Attlee, Roosevelt, Truman, Hull, Stettinius and Byrnes. *But what are mere words beside what has actually happened at Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco, Potsdam, London, and Moscow? The ambiguity is fundamental: it disturbs the entire world, wipes out the value of public opinion in the Western countries where such opinion is still free and handicaps any political program aimed at ensuring future peace.*

The last of a series of failures in foreign policy was the Moscow agreement of December, 1945. The authoritative columnist, Walter Lippmann, in an article entitled "Mr. Byrnes' Critics," maintained that the Secretary of State drove a good bargain, allowing Russia to maintain or strengthen its position among its satellites in Eastern Europe while the United States kept the control of Japan. He said: "If anyone objects to this division as contrary to our declarations against spheres of influence, he must ask himself whether he is honestly prepared to liquidate our own sphere of influence in order to liquidate the Soviet Union's sphere." Mr. Lippmann's reasoning is logical enough, except that it lacks a foundation. It was up to the State Department or Congress or the president to tell the American people, and the people of other countries concerned with American policy, that today there is no hostility to the establishment of spheres of influence. As a matter of fact, protests will be made again, in the manner of those voiced by Cordell Hull, at an opportune time (such as election time), or perhaps when MacArthur needs support in his resistance to Russian interfer-

ence in Japan. *Once again we shall see what a chasm there is between words and deeds.*

When Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met at Teheran as the guests of the Shah, they could hardly do less than promise him that Allied troops would leave his country as soon as the war was over. Indeed, on December 1, 1943, it was officially announced that Iran would preserve its territorial integrity "in accord with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four governments [including that of Iran] continue to adhere." This statement was said to represent a victory for Roosevelt, but the Atlantic Charter and the allotment of spheres of influence are as different as black from white.

Eden, with Churchill to back him up, made a similar concession. Although he had previously stated that Britain would not recognize for the duration of the war any territorial changes in Poland, he accepted at Yalta, while the war was still in progress, the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern boundary and other modifications which did not at all fit in with his previously declared policy.

Once upon a time, when a statesman made such an about-face, he resigned and turned over his post to another who was not involved in any of his policies. Under an orthodox parliamentary system, the legislative body which had settled on one policy would be dissolved and the electorate would be consulted as to whether the new policy meant an entirely new tack. Today, personal dignity and political logic are out of style. Governments make so many and such contradictory statements that one can no longer take them seriously.

Who could have believed, after so many declarations in favor of setting up and supporting democracy in the countries invaded and oppressed by the Nazis, that we should see in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Poland quasi-totalitarian governments, which permit neither a free

press nor free elections and carry on political and religious persecution in the best Nazi tradition? The United States and Great Britain have protested, to be sure; they were reluctant to recognize the governments set up so high-handedly by Russia; they objected to the procedure, but in the end they wearied and in one way or another they gave in.

We simply cannot know what is the reason behind this gradual devaluation of the democratic idea. When Eden and Hull conferred for the first time with Molotov at Moscow in October, 1943, and laid the groundwork of their policy toward Italy, they admitted that the Italian Government should be made "more democratic" (Badoglio and his technicians were in power at the time), and that the Italian people should regain their freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, etc. Eden and Hull pretended not to be aware of the fact that the advantages which they were conceding to Italy simply did and do not exist in Moscow, where none of these freedoms is to be found.

It was then that the problem arose whether the Russian regime is a democracy, whether or not it is a higher democracy than that of America and Britain, whether it embraces certain freedoms, and whether or not these freedoms are more strongly guaranteed than their Western counterparts. The lack of clarity in regard to this question soon showed itself in a series of glaring contradictions. There was talk of Baltic plebiscites when it was known that they were carried out under an armed Russian occupation, of Polish freedom when Poland lay under a foreign yoke, of democracy in Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary, as if such a thing could exist alongside the armed protection of Moscow. The American and British governments know perfectly well that the governments of these countries are neither free nor democratic, but a host of documents, declarations and communiqués are there saying that they are, thus creating an incurable state of ambiguity and confusion,

which is widespread among all peoples and threatens to undermine the political consistency of both the new international organization and that of the Western democracies.

Until yesterday we had democracies and dictatorships. They tried to get along together but ended by waging war: Britain, France and the United States against Germany, Italy and Japan. Today, on the other hand, we have the old democracies of the West and the so-called "new" democracies of eastern Europe, which display an excess of zeal in the elimination of "Fascism," but are reluctant to admit that they are continuing to use totalitarian methods peculiar to our late enemies, all in the name of a touted humanitarian and international democracy, which simply does not exist.

I am not accusing Russia, which is pursuing a well-defined policy of its own. I accuse America and Britain of accepting and bolstering the moral and political ambiguity and confusion of dictatorships which call themselves democracies and of totalitarian states which pretend to defend freedom.

A Great Moral Crisis

At this point the honest reader may well ask whether the writer would go so far as to prefer out-and-out conflict to the hard-won partial agreements which the Big Three have reached in their successive conferences.

I am all for agreement, but on the condition that a spade is called a spade. If Russian policy—which simply must be taken into account for the sake of world peace—means to set up a sphere of influence all its own (a security zone, it is called by the mouthpieces of Stalin), and if America and Britain must unwillingly allow it to do so, then let this fact be plainly stated. Let there be no more talk of accepting it in the name of democracy, and of international brotherhood, and of the Atlantic Charter (which the Big Three

claim to have entirely respected). Let it be said frankly that there had to be a compromise. To tell the truth and to educate the public to accept it is the first duty of a self-respecting democratic government.

Sooner or later the truth will out. But there is a difference between a truth that is spoken forthright at the proper time and a hidden or veiled truth revealed when it is too late. In 1935, at the time of the Fascist aggression against Abyssinia, Sir Samuel Hoare, then His Majesty's Foreign Secretary, made a speech at Geneva in favor of the League of Nations and its role in maintaining world peace. He reiterated the intention of the British Government to stand by the League, and his speech met with great success. Those who, like myself, had little confidence in him as a man, had to agree that for once he had the right idea. Later it was learned that this same Hoare had made a secret agreement with Laval to apply the sanctions against Fascist Italy very mildly, without extending them to war goods. At the same time he had thought up the "Laval-Hoare" plan, following the secret suggestion of Mussolini, who at the last minute refused, because he saw that he could carry out his aggression without being penalized for it anyhow.

Why then did Sir Samuel Hoare speak so enthusiastically of the League? It was on the eve of elections in Britain; the people were strongly opposed to the Abyssinian War, and the Conservatives would have lost if they had revealed their traffic with Laval and Mussolini. So they concealed their miserable compromise with a piece of false demagoguery at Geneva, and won the elections. Mussolini won his war in spite of the opposition of the British people to the Laval-Hoare plan. The time came, indeed, when it was not a Conservative like Sir Samuel Hoare (now Lord Templewood), but a sincere and even ingenuous Socialist, Léon Blum, who suggested to the League that the sanctions against

Italy be withdrawn, the conquest of Abyssinia be recognized, and the Negus be expelled from the Assembly.

There is another historical parallel. At the end of the eighteenth century, when Austria, Prussia and Russia divided up Poland, the Sultan of Constantinople refused to acknowledge their action. Every time he received the ambassadors accredited to him, an official would call out the name of Poland and follow it with the word: "Absent!" The Sultan may not have been moved by a respect for international law, but at least he had some self-respect!

The League of Nations could at least have waited for a year or two before expelling the representative of invaded Abyssinia while it fondly embraced the representative of the aggressor.

And what do we see now, after the Second World War? Fine speeches, points à la Wilson, solemn declarations, abundant promises, repeated assurances, moral principles of undoubted worth, but in reality we are in a phase of Big Three domination, of international dictatorship, of the veto right and of power politics. The contrast between words and deeds is making for the most serious moral tragedy in history. There is nothing new in covering up self-interest with high-sounding principles. But today we are at a crucial point, because man has in the palm of his hand a means of instant self-destruction, the atomic bomb. In spite of this, the great powers are still striving for frontier changes, safety zones, spheres of influence, naval bases, strategic points and veto powers, just as if the recent wars had been forgotten and the atomic bomb did not exist.

II.

In Search of the Road

Ten months of vacillation from the San Francisco Conference to the establishment of U.N. headquarters in New

York; we may define this period as that of searching for the road which may lead to peace. We are no longer at war, but we have no peace. The world is topsy-turvy; the road to peace has not been found.

Moscow plays the sphinx, keeps her goals secret, acts shrewdly and cleverly, moves independently and holds the other two in check. Meanwhile London and Washington have been groping their way through all the confused affairs of the world in an effort to reach agreements case by case wherever possible.

The first test was in London in September, 1945. At that time everyone was feeling the impact of the atomic bomb, which had put an end to the war with Japan within a few days. And the specter of the atomic bomb played a cruel trick on the two Anglo-Saxon countries. The American press immediately hushed up the discussion about whether to keep the secret of the atomic bomb secret or to share it with Russia. But Stalin and his foreign minister played a better game. Abandoning the meeting of the five ministers who were supposed to decide on peace terms with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, they showed that the veto and subtle procedural pretexts gave them a power mightier than the specter of the atomic bomb.

It was clear that although the atomic bomb constituted immense power, it would never have the same power in the hands of America and Britain, civilized and democratic countries, as it would in the hands of a dictatorial and totalitarian nation, such as was Hitler's Germany and such as is (notwithstanding the many differences) Stalin's Russia.

In short: after the London fiasco, Bevin and Byrnes decided, willy-nilly, to go to Moscow. They remembered a wartime decision on periodical meetings of the three foreign ministers in the three capitals of the three powers. Therefore they took up the pilgrim's staff again and went to the Kremlin, resolving to cast the U.N. adrift and resume the

meetings of the foreign ministers' deputies in drawing up the peace treaties. China was excluded, and France was admitted only for the treaty with Italy.

All hopes were placed in the U.N. which met in London in January, 1946. The difficulties involved in appointments, the choice of the secretary general, and the permanent and temporary headquarters were overcome with great good will. But soon the dispute broke out between the governments of Russia and Great Britain over the questions of Iran, Greece, and Indonesia, plus the issues of Syria and Lebanon. The U.N. London meetings came to a formally conciliatory close, but they showed the reality of the conflict between the three.

A modification of the situation began in America with a series of strongly worded declarations by Republican Senator Vandenberg—one of the American delegates in London—by Secretary of State Byrnes (not to speak of less important figures) and finally by Churchill in a speech, given in the presence of President Truman, which will be known even by the place where it was delivered: Fulton, Missouri. In that speech and in those that followed, Churchill's thesis was that Russia should be shown a strong front, both in words and in an Anglo-American military alliance which should serve to keep Russia in her place, since for her force is stronger than reason.

In the interim between Churchill's speech—and the re-opening of the U.N. Security Council at Hunter College, three other suggestions for finding the road to understanding with Moscow were made which deserve to be mentioned.

The first was that of Senator Pepper, who proposed another meeting of the three leaders: Truman, Stalin, and Attlee. This proposal was promptly and flatly rejected by Truman. And that was fortunate, because the functioning of the U.N. should not be prejudiced by secret agreements among three nations, with the deplorable results which ensued during the war at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

Another proposal was to send the American fleet on a fine cruise around the seas to demonstrate the willingness to use it if and when that should be necessary. This stupid display of force (which would have matched the atomic bomb specter which was flourished during the September meetings in London) was stopped in time. Russia will achieve a greater effect by sending her tanks into Iran than America would by sending her fleet on a trip about the seas.

In our opinion these proposals are blind alleys, and each one, taken alone, leads to an impasse: the present impasse. It is true that on the eve of the New York meetings Generalissimo Stalin expressed faith in the U.N. and reaffirmed the idea of equality of all the United Nations. These were platitudes which did not prevent him from sending his armies into Iran.

During the war the *Triple Entente* was subordinated to one unifying idea: winning the war. General interests, the rights of the peoples of the Allied nations and those of nations to be conquered (principles jointly recognized, as were those of the Atlantic Charter) were sacrificed to that idea. Today the question of whether or not that was wise must be left to historians, moralists, and jurists; the unifying political factor was there and was overtaken with victory. Now that the war is over, there is, it is true, a unifying principle: that of peace (and let there be no doubt that even Stalin and his helpers want peace). But while the idea of winning the war lent itself to the most simple expression, common to all three, and their Allies, that is, destruction of the enemy and of every obstacle to physical victory—the idea of peace, being constructive and not destructive, has no simplifying term.

The difficulty of the construction of peace corresponds to the extent of destruction wrought in the world by the war. This destruction has altered the balance of moral, political, economic, and social forces in every country in the

world. The difference between the Western and Eastern nations, which has proved to be so deep and has found expression in the disputes between the three great conquering powers, existed before today. It became acute even during the war, although it was never emphasized for fear of weakening the Allied front. It is indeed a profound difference in ideologies and interests, which involves the present and future of the world.

For these reasons, the meetings of the three can never achieve anything but a temporary compromise (rather, a bargain) between the three to the detriment of others, without thus advancing one step toward peace and international order. The explanation is simple. If the three powers act in accordance with the principles and procedures of the U.N., then why should they alone claim the right of decision, thus antagonizing the general feeling and encroaching on the rights of other nations? If, instead, the three act without regard for the rules or the general interest of the member nations, why keep the U.N. alive and declare at every step that the only salvation for the world lies in the new organization and in equality of all the member nations?

Already the three have such great powers in the U.N. and such great advantages over the rest of the world (and also such great responsibilities) that it is not really necessary to withdraw to the secret council halls of Potsdam or Moscow to evade the control of the other countries and of public opinion. In short, there must be either dictatorship of the three or the U.N. constitution; the two together are contradictory and invalidate each other.

As a means of clarifying the situation Walter Lippmann has proposed a kind of military conference between the Big Three.¹ He says, in effect: Let us measure the present military potential of Russia, the United States of America, and

¹ See "Soviet American Military Ideas" in the New York *Herald Tribune*, March 21, 1946.

Great Britain and see whether the play of physical forces is such as to give the upper hand to the East or the West. He argues that this preliminary study must lead to the conclusion that neither of the two blocs can be victorious, that on the contrary the two blocs would surely end in mutual destruction. To have any practical value Lippmann's proposal presupposes that Stalin is willing to discuss his plans and forces with the military leaders of America and Britain, and that he is disposed to conclude military pacts with those two powers agreeing to mutual control. Anyone who bears in mind the strictness with which Stalin refused to admit Allied military leaders during the war not only to the battlefields but to the rear areas and war factories, even in the darkest hours when the Nazis were near Moscow and were besieging Leningrad and Stalingrad, will realize what a flat and curt refusal would meet any suggestion of a military conference and understanding between the three which might lead to practical and serious conclusions.

If Stalin has military plans for Russian supremacy in the near or distant future he will never be willing to disclose them and discuss them with his future enemies. Stalin well knows that he cannot literally wage war today, but he also knows that the other two cannot either. His position is clear: To win all he can today—today and not tomorrow—by means of ability, shrewdness, and extortion, so that when tomorrow finally comes he will be in a more advantageous position than ever. It is an ambitious but a practical idea. The United States and Great Britain have no choice but to put themselves on the same level or to act in such a way as to shift the controversies to a different level, thus forcing Stalin to abandon his.

In his famous Fulton speech Churchill wanted to see how the land lay, with the aim of being able eventually to force Stalin to play on Anglo-American terms. He proposed that the United States and Great Britain unite for peace and

war, merging their fleets and armies and having common means and ends. Faced with such a situation, Russia would change her policy or would find that she had bitten off more than she could chew.

American opinion was partly cool, partly hostile to the idea of such a pact, which is contrary to the American tradition and to the psychology of the American people. Churchill realized that he had gone too far; and in his subsequent speeches he limited, weakened, and explained. Even if the prospect of an expanding Russia, hostile to Britain and America, did justify Churchill's attack, the remedy lacked political vision. Never would America accept a Washington-London diarchy; never would Great Britain agree to become the forty-ninth American star.

Americans and Britons know well that in the hour of peril race instinct, political interests, and the values of Western civilization which their nations embrace will lead them, as they did in 1917 and 1941, to unite their common lot in war. They also know well that during times of truce and peace the two countries are destined to sympathize with and help each other within certain limits, in actions more than in words, and often without wanting to. Therefore they are incapable of assuming ties which exceed their current sympathy. If Britons and Americans had not been so incapable of making their own decisions, neither the First nor the Second World War would have taken place.

That is why Churchill would not even be able to persuade the English, not even the Conservative Party of which he himself is the leader, to accept the policy which he proposed at Fulton. Then how can he expect to persuade the Americans? Stalin knows this; Stalin knows very well that all the declarations by Vandenberg, Byrnes, and Truman himself, about determining to be strong and make our weight felt at last and put an end to the policy of the Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow conferences, will not survive the day

they appear in the newspapers. There is no action behind the words. There cannot be, because action would offend the mentality and sentimentality of the Anglo-Americans, who are not willing to fight until the last minute: that is, when there is no other alternative, because the enemy has taken the initiative of war. This, which may be essentially a highly civilized feeling, may also be a congenital and insuperable weakness. That is why Churchill's proposal would be nothing but a formidable façade concealing a void.

Let us suppose for a moment that Churchill's plan could be realized. If the Anglo-American military agreement is to function within the framework of the United Nations organization, it would succeed only in creating suspicion and permanent resentment, without any advantage aside from that which the United States and Great Britain can have today through understanding their mutual interests as handled by the U.N. agencies. If on the contrary—and Churchill does not think about this—the Anglo-American military agreement were to function autonomously in countering whatever moves Russia might make, the U.N. would lose its reason for existence and would die the death of the League of Nations.

Even the isolationists deserve to be mentioned, since they are so persistent, even in the face of factual evidence, that they actually command real respect. They do not see that without the explicit desire of her people or a pre-established program by her leaders, the United States of America has become the leading country in the world, or at least has come to share responsibility for world order with two companions of whom one is weakened by war and the other has ideas, customs, traditions, and policies which are incompatible with those of America. Whether she wishes to or not, America must remain in that position. The isolationists do not understand this; they think that America can turn

back forty years or more and renounce the new role that events have forced upon her.

The effect of such a policy would be so harmful to America, both economically and politically, that it seems strange that it can even be considered, much less discussed and defended. If America withdrew into her shell, she would first have to renounce the economic expansion that is dictated by her very way of living, by the nature of her industries, and by the enterprising spirit of her people. That is impossible; America needs the rest of the world (and a world at peace) just as the rest of the world needs America.

Edgar Mowrer has often referred to the pressing alternative either to come to an understanding (with the Russians) or break relations. Unfortunately that alternative does not exist, for understanding is necessary and rupture is impossible. He referred to the problem of Germany, but that is one of many problems and can by no means be isolated. America can (if she wishes) leave Germany and withdraw her army from her occupation zone; but in doing that America would be renouncing her role not in Bavaria or Austria but in Europe. America would lower her prestige in the world by declaring herself unable to defend her interests, ideals, and policy at even one point. Unfortunately America is forced by her new stature to be always and everywhere present and to share responsibility for the new order of things. Just as isolation and rupture would constitute material refusal to shoulder her responsibilities in the field, so appeasement would constitute moral refusal to shoulder her responsibilities and follow her own line of action.

The American appeasers of today have forgotten their English cousins of the time of Hitler and Mussolini, from 1933 to 1939. They have forgotten the Chamberlains, the Runcimans, the MacDonalds, and also Samuel Hoare, Baldwin and Simon. It would be instructive and opportune to compare that time with the present, those complacent Eng-

lish with the ingenuous Americans of today. We would see how the prewar policy is being repeated today, just the same, without modification, indeed with the aggravating factor that there are no longer ramparts which formerly kept Russian (and Anglo-American) expansion in check: Germany in the West and Japan in the East.

The American appeasers think they are preventing war now when they make concessions which will aid their probable enemy in war tomorrow. Because of its inherent weakness the policy of appeasement can only be occasional and limited in time and space; it can by no means be a normal long-range policy. Whoever endorses it is either honestly naïve, or what is usually called a fellow-traveler, or actually dedicated to the triumph not only of an ideal which is not American, Communism, but of a foreign power, Russia.

The Paris Conference

It is the fate of Italy, not that of Trieste, or the Italian colonies or the Italian fleet, that is the subject of discussion among the foreign ministers of the four great powers in the Conference of Paris.

Meanwhile we have known for two years, although no one has wished to admit it, that the chief obstacle to a fair peace for Italy lies in the attitude of Russia. Not that Russia harbors any grudge against Italy, nor that there are conflicting interests between them. Russia is simply pursuing a policy opposed to that of the British, because it sees in Great Britain an obstacle to the consolidation of its present gains and future expansion. Italy occupies the center of the Mediterranean, at the southern boundary of Russia's "sphere of influence" in Europe, which includes Austria and Yugoslavia. Italy, then, must not be built up as a possible enemy to Russia (this point is rightly taken), or as a possible bulwark of British control of the Mediterranean

(this is reasonable enough); Moscow is even unwilling (it seems to me) that it should be an independent nation with a policy and a personality of its own (and this is inadmissible).

Italy's position is paradoxical in yet another way. Although it is to Great Britain's interest to keep Italy in its own sphere rather than to allow it to fall within the sphere of Russia, Britain does not wish Italy to be a bulwark of western Europe against the Orient, or even to be strong enough to follow an independent path. Absurd as this attitude may seem, it fits very well into the old British policy of *divide and rule*, *wait and see*, and other such pragmatic slogans which have served to gradually build up the British Empire and also to bring about two world wars, both of them avoidable.

Roosevelt did not live long enough to realize that Britain and Russia might come into conflict over the fate of Italy, or perhaps he failed to see the importance of such a possibility, because he did not take into account the fact that ever since the fifth century more than half the history of our present civilization has centered around the Italian peninsula, and all this time it has been a bone of contention or disputed sphere of influence in the geographical picture of Europe. Thus it was that Roosevelt had no objections to Russian participation in the signing of the Armistice with Italy, although Russia had sent neither men nor ships to take part in the North Africa and Sicilian campaigns, had no share in the negotiations leading up to the Armistice and was not likely to join in the drive to the north. Was this a reward to Stalin for his unwillingness to attend the meeting at Casablanca? Or an inducement for him to come to Teheran?

Roosevelt, in typically American fashion, was convinced that a generous gesture, a spontaneous offer, a one-sided concession, would appease Stalin and give him greater con-

fidence in the United States. Italy was one of the cards in his hand, a pawn in the "business deal" to be made between East and West. He did the same thing at Yalta, when he handed over half of Poland to Russia, with nothing in return; here the purpose was to settle Poland's western border and to avoid mass deportations. Later he offered half of Korea and the Kurile Islands to Russia and explicitly or implicitly allowed Russia to occupy Manchuria, all this in order to persuade Russia to enter the war against Japan, a step which Russia took only at the last minute and which was, whether we like it or not, no more and no less than a stab in the back. Little by little, then, Washington was left with no cards in hand except the loan to Russia. This is a card that Stalin will turn to his own advantage against the United States, when and where it suits him, since he has ways of influencing a certain sector of public opinion within the United States in his favor.

Secretary of State Byrnes, who has become aware of the errors of the past, has been striving to the best of his ability to stiffen American foreign policy, but everywhere he turns he meets closed doors and an iron curtain. So it was with the London and New York meetings of the U.N., so it has been with the peace treaties with Italy and the Balkan countries and the final settlement of Germany and even of Austria. Ever since he has been in office, Byrnes has been putting out feelers, making proposals and counterproposals, modifications, attenuations, and concessions. But, quite aside from the minor disagreements he may have with Bevin and Bidault, he still finds Molotov hard as nails. Whether Molotov speaks softly or sarcastically he is always the same; he seems to be a man under inviolable orders or possessed by a plan which he must carry out at any cost.

In regard to Italy everything has been suspended for a long time. The main question has been the fate of Trieste and other parts of Venezia Giulia. It was agreed in London

in September 1945 to draw an "ethnic line" as the Yugoslav-Italian border. In Paris Molotov insisted on dropping the ethnic line in favor of another one, drawn arbitrarily, which would deprive Italy of some section of territories which she has held ever since 1866.

Whenever it seems to Molotov that a single comma of the Yalta or Potsdam agreements is violated he raises a protest, hews to the line and appeals to the body of already existent "dogma." On the other hand, when he is the one to suggest a change in a previous decision, he minimizes its importance and even goes so far as to deny that he ever understood its original terms for what they were. If the Americans and the English had been warier during the earlier deliberations and then stuck stanchly to their guns, there might have been better results. But these good "traders" and "business men" had a notion that the best way to deal with Russia was to present a new solution every day, not realizing that this way led to inconsistencies and only weakened their position.

Byrnes, Bevin and Bidault, although not in agreement on the "ethnic line," have stood out for Italy's right to Trieste and the territory to the west and Molotov has been obliged to feel out first these three and then the Italian premier, De Gasperi, on a compromise whereby Italy would receive more favorable treatment in regard to colonies, reparations and the Dodecanese Islands as long as Trieste was turned over to Yugoslavia. Russia must indeed be deeply interested in the fate of Trieste if it is ready to give up its claims to Tripoli and the Dodecanese. It is quite plain that a Yugoslav Trieste means a Russian Trieste. Trieste is the key to the Adriatic and a back door to the Mediterranean. Russia knows it cannot get Tripoli and the Dodecanese because Britain simply will not give an inch in this direction. Hence it is concentrating its attention on securing Trieste through the intermediary of a third party and on strengthen-

ing Yugoslavia in such a way as to make it into a Russian outpost facing Greece and Italy.

Where is the Atlantic Charter, signed by both Russia and Yugoslavia, which pledged renouncement of territorial aggrandizement? Who remembers the Atlantic Charter, anyhow? Neither in London nor in Paris did any one of the Big Four look to the Charter or make a stand on principles. This is why we see in the West shifting sands and in the East the mysterious but unbending will of the Kremlin.

If we recall Stalin's attitude during the war toward Yugoslavia we are struck by the fact that he vetoed any entry of American and British troops into the country. Churchill, in order to placate Stalin, threw overboard Mihailovitch in exchange for a leader of Russia's choice, and the Anglo-American press went all out for the myth of Tito, only hero of Yugoslav resistance to the Germans, making him into an almost legendary figure. But at Teheran, when strategic decisions of importance had to be taken, Churchill sensibly proposed a campaign to sweep northward up the Adriatic and through Yugoslavia to Vienna. Stalin opposed this plan and Roosevelt supported him, under the pretext that the Allied staff was ready to make a drive through Italy but had no blueprints for a campaign in Yugoslavia. The writer cannot help recalling that, in November, 1942, when the Allies landed in Algeria, he backed the idea of capturing Sicily and Apulia, thence making landings in Albania and Yugoslavia and fighting through to Austria. An article to this effect was published in *People and Freedom* of London and *The New Leader* of New York in December of the same year, and the writer returned to the same theme in a book on Italy published in the United States, England and Italy. Walter Lippmann was the first American to come out bravely and hint in his *Herald Tribune* column of May 4, 1946, that this was one of Roosevelt's gravest errors, one

that changed the face of Europe and undermined its whole structure.

At this time Stalin's *veto* power was political rather than military and carried little weight, for the Russians were battling for Stalingrad and bearing the weight of a long north-to-south front. In any case, this refusal led Britain to mount an offensive in the Dodecanese Islands, with the hope of conquering them one by one. This offensive did not succeed and Italy was led to the sacrifice, in a yard-by-yard struggle of little use to the main attack on Germany and highly destructive to a country that had already made an unconditional surrender. The result of this fatal error was that Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary were all taken by the Russians and hence they passed politically and economically out of joint Allied control. They (along with Czechoslovakia) and the Balkans have fallen into the Russian sphere. Of course Russia did fight for them, although America and Britain contributed to the Russian victory with ships, arms and supplies, and in practical politics victorious armies and the territories they occupy are what count. The Anglo-American representatives and their army units have evacuated these countries or else they never went into them except, as in Germany and Austria, in a subordinate capacity where they have to take orders from the "comrades."

Italy was sacrificed, then, to little purpose, in a long-drawn-out and destructive war. It is paying, in part, for the errors of the Allies and is obliged to defend with all its might and main even Venezia Giulia, for which together with the Trentino, six hundred thousand Italians died in the First World War.

Of course Washington and London were not battling against Russia's ambitions for Trieste for the sake of fair Italy. Trieste has been the symbol of a wider struggle, the strategic focal point and meeting-place of Eastern and Western civilizations, just as were once upon a time Buda-

pest, Prague and Vienna. These points are now lost, but Trieste still hangs in the balance. The city could be captured by a surprise attack on the part of the Yugoslavs (with the Russians in the background) combined with a popular revolt in the towns of Istria where Croats and Slovenes have infiltrated. Whoever thought up the "Morgan Line" of demarcation hoped to make a gesture of appeasement toward Tito, and this same policy has characterized throughout the commanding officers and their advisers in the Anglo-American zone of occupation, who have winked at so many murders of Italians in Istria and thus further complicated local situations.

The germ of "appeasement" is deep-seated in Americans and British alike; it is a degeneration of "business methods," of "pragmatism" devoid of logic, of the evasiveness of those who cannot bring themselves to embracing well-planned and far-reaching courses of action or definitive commitments. Now they are floundering in one proposed solution after another, across the table from those who have put them with their backs to the wall. Luckily when the Americans and British are maneuvered into such a position they eventually fight back. In the end they will find a way of fighting back, reluctant as they may be.

Moreover the United States has learned from Paris that a new way of dealing with Russia is called for, that Russia has ideas, interests and ambitions that absolutely do not harmonize with those of America and the European countries still outside the orbit of the Kremlin. It is time to say: *So far, and no farther*, to abstain from shady bargaining, to make a stand on a safe and reasonable course of action, and to stick to it. The policy of concessions, all the way from Teheran, to Yalta, Potsdam, London and Moscow, must come to an end. Does this mean war? No, it is the only way to emerge from the crisis of fear which seems to have gripped the Big Four. Let us have the courage of our

convictions! Russia will not change from one day to the next; we must have patience over a number of years. Annoyances will crop up here and there; they always do. Didn't the annoyances of Iran, Korea, Manchuria, the four zones of occupation in Germany, and other European problems come out of *appeasement*? *Resistance*, too, will bring annoyances with it. We shall see which method is more successful after we have tried a new one.

Let there be no more talk of proposed treaties and collective declarations. Such talk has been idle ever since the Atlantic Charter was violated by the British and denied support by the Americans. Let us keep to the San Francisco Charter of the United Nations; it rests on solid ground in spite of its faults and in spite of the veto power, which must be weakened and limited by the pressure of public opinion and by the voice in world affairs given to small nations. The consultative vote of the majority of the United Nations should carry such weight as to neutralize the effects of a veto on the part of one of the Big Five. Let us return to principles and sincerely accept the democratic method. But first the United States and Great Britain must give up their *power politics* and see to the rebuilding of Europe.

A peace treaty with Italy is one of the first things to attend to: the Big Three promised it on their honor when they made Italy a cobelligerent in October of 1943 and since then any number of statements have testified to its necessity, the last of these being the Potsdam Declaration. If three discussions of this subject cannot bring agreement with Russia then it would be wise to keep American and British troops in Venezia Giulia, the Italian colonies and the Dodecanese Islands and to draw up a treaty exclusive for the moment of these problems while protecting Italy from any possible encroachment. If Russia signs such a treaty, well and good; if Russia doesn't sign . . . never mind, let us have patience.

Some concrete accomplishment is necessary since the veto power has been turned a weapon of obstruction which is holding back the rebuilding of Europe and leaving the whole Continent unstable and subject to agitation, uprisings and civil war. There is danger in postponing peace treaties until the threshold of the winter of 1947.

Conclusion

THE READER who has followed me through the chapters of this book will find it hard to guess which one of the various and complicated trends will take the lead. Will it be Nationalism? Laborism? Imperialism? Internationalism? All these "isms" and many more, including totalitarianism which is the youngest of them all, in conflict with the first born, democracy (or democraticism as we may call it to conserve similar terminology and ideals), have their own leaders, their own followers, their own spheres of influence. They fight one another, wipe out one another, cooperate and return to fight again unremittingly, as if each were alone entitled to the complete adherence of man.

To our simple, particularistic and practical mentality, the coexistence of these and other "isms" is rather embarrassing and illogical: we are induced by our own instinct to make a choice, to give preference to one, eliminating the others. There are those too who, having made the choice, see only the party which they follow (the suffix "ism" indicates an ideal as much as a degeneration) and to this they attribute all virtues and thus it becomes the touchstone for the healing of all evils. They fail to perceive the *raison d'être* of the other "isms," and the benefit which the constant and progressive conflict of ideals and collective interests brings to man, tending to eliminate the evils of the present and to effectuate improvement for the future.

True, nationalism and internationalism have already coexisted for a long time and some steps have been taken for the transition from the former to the latter with the view of creating the social structure of tomorrow. Reducing these

two facts to terms of sociological conflict, we have to classify nationalism as an actual historical conditioning factor, and internationalism as an ideal to be realized in the future. These two positions can be changed when, in a given place and owing to given circumstances, nationalism is still felt as an ideal to be developed (for example, the unification of Eire or the freedom and reunification of Germany), and internationalism, that particular sort of internationalism, is felt as something to be overcome because it is in opposition to the conception of a higher and more effective internationalism (the U.N. with the veto power as compared with an international super-State).

However, one must not be deceived by the inversion of the sociological terms; fundamentally, there are two moments in the human mind and activity, that of rejecting the present as insufficient, erroneous and dangerous, and that of idealizing a better future; but there may be, also, that of defending the present because it is considered safer as compared to the future which is believed to be dangerous. Thus two currents are formed: the ideal or mystic, and the conservative or realistic, both of which are necessary in order that humanity may advance and reach its objectives, just as in a vehicle the starter and the brake are equally necessary.

Nevertheless, these tendencies are not completely subjective; on the contrary, they are conditioned by existing realities which press upon human nature and release its intellectual and physical energies. There is today an urge to defend the national interests which represent the patrimony of language, culture, history, economy and political power such as each nation has secured up to the present time. But there is also an urge to avoid the evils and dangers with which the nationalistic and imperialistic system is fraught (the First and Second World Wars were the most tragic results of it), so that man is obliged, whether he wishes or not, to think in international terms. Economy pushes

ahead beyond national limits toward international and world-wide interests and trade. When we see the enforced barriers set up by Russia against international communications, we realize that today they are obsolete and against nature, for the very reason that the world is bound to surpass particular and national limits. And when we see that many Americans still persist in holding the conception of high tariffs and anti-immigration protection, we realize that we have still a long way to go toward internationalism. It is not easy to overcome the nationalistic mentality.

But while man lingers in the positions of the past and advances unwillingly toward the positions of the future, nature co-operates with man, either by presenting insurmountable obstacles which arouse man's inventive faculties or by helping solutions by unforeseen events. Today it is the discovery of atomic energy that pushes man toward unknown zones of a new internationalism. Those who are in possession of the secret of atomic energy which has been used as a means of destruction, as well as those who possess other terrible secrets regarding methods of destroying the world, are convinced that the secret will not long endure and that the day is not far distant when other countries and governments will be able to devise and produce similar or more powerful instruments of destruction. It is absolutely imperative to prevent the use for destructive purposes of all natural energies, to control their production and to permit their use for scientific and industrial works only. This constitutes a greater danger for mankind but also a more arduous task—a new collective duty in the face of a greater collective danger. Man is warned again to consider his real nature as minister of a superior power which is above him and which fixes his rights and his duties.

The internationalization of the atomic bomb will bring with it the transformation of national into international rights. The raw materials whereby such bombs are made

must be transferred, through indemnities, from private and national ownership to international ownership. There will be countries which will accept the new international law and others which will oppose it, thus creating another conflict between nationalism and internationalism. It is clear that to prevent this an authority, a law, and an executive power endowed with an adequate force are necessary. Here we are at the crossroads between voluntary internationalism (the one of the former League of Nations and of today's U.N.) and "coactive" internationalism, that which one foresees must be brought into existence in order to control atomic energy.

Nobody can forecast whether this "coactive" internationalism (which is usually designated by an inexact term such as super-State) will be materialized through peaceful or violent means. The transformation of feudal Europe into absolute kingdoms and from these into national States was a long process of centuries which ripened through conflicts and long wars.

Today, after having passed through two seas of blood with the two world wars, we see that the time is ripe for a new and complete international and there is no need for a third war. For more than a century man has been advancing toward an international consciousness, from the day when he crossed the ocean in a steamboat, when the continents were linked by telegraph, when on the ground distances were shortened by the automobile, and in the air he could travel around the world in a few days.

It is strange that in this century of international maturation, nationalisms have become accentuated and more dangerous and have passed through periods of hysteria like a strong man who, feeling that his end is near, tries to impose his personality by exciting his energies until he succumbs. The invention of the atomic bomb forces man to seek an international solution of the security problem, for the nation

no longer has boundaries, or economy, no longer has protections, and man himself has no longer any personal refuge from the world wherein he lives.

Today one country only may say "no" to the international organization, and it is Russia: this is the post-war revelation which is disturbing the entire world. When experts, politicians, and military men have devised a way to protect the world from the atomic bomb—and there is no other than to submit all countries to a sole law of international "coactive" discipline—then Russia alone can shut herself within her own boundaries and refuse the internationalization of the mines, the factories and the industries which contribute to the production of atomic energy. Only then will the problem arise of how to oblige Russia to obey the international law and submit herself to the security discipline which mankind demands to avoid its destruction.

Those who believe that a war between America and Russia is inevitable, with all other nations standing on one or the other side, in my opinion are prophets of catastrophe. Many times have I said in these pages that nowadays a Third World War is neither probable nor possible to foresee. Unfortunately, we must admit that the misunderstandings among the Big Three poison the atmosphere of the world and give rise to talk of imminent war.

Today we have chaos in Europe because England and America have not succeeded in outlining a constructive plan in which Russia can be invited to co-operate. But the problems of Germany, of the Italo-Yugoslav boundaries, of Danubian navigation, of the Italian colonies, of the Dardanelles—none of them is a reason for war, just as the Iran, Manchuria and Korea problems are not. The core of the problem is the control of atomic energy by an international authority, effectual and freely constituted. This control is impossible as long as there is the veto right allowed by the San Francisco Charter, as long as the U.N. is dominated by

the antidemocratic and dictatorial Pentarchy, as long as there exist the isolationisms, whether Russian or American, supported by their economic and military nationalisms.

Will world public opinion be able to provide an exit from the blind alley in which the international finds itself? Will new wars take place within ten or twenty years? Since political wisdom consists in correcting present evils and forestalling them through a range of years which—according to knowledge gained from the past—cannot exceed ten years, let us content ourselves with stating that the duty of today and the anticipation of tomorrow compel us to go toward the international trying to put within it nations and empires, such as they exist today, subordinating them to a superior law, that is, the law of world security.

Such a palingenesis will not be possible unless the moral law of justice and liberty is accepted and proclaimed as the true law of the world, to animate the material and practical law such as the security law will be. Are the responsible men of the national governments, now associates in the U.N., capable of facing this problem in its technico-political import and its moral significance? We hope so for the good of humanity, but public opinion must uphold the efforts made in the right direction and criticize those which are on the wrong road so that both may, in due time, be appraised and re-evaluated. A new collective consciousness must be forged to overcome nationalistic prejudices and particularistic interests, accepting the limitations imposed by the international in order to enjoy its benefits, in the conviction that within the new structure individual nations will find a right place, organically useful, just as today within the national framework, the cities, the provinces and the localities, which in the now-forgotten past were causes of turbulence and war, have their place.